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 I 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates to what extent financial constraint and financial disparity 
influence bidder merger performance, how analyst recommendation consensus relates 
to bidder announcement return, and whether divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry affect M&A abnormal returns.  
 
First, this thesis examines the impact of financial constraint and the financial constraint 
disparity between bidder and target on bidder abnormal return. I find that a constrained 
acquirer outperforms an unconstrained bidder in both the long and short run; target 
financial constraint is significantly negatively related to bidder announcement return. 
Acquiring a financially constrained target tends to positively influence an acquirer’s 
abnormal returns in the long run. In addition, disparity between acquirer target financial 
constraints (ATDKZ) is negatively related to bid premium. 
 
Second, this paper investigates whether analyst recommendations affect merger and 
acquisition performance: whether recommendation consensus has the predicting power 
on acquisition performance, and if so, which type of recommendation consensus is 
more accurate than the others. The results suggest that recommendation consensus is 
positively related to acquirers’ announcement return; acquirers with high 
recommendation consensus before announcement day outperform acquirers with low 
recommendation consensus in the short run; analysts can successfully predict the 
incoming M&A deals and adjust their recommendation accordingly; and the 
recommendation consensus estimated 90 days preceding deal announcement has the 
strongest predicting power. It suggests that analysts do have the superior skill.  
 
Finally, this study estimates how the combination of analyst divergence opinion and 
information asymmetry influences bidder abnormal return by controlling bidder 
pre-merger performance. A low divergence opinion bidder outperforms a high 
divergence opinion bidder in both the long and short run. This effect is much stronger in 
 II 
the sample of poorly performed bidders than well-performed bidders. For bidders with 
poor pre-merger performance, analyst divergence opinion has negative impact on 
announcement return. For bidders with good pre-merger performance, a positive 
relation has been found between information asymmetry and announcement return. 
These empirical results strongly support that bidder pre-merger performance is an 
important conditioning variable that we should take into consideration in examining the 
impact of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder merger and 
acquisition performance.  
 
Overall, this thesis provides new empirical evidence on how bidder M&A performance 
is related to financial constraint, financial constraint disparity, recommendation 
consensus, divergence opinion and information asymmetry. The results suggest that 
constrained bidders outperform unconstrained bidders, financial analyst do have 
superior skills, and pre-merger performance is an important controlling variable when 
we study divergence opinion and information asymmetry in the context of M&A 
abnormal return.  
 V 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... I 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... V 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................. VII 
Declaration .................................................................................................................. IX 
Statement of Copyright ................................................................................................. X 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... XI 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2: Financial Constraint and M&A Returns ....................................................... 8 
2.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8 
2.2. Literature Review.............................................................................................. 17 
2.3. Hypothesis Construction ................................................................................... 32 
2.4. Data and Methodology ...................................................................................... 35 
2.4.1 Sample Selection ......................................................................................... 35 
2.4.2 Methodology ............................................................................................... 36 
2.4.2.1 Univariate Test ..................................................................................... 36 
2.4.2.2 Multivariable Test ................................................................................ 38 
2.4.2.3 Measures of financial constraint .......................................................... 43 
2.4.2.4 Measure of short-term performance..................................................... 44 
2.4.2.5 Measure of long-term performance ..................................................... 45 
2.5 Results and Discussion ...................................................................................... 47 
2.5.1 Summary Statistics...................................................................................... 47 
2.5.2 Regression Results ...................................................................................... 53 
2.5.6 Robustness Test ........................................................................................... 70 
2.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 71 
Appendix .................................................................................................................. 76 
Chapter 3: Recommendation Consensus and M&A Returns ....................................... 96 
3.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 96 
3.2. Literature Review............................................................................................ 103 
3.3. Hypothesis Construction ................................................................................. 120 
3.4. Data and Methodology .................................................................................... 122 
3.4.1 Sample Selection ....................................................................................... 122 
3.4.2 Methodology ............................................................................................. 125 
3.4.2.1 Univariate Test ................................................................................... 125 
3.4.2.2 Multivariable test ............................................................................... 126 
3.5. Results and Discussion ................................................................................... 131 
3.5.1 Summary Statistics and Univariate Test ................................................... 131 
3.5.2 Multivariate Test ....................................................................................... 134 
3.5.3 Robustness Test ......................................................................................... 142 
 VI 
3.6. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 143 
Appendix ................................................................................................................ 146 
Chapter 4: Divergence Opinion, Information Asymmetry and M&A Returns .......... 167 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 167 
4.2 Literature review .............................................................................................. 175 
4.3 Hypothesis Construction .................................................................................. 187 
4.4.Data and Methodology ..................................................................................... 191 
4.4.1 Sample Selection ....................................................................................... 191 
4.4.2 Methodology ............................................................................................. 193 
4.4.2.1 Univariate Test ................................................................................... 193 
4.4.2.2 Multivariable Test .............................................................................. 197 
4.4.2.3 Measuring Short-term Performance ................................................... 201 
2.4.2.5 Measure of long-term performance ................................................... 202 
4.4.2.4. Measure Divergence Opinion and Information Asymmetry ............. 203 
4. 5 Results and Discussion ................................................................................... 205 
4.5.1 Summary statistics and Univariate Test .................................................... 205 
4.5.2 Multivariate Test ....................................................................................... 212 
4.5.3 Robustness Test ......................................................................................... 232 
4.6. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 234 
Appendix ................................................................................................................ 236 
Chapter 5: Conclusion................................................................................................ 257 
5.1 Summary .......................................................................................................... 257 
5.2 Implications...................................................................................................... 260 
5.3 Limitations and future research ....................................................................... 261 
Reference ....................................................................................................................... 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VII 
List of Tables 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics for acquirer and targets firms characteristics ................ 78 
Table 2.3 Summary statistics for acquirer and targets deal characteristics and market 
environment. ................................................................................................................ 80 
Table 2.4 OLS regression results impact of acquirer financial constraints on acquirer 
short run abnormal returns ........................................................................................... 82 
Table 2.5 OLS regression results impact of target financial constraints on bidders 
short run abnormal returns. .......................................................................................... 84 
Table 2.6 OLS regression results impact of financial constraints disparity on bidders 
short run abnormal returns. .......................................................................................... 86 
Table 2.7 OLS regression results impact of acquirer financial constraints on acquirer 
long run abnormal returns ............................................................................................ 88 
Table 2.8 OLS regression results impact of target financial constraints on bidders long 
run abnormal returns. ................................................................................................... 90 
Table 2.9 OLS regression results impact of financial constraints disparity on bidders 
long run abnormal returns. ........................................................................................... 92 
Table 2.10 OLS regression results for the impact of financial constraints on premium.
...................................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics-- Univariate Test—recommendation consensus oriented
.................................................................................................................................... 146 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics and Univariate Test —Acquirer short-term abnormal 
return oriented ............................................................................................................ 148 
Table 3.3 OLS regression of acquirer’s short-term performance to Recommendation 
Consensus 365 ........................................................................................................... 151 
Table 3.4 OLS regression of acquirer’s short-term performance to Recommendation 
Consensus 90 ............................................................................................................. 153 
Table 3.6 How recommendation consensus 365 response to acquirer’s CAR after the 
deal announcement..................................................................................................... 157 
Table 3.7 How recommendation consensus 90 response to acquirer’s CAR after the 
deal announcement..................................................................................................... 159 
Table 3.8 The impact of Reg-FD on recommendation consensus 365 and acquirer’s 
CAR. .......................................................................................................................... 161 
Table 3.9 The impact of Reg-FD on recommendation consensus 90 and acquirer’s 
CAR ........................................................................................................................... 163 
Table 3.10 IV regression of acquirer’s short-term performance to Recommendation 
Consensus 365 ........................................................................................................... 165 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Bidder Abnormal Return ........................................ 236 
Table 4.2 OLS Regression of analyst divergence opinion and acquirer’s short-term 
abnormal return .......................................................................................................... 238 
Table 4.3 OLS Regression of idiosyncratic volatility and acquirer’s short-term 
abnormal return .......................................................................................................... 240 
Table 4.4 OLS regression of the combined effect of Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) 
and Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return ........ 242 
 VIII 
Table 4.5 The impact of divergence opinion (Divo) on bidders with negative pre 
merger performance ................................................................................................... 244 
Table 4.6 The impact of the combined effect on bidder with negative pre merger 
performance ............................................................................................................... 246 
Table 4.7 The Impact of idiosyncratic volatility on bidders with positive pre merger 
performance ............................................................................................................... 248 
Table 4.8 The impact of combined effect on acquirer with positive pre merger 
performance ............................................................................................................... 250 
Table 4.9 The combined effect of Analyst Dispersion (Divo) and Idiosyncratic 
Volatility (Sigma) on acquirer’s long-term abnormal return ..................................... 252 
Table 4.10 IV Regression of analyst divergence opinion and acquirer’s short-term 
abnormal return .......................................................................................................... 254 
Diagram 4.10 Divergence opinion and pre merger performance ............................... 256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IX 
 
                 Declaration 
 
No part of this thesis has been submitted elsewhere for any other degree or qualification 
in this or any other university. It is all my own work unless referenced to the contrary in 
the text.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 X 
            
 
            Statement of Copyright 
   
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.  
No quotation from it should be without the author’s prior written consent and 
information derived from it should be acknowledged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XI 
             Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
A PhD is a lonely journey, but I was fortunate to receive lots of love, care and guidance 
from family and friends. First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my 
principal supervisor, Dr Michael Guo, for his inspiration, guidance, and encouragement 
and support, not only in the academic research but also in many aspects of life. Thanks 
to Dr Li Ding for her comments and advice. I sincerely thank my parents: without their 
love and support, it would have been impossible for me to accomplish this 
life-changing task. Thanks to my beloved wife HongYan Cai for her tolerance and 
support throughout my PhD period. More importantly, I thank her for giving me a 
daughter and a son in the past three years. They keep me busy but fill my heart with joy. 
I also would like to thank my best friend, Xiaofei Xing, for our brotherhood and the 
long hours in the study room. Our friendship is the one of most precious gifts I have had 
in Durham. Thanks to all the people who supported me in my PhD journey. 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
To my beloved family 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are the fundamental activity in the market for 
corporate control. At the micro level, firms benefit from M&A in many ways. 
Acquirers can achieve rapid expansion or transfer their overvalued stock into a solid 
asset. For targets, it is one of the most efficient ways to cash out. At the macro level, 
M&A efficiently relocates limited resources within the economy. Jensen (1988) 
discusses many controversial issues related to the corporate control market in the 1980s. 
He points out that the corporate control market creates social and economic benefits 
because a highly active corporate control market indicates high efficiency of resource 
relocation and high market volatility. According to Thomson One Banker, the 
worldwide transaction value of M&A activity in 2011 reached $2,400.67 billion, and 
the number of completed deals worldwide increased from 18,712 in 2009 to 31,380 in 
2011. This figure suggests that the corporate control markets have been highly active 
since the financial crisis.  
 
Due to the popularity and importance of the corporate control market, M&A has 
attracted much academic attention. Initially, this thesis examines how financial 
constraint influence bidder acquisition performance. The effect of financial constraint 
on merger and acquisition performance has been extensively studied in previous 
literature. The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) suggest that bidders with 
excess cash reserves tend to suffer from server agency cost – the conflict interest 
between managers and shareholders toward free cash flow distribution will force 
managers to make value-destroying acquisitions. The ‘hubris hypotheses’ (Roll, 1986) 
provides alternative views about aggregated merger gains. M&A are value destroying 
because CEOs’ overconfidence and the takeover mechanism. Overconfident CEOs 
overvalue a target and the potential synergies to be derived from that takeover. They 
therefore tend to overpay for the target and consequently suffer from the “winner’s 
curse” after the deal is completed. Malmendier and Tate (2005) find a strong and 
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positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and free cash flow. As a results, the 
majority of studies in this area conclude that financially constraint bidder outperform 
financially unconstraint bidder in the context of merger and acquisition performance 
(Jensen, 1988, Martin and McConnell, 1991, Smith and Kim, 1994, Harford, 1999, 
Lamont et al., 2001, Baker et al., 2002, Malmendier and Tate, 2005, Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008). 
 
Although there are many papers in the literature that analyse the relation between 
bidder financial conditions and deal outcomes, there is lack of research on to what 
extent target financial conditions can influence the outcome of M&A. It is a fact that a 
financially unconstrained target has more options in anti-merger activity than a 
financially constrained target. Acquiring targets with different financial constraints will 
generate different outcomes. The relationship between target financial constraints and 
merger outcome needs to be studied further.  
 
Furthermore, there is a lack of research on how the financial constraint disparity 
between bidder and target influence M&A abnormal returns. Lang et al. (1989) and 
Servaes (1991) studied the relationship between Tobin’s Q and takeover returns. They 
employ Tobin’s Q as a proxy for management performance and argue that takeovers by 
well-managed (high Q) bidders for poorly managed (low Q) targets generate the largest 
announcement returns to bidders. They raise an interesting question: will a financially 
constrained bidder acquiring a financially unconstrained target receive a higher 
abnormal return than those acquiring a financially constrained target? How will the 
magnitude of the financial constraint disparity change bidders’ abnormal returns in both 
the long and short run?  
 
To answer these questions, Chapter 2 studies a sample of 1,622 US merger and 
acquisition deals announced over the period 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2009. In 
Chapter 2, financial constraint is measured by investment–cash flow sensitivities 
(Fazzari et al., 1987), the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) and WW 
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index(Whited and Wu, 2006). As results, Chapter 2 finds that a constrained acquirer 
outperforms an unconstrained bidder in both the long and short run; target financial 
constraint is significantly negatively related to bidder announcement return. Acquiring 
a financially constrained target tends to positively influence an acquirer’s abnormal 
returns in the long run. In addition, Disparity between acquirer target financial 
constraints (ATDKZ) is negatively related to bid premium. 
 
Chapter 3 examine how analysts’ coverage will influence the outcome of M&A. 
Security analyst can influence market sentiment by issuing earning forecast and 
recommendations. Reputation concern hypothesis (Fama, 1980, Lazear and Rosen, 
1979, Holmström, 1999) state that Security analyst reputation is a long career concern. 
This is because; Analyst’s compensation rely on how many profitable 
recommendation they made for their clients (Trueman, 1994), Security analyst’s 
reputation is based upon the forecast accuracy and length of forecasting record(Chen 
et al., 2002). Therefore, the investor gives extra credit to a security analyst with high 
reputation. Merger and acquisition (M&A) significantly changes bidder and target’s 
stock performance. It can generate a huge amount of information in short period of 
time. To precisely process this information and provide accurate recommendations, 
analyst has to have superior information processing ability. On the other hand, Bank 
affiliation theory suggests that analysts tend to give optimistic recommendation to 
acquirers. Conflicts between broker and investor do exist. Analysts tend to give 
favorable recommendations to affiliate brokerage houses. It can be argued that career 
concerns will discipline such behavior. The empirical evidence regard to the 
reliability of analyst recommendation is inconclusive (Stickel, 1995, Womack, 1996, 
Barber et al., 2001, Barber et al., 2007, Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007, Hilary 
and Hsu, 2013, Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2014).  
  
Therefore, Chapter 3 examines whether analyst recommendations influence merger 
and acquisition performance and if analysts can successfully predict merger and 
acquisition performance and provide accurate recommendations. Furthermore, to 
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resolve the issue, Chapter 3 studies a sample of 8889 US Merger and Acquisition 
deals from 1993 to 2010, and finds that recommendation consensus and the changes 
in recommendation consensus have positive influence on acquirers’ short-term 
performance; acquirers with high recommendation consensus before announcement 
day outperform acquirers with low recommendation consensus in the short run; 
analysts can successfully predict the incoming M&A deals and adjust their 
recommendation accordingly; trading with recommendation consensus is profitable. 
Moreover, acquirer short-term M&A performance directly links to adjustment of 
recommendation after announcement day. The effect of recommendation on 
acquirer’s M&A short-term performance remains unchanged after the implementation 
of regulation fair disclosure. The results in Chapter 3 support the reputation concern 
theory.  
Chapter 4 examines how analyst divergence opinion and information asymmetry 
influence bidder merger and acquisition performance. Divergence opinion theory 
(Miller, 1977) and information asymmetry theory (Travlos, 1987, Myers and Majluf, 
1984) are vitally important when we study the influence of analyst on bidder merger 
and acquisition performance. Miller (1977)’s divergence of opinion theory assumes 
that investors have their own identical stock evaluation and the short selling is limited. 
If the divergence opinion is high, the most optimistic investor decides the stock price. 
In the scenario of merger and acquisition, a high pre-deal divergence opinion 
indicates overvalued stock. Therefore, a high divergence opinion will lead to negative 
bidders announcement return. On the other hand, asymmetry information theory 
implies that there is asymmetry of information between management and investors. 
Deal announcement will disclose more information to the market. The signalling 
effect will change bidders’ abnormal return accordingly. For example, stock payment 
leads to negative abnormal return because it signals that bidder is overvalued. 
However, bidder will benefit from pre-merger overvaluation if the bidder is capable of 
maintaining the level of asymmetry of information until completion of the deal. 
Therefore, high information asymmetry is positively related to bidders’ announcement 
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return. As discussed above, we have two competing theories and previous literature 
provides mixed results (Dierkens, 1991, Diether et al., 2002, Boehme et al., 2009, 
Chatterjee et al., 2012, Dionne et al., 2014, Golubov et al., 2015). 
 
Chapter 4 argues that the mixed results are caused by the absence of bidders’ 
pre-merger performance. According to the trading mechanism demonstrated in Miller 
(1977), low divergence opinion indicates that the firms stock price have already been 
fully realised by the optimistic investors available in the market, there is low trading 
activity and low investor recognition. No matter whether the stock price is high or low, 
there is lack of price movement. Poor past performance also shows the same problem. 
The lack of investor recognition shrinks the number of potential buyers. The declining 
stock price and fixed investment recognition demand firms to attract more attention. 
The investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 1987) asserts that an exogenous event 
increases stock recognition, the company will lower the cost of raising capital and 
increase the investment opportunity; merger and acquisition is one of such exogenous 
event. Moreover, Miller (1977)’s view is that increase in stock recognition attracts 
more investors from the buying side. So the value of stock increases but the expected 
return will decrease. Bushee and Miller (2012) support that increase in public exposure 
helps a company attract more institutional investors that boost stock valuation in 
incoming years. Therefore, the deals conducted by bidders with low divergence 
opinion tend to be value enhancing. On the other hand, bidders with low divergence 
opinion and good past performance are more likely to conduct value-destroying deals; 
this is because these bidders are like the “glamour” bidder in Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998). As discussed in Chapter 2, they are associated with high P/E ratio, high free 
cash flow, overconfident CEO and high agency cost. Therefore, Chapter 4 highlights 
that pre-merger performance is an important conditioning variable in examining the 
impact of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder merger gains.  
 
To resolve this issue, Chapter 4 splits bidders into well-performed bidder and poorly 
performed bidder. By studying a sample of 7842 US M&A deals conducted from 1990 
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to 2013, Chapter 4 finds that a low divergence opinion bidder outperforms a high 
divergence opinion bidder in both the long and short run. This effect is much stronger 
in the sample of poorly performed bidders than well-performed bidders. For bidders 
with poor pre-merger performance, analyst divergence opinion has negative impact on 
announcement return. For bidders with good pre-merger performance, a positive 
relation has been found between information asymmetry and announcement return. 
These empirical results strongly support that bidder pre-merger performance is an 
important conditioning variable that we should take into consideration in examining 
the impact of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder merger and 
acquisition performance.  
 
Overall, this thesis suggests that financially constrained bidders outperform 
financially unconstrained bidders, and the financial disparity between acquirer and 
target has a positive and significant impact on acquirer’s acquisition performance in 
the short run but not in the long run. Financial advisors do have superior skill, the 
recommendation consensus has positive impact on bidder announcement return. Pre 
merger performance is an important conditioning variable when we examine the 
impact of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder abnormal return. 
The impact of analyst divergence opinion is more pronounced in poorly performed 
bidders, the impact of information asymmetry is more pronounced in well-performed 
bidders.   
  
This thesis contributes to the M&A literatures in many aspects. First, this study 
provides new evidence on how financial constraint related to merger and acquisition 
performance. Different from previous literature, Chapter 2 sheds new light on the 
combined effects of acquirer and target financial constraints on acquirer short- and 
long-run abnormal returns. It provides empirical support to the hubris and cash flow 
hypotheses; financially constraint bidder outperform financially unconstraint bidder, 
financial disparity between acquirer and target has a positive and significant impact 
on acquirer’ acquisition performance in the short run but not in the long run since high 
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financial disparity leads to lower premium.   
 
Second, the existing literature does not explore how well the recommendation 
consensus can predict bidder announcement return. Due to the quality difference in 
analyst recommendation, it is necessary to identify which type of recommendation 
consensus can influence merger and acquisition performance. Chapter 3 suggest that 
recommendation consensus estimated within 90 days proceeding announcement day 
have the strongest predicting power. In addition, the predicting power of 
recommendation consensus has declined after the empowerment of Reg-FD.  
 
Third, Chapter 3 provide new evidence on analyst reputation concern theory, by study 
the changes of recommendation and the timing of those changes, Chapter 3 suggest 
that analyst do have superior information processing ability, they can adjust their 
recommendation on time and those changes have significant impact on bidder 
announcement return.  
 
Fourth, by controlling bidder pre-merger performance, Chapter 4 fully explores how 
divergence opinion and information asymmetry influence bidders merger performance. 
The empirical evidence suggest that bidder pre-merger performance is an important 
conditioning variable that we should put into consideration in examining the impact 
of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder merger and acquisition 
performance.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows, Chapter 2 examines how finance 
constraint and financial disparity influence bidder merger and acquisition 
performance, Chapter 3 investigates the predicting power of recommendation 
consensus on bidder announcement return. Chapter 4 explores how divergence 
opinion and information asymmetry influence bidders merger performance. Chapter 5 
draws the conclusion of the study, discussing the main findings, implication, 
limitation and future research. 
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Chapter 2: Financial Constraint and M&A Returns  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
M&A remains one of the most popular strategies for firms to achieve rapid growth. 
However, the question of whether bidders benefit from M&A remains inconclusive. 
We accept that M&A is value-enhancing. However, we argue that it can be 
value-destroying under certain conditions, especially for bidders with overconfident 
CEOs (Roll, 1986) and a high free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). In this Chapter, we 
examine what extent financial constraint and financial disparity influence bidder 
merger performance 
 
Roll (1986) provides alternative views about aggregated merger gains by introducing 
the ‘hubris hypotheses’. He believes that M&A are value destroying because CEOs’ 
overconfidence and the takeover mechanism. Overconfident CEOs overvalue a target 
and the potential synergies to be derived from that takeover. They therefore tend to 
overpay for the target and consequently suffer from the “winner’s curse” after the deal 
is completed.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find a strong and positive relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and free cash flow. Their result suggests that high free cash flow can 
significantly fuel CEO overconfidence. Smith and Kim (1994) suggest that a bidder 
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with high free cash flow tends to receive negative announcement abnormal returns, and 
that ‘slack poor’ bidders tend to achieve positive announcement abnormal returns. 
Moreover, Harford (1999) examines whether excess cash holdings stimulate top 
management to conduct takeover transactions, and whether these deals (made by 
cash-rich bidders) tend to be value-destroying. They find that cash-richness is 
significantly positively related to the probability of being a bidder, but is negatively 
related to bidder announcement returns. Additionally, post-merger, long-term 
abnormal operating performance for cash-rich bidders is significantly negative, but is 
not significantly different from zero for cash-poor bidders. In other words, cash-rich 
companies tend to conduct value-destroying takeovers. Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
find that bidders’ financial conditions may significantly alter the outcome of M&A. 
Consequently; deals conducted by overconfident CEOs with high free cash flow are 
most likely to be value destroying.  
 
Their findings support the ‘free cash flow hypothesis’ developed by Jensen (1986). He 
argues that bidders with excess cash reserves tend to suffer from server agency cost – 
the conflict interest between managers and shareholders toward free cash flow 
distribution will force managers to make value-destroying acquisitions. Thus, it is 
widely accepted that bidder’s financial constraints is one of the most important factors 
influencing the outcomes of M&A.  
  
Although there are many papers in the literature that analyse the relation between 
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bidder financial conditions and deal outcomes, there is lack of research on to what 
extent target financial conditions can influence the outcome of M&A. It is a fact that a 
financially unconstrained target has more options in anti-merger activity than a 
financially constrained target. Acquiring targets with different financial constraints 
will generate different outcomes. The relationship between target financial constraints 
and merger outcome needs to be studied further.  
 
In this study, we use the KZ index as a measurement of financial constraint. This is 
not only because the KZ index focuses more on firms’ accounting conditions but also 
because it is one of the most commonly used financial constraint measurements in the 
field of M&A. The KZ index is used to measure a firm’s financial condition in 
Lamont et al. (2001), Baker et al. (2002), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Malmendier 
and Tate (2008). In addition, instead of measuring the actual financial resources held 
by a firm, the KZ index is more concerned about the firm’s financial health. 
According to the calculation function, a financially constrained firm will have a 
positive KZ value. The larger this KZ value is, the more constrained the firm will be. 
We have estimated a KZ value for all of the bidders and targets in our sample. We 
define the financial disparity between bidder and target (ATDKZ) as the difference 
between bidder and target KZ value. A positive financial disparity indicates that those 
bidders are more financially constrained than the target.  
 
Finally, we carry out univariate and multivariate tests to analyse the relationship 
 11 
between bidders and target financial conditions and bidders’ acquisition performance. 
We then analyse the relationship between the bidder/target financial constraint 
disparity and bidders’ abnormal return in both the long and short run. Finally, we 
analyse to what extent bidders and targets’ financial constraints and financial constraint 
disparity can alter the bid premium in M&A. For the univariate test, we divided the full 
sample into three subsamples on the basis of financial constraint disparity, namely, a 
constrained bidder acquiring a rich target (CBRT), Neutral (N), and an unconstrained 
bidder acquiring a poor target (UCBPT). This unique design enables us to carefully 
examine the difference in firms and deal characteristics among the different deal groups. 
For the multivariable test, the dependent variable is bidder abnormal return in both the 
long and short run. We use a cumulative abnormal return 3, 5 and 11 days surrounding 
the announcement day to measure bidder announcement return. We use buy and hold 
abnormal return 12, 24 and 36 months after the month of announcement to measure 
bidder abnormal return in the long run. The premium is estimated by the difference 
between the deal value and the target stock price four weeks prior to the announcement 
day divided by the target stock price four weeks prior to the announcement day. Key 
explanatory variables are bidder’s financial constraint (AZK), target financial 
constraint (TKZ) and financial constraint disparity (ATDKZ).  
 
In addition, we use a group of control variables to control other essential firm and deal 
characteristics. Previous papers identified several factors could potentially influence 
takeover outcome. Morck et al. (1988)use stock price Runup as the measure of bidder 
 12 
pre-deal performance and find that bidder Runup is positively related to bidder 
announcement returns. In contrast, Rosen (2006) finds bidder Runup to be negatively 
related to both short-run and long-run abnormal returns for bidders. Maloney, Maloney 
et al. (1993) investigate the relationship between capital structure and M&A returns. 
They find that bidders with higher leverage gain higher announcement returns and 
argue that debt helps to alleviate agency problems and therefore improves the quality of 
M&A decision-making. Kohers and Kohers (2001) analyse takeovers of high-tech 
firms and find a positive relationship between ROE and long-run abnormal returns to 
bidders. 
 
In addition, Travlos (1987) highlights the signalling effect caused by usage of stock 
payment in M&As. He shows that bidders that completed a deal by paying in stock face 
substantially lower announcement returns than others, as stock payment signals 
overvaluation of the bidder’s share. Loughran and Vijh (1997) estimate how bidders’ 
post-acquisition return is affected by the means of payment, via analysing 947 
completed deals from 1970 to 1989. They found that mergers paid for in stock lead to a 
25% reduction in bidders’ abnormal returns within five years of the deal being 
completed, whereas a tender offer completed in cash leads to a 67% increase. 
Furthermore, Moeller et al. (2004) emphasise the size effect in M&As; they suggest 
that announcement returns for smaller bidders are 2% lower than those of bidders of 
average size. This finding holds constant after controlling for firm and deal 
characteristics.  
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Other deal-specific factors, including diversification and deal attitude, have also been 
found that could alter the deal outcome. Morck et al. (1990) suggest that bidders receive 
a lower abnormal return if they conduct diversifying deals. Villalonga (2004) applies 
data selected from the Business Information Tracking Series to study what actually 
happens to firms that diversify from their original establishment. He suggests that 
diversification premiums do exist and robust from different value and diversification 
measurement. However, it can be argued that Villalonga (2004) studies all 
diversification without specifying the diversification achieved through M&A. Servaes 
(1991)documented that hostile takeovers lead to an 8% reduction in bidders’ gains. 
However, Schwert (2000) points out that a hostile takeover is the strategy chosen by 
bidders or targets’ management in order to maximize transaction gains; however, there 
is no significant evidence regarding the relationship between hostility and bidders’ 
abnormal returns.  
 
Our results show that a constrained acquirer outperforms an unconstrained bidder in 
both the long and short run. For the short run, acquirers’ KZ value (AKZ) is 
significantly positively related to acquirer cumulative abnormal return five days 
surrounding the announcement day. A one unit increase in the value of AKZ leads to a 
2.08% increase in CAR[-2,2]. This suggests that more a constrained acquirer will 
achieve higher abnormal returns than a financially constrained bidder. For the long 
run, acquirer’s financial constraint (AKZ value) is positively related to acquirer 
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long-term abnormal return, estimated by BHAR[0,24] and BHAR[0,36]. A one unit 
increase in acquirers’ financial constraint will increase BHAR[0,24] by 10.4% and 
BHAR[0,36] by 15.31%. This is because deals conducted by constrained bidders tend 
to be value enhancing as targets are chosen more rationally than in deals involving 
unconstrained bidders. However, it can take time for bidders to realize the synergies 
created from M&A. The impact of bidders’ financial constraint therefore appears 
some 24 and 36 months after the month of announcement. This result implies that 
constrained firms do not suffer from overconfidence. Rather, they choose their target 
and implement their acquisition strategy more elaborately and effectively than 
financially unconstrained bidders. Our results support the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 
1986) and the cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986).  
 
We also find that target financial constraint is significantly negatively related to bidder 
announcement return three days surrounding the announcement day. A one unit 
increase in the TZK value will cause CAR[-1,1] to decrease by 1.18%. An increase in 
the TKZ value means that the target becomes more financially constrained. These 
results indicate that acquiring a financially unconstrained target has a positive 
influence on bidders’ abnormal returns in the short run. This is because acquiring a 
financially unconstrained target is a sign of cash inflow to the bidder. This positive 
signal raises the bidder’s stock returns in the short run. Our results also show that a 
financially constrained acquirer acquiring a financially unconstrained target tends to 
have a substantially higher market-to-book ratio (4.889) than its target (3.623). A 
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financially constrained acquirer acquiring a financially unconstrained target uses more 
stock in means of payment (37.638%) than the average of the full sample (29.593%). 
This indicates that financially constrained acquirers tend to be overvalued by the 
market; the purpose of acquiring a financially unconstrained target is to transfer 
overvalued stock into a solid asset. The relation between bidder abnormal return and 
financial constraint disparity further proves this implication. Our results show that the 
financial condition disparity between acquirer and target has a positive and significant 
impact on acquirer’ acquisition performance in the short run but not in the long run. A 
one unit increase in financial constraint disparity (ATDKZ) leads to 1.79% increase in 
CAR[-1,1] and 2.3% [-2,2].  
 
On the other hand, acquiring a financially constrained target tends to positively 
influence an acquirer’s abnormal returns in the long run. A one unit increase in TKZ 
will increase BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24] and BHAR[0,36] by 8.95%, 12.13% and 
14.52% respectively. This is because a financially constrained target has less 
bargaining power in a merger deal. The bidder chooses the target rationally as a 
financially constrained target does not provide any extra cash inflow. The results from 
the univariable test suggest that financially constrained targets are less leveraged and 
have a lower market-to-book ratio than the acquirers. Acquiring financially constrained 
bidders are buying solid asset. Our result suggests that these assets tend to be 
productive in the long run. 
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Finally, bidder financial constraint has an insignificant impact on bid premium though 
the sign of the coefficient indicates a negative relation. Target financial constraint is 
positively related to bid premium. A one unit increase in the target KZ value results in 
an 8.77% increase in bid premium. Disparity between acquirer target financial 
constraints (ATDKZ) is negatively related to bid premium. The results suggest that a 
financially constrained bidder pays a lower premium when acquiring a financially 
unconstrained target. A one unit increase in financial constraint disparity (ATDKZ) 
causes a 9.63% decrease in bid premium.  
 
This study contributes to the M&A literature in many respects. First of all, this study 
uses one of the most comprehensive samples, which covers the US M&A deals 
conducted from 1990 to 2009. Secondly, this study sheds new light on the combined 
effects of acquirer and target financial constraints on acquirer short- and long-run 
abnormal returns. It provides empirical support to the hubris and cash flow hypotheses. 
Finally, for the first time in the literature, the sample is sorted on the basis of differences 
in bidder and target financial condition. We define the financial constraint difference 
(ATDKZ) as bidders’ KZ value minus targets’ KZ value. The higher the KZ value, the 
more financially constrained the firm will be. The value of ATDKZ is positive when a 
financially constrained bidder is acquiring a financially unconstrained target. 
Financially constrained bidders acquiring financially constrained targets is categorised 
as CBRT. Financially constrained bidders acquiring financially unconstrained targets is 
categorised as UCBPT. Deals conducted by acquirers and targets with similar financial 
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conditions are categorised as Neutral. This unique design enables us to study where the 
disparity of acquirer and target financial conditions influences acquisition performance.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide a 
comprehensive literature review and construct the main hypothesis. Section 3 shows 
the data selection procedure, sample description and methodology. Section 4 includes 
the preliminary results and a robustness test. Furthermore, we outline the proposed 
thesis chapters and the time-line of the research and submission in section 5. Finally, 
we conclude this report in section 6. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
In this section, we systematically review previous papers in the literature related to 
merger gains, financial constraints and other essential factors that affect bidders’ 
returns. 
 
Previous studies suggest that merger gains are generated from different sources. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) discuss many controversial issues related to the corporate 
control market in the 1980s. He points out that the corporate control market creates 
social and economic benefits because takeovers encourage industrial restructuring and 
improve firm efficiency. Martin and McConnell (1991) study the disciplinary function 
of the corporate control market by analysing 253 tender offers from 1958 to 1984. 
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Their results suggest that the disciplinary function of a corporate takeover is a 
significant deterrent of non-value-maximizing behaviour conducted by top managers. 
On the basis of motivation, takeovers can be partitioned into synergy-maximizing 
takeovers and disciplinary takeovers. Disciplinary takeovers do not require the 
physical combination of a bidder and a target firm. Rather, to complete a disciplinary 
takeover, a bidder just needs to remove the top management of a target firm. Thus, 
Martin and McConnell (1991) define a disciplinary takeover as a takeover where the 
target top management is removed shortly after deal completion. They find that the 
pre-acquisition performances of a disciplinary takeover are significantly lower than 
those of a non-disciplinary takeover. Although there is no significant difference in the 
returns of disciplinary and non-disciplinary takeovers, 41.9% of target top 
management is removed within 12 months after deal completion, giving a turnover 
rate of target top management 32% above the annual average. The results indicate that 
the top managers of an underperforming target are more likely to be overthrown after 
deal completion. In this case, the threat of becoming a takeover target encourages top 
managers to improve their firms’ efficiency.  
 
On the other hand, Houston et al. (2001) agree that M&A create value but the source 
of synergies is cost-saving rather than improvements in efficiency. To identify the 
sources of synergies, they collect a sample of 64 major bank acquisitions with a 
minimum deal value of $400 million from 1985 to 1996. The sample is then 
regrouped by two managerial projections: cost-saving and revenue enhancing. 
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Synergies are defined as the positive stock returns received by a combined firm. 
Houston et al. (2001) document that the main projections of bank mergers in the 
1980s were market expansions, whereas bank mergers in the 1990s focused on 
cost-saving. The different managerial projections generate different merger and 
acquisition outcomes; the result shows that the abnormal return of deals in the 1990s 
is significantly positive and higher than the abnormal return of deals in the 1980s. The 
result also shows that an overlap transaction has a higher abnormal return than a 
market expansion transition. An overlap transaction is defined as a deal where the 
bidder and target branches overlap. The higher the magnitude of overlapping, the 
higher the bidder’s merger gains will be. This is because these overlapped branches 
give the bidder the opportunity of cost-saving. The announcement returns are 
significantly and positively related to managers’ estimated cost savings. Their results 
also suggest that the motivation of a major bank acquisition is to pursue a synergy 
created by takeovers rather than empire-building. They also point out that managers 
are over-optimistic in anticipation of merger gains; bidders only receive 22% of the 
estimated merger gains on average. They also found the actual cost of a merger to be 
24.3% higher on average than the managers had estimated.  
 
By studying a sample of 264 large mergers involving less regulated industrial firms 
from 1980 to 2004, Devos et al. (2009) simultaneously examine the relative 
importance of three major synergy sources to merger gains. These are the tax shield, 
market power and efficiency improvement. The synergies are estimated by the 
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difference between the present values of the Value Line forecasts of the cash flow of 
the participants before the takeover and those of combined firms after takeover. Total 
synergy is divided into operating synergies and financial synergies. Operating 
synergies are classified as increased operating profit and savings from investment 
reduction. The result shows that the total synergies are significantly positive with an 
average of 10.03%. Merger gains are generated from efficiency improvement rather 
than tax reduction and market power. The result also shows that financial synergies 
and operating synergies are significant but financial synergies are much smaller than 
operating synergies. The main sources of operating synergies are cutbacks in 
investment. Operating synergy, which accounts for 83.53% of the total synergy 
created, is mainly the result of saving in investment expenditure rather than any 
improvement in profitability. In addition, this paper also compared the synergy 
created from focused and diversifying mergers deals, as the sample includes acquirers 
in 73 industries and targets in 74 industries. The result shows that focused mergers 
conducted by value bidders can achieve larger synergies than in diversifying deals.  
 
On the other hand, Roll (1986) provides alternative views about aggregated merger 
gains by introducing their ‘hubris hypotheses’. Roll (1986) suggests that the 
aggregated gains created by mergers are less than or equal to zero as a result of CEO 
overconfidence and the takeover mechanism. The takeover process could be divided 
into three steps: acquirer identifying potential target; evaluating target independently 
with all information available; and executing the deal when the target value is above 
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the current market price. If there are multiple bidders, the winner of the bid is the one 
who pays the highest price. Therefore, the winner will face the ‘winner’s curse’. The 
price paid is too high and exceeds the true value of the target and the potential growth 
of the combined firms.  
 
Roll (1986) makes certain assumptions. These include the financial market having 
strong-form efficiency, whereby asset price is influenced by any information about the 
firm;  products and labour markets are efficient, i.e. any increase in output or 
reduction in cost cannot create gains; and firm management is operating at maximum 
efficiency. The hubris hypothesis explains the takeover phenomenon when there are 
no gains in merger and tender offer. This is because the Market has systematic bias in 
pricing. Overconfident CEOs also tend to overvalue the target and the potential 
synergies to be created from a takeover. They therefore tend to overpay for the target 
and suffer from the “winner’s curse” upon deal completion.  
 
Under the assumptions that the bid occurs randomly and others cannot foresee it, there 
is no other the information about bidding apart from the bidding firm seeking to 
combine with the target firm. The hubris hypothesis predicts stock price changes for 
all merger participants around a takeover. Firstly, there will be decreases in the value 
of combined firms. Secondly, the price of bidding firms will initially decrease on the 
bidding announcement; information of forfeiting or losing the bid will raise the price. 
If the bid is successful, the price will eventually decline. Thirdly, for targeting firms, 
 22 
the price will increase upon the announcement. The price will return to its original 
level when the bidding is withdrawn and there is no further bidding.  
 
Jensen (1986) introduces the free cash flow hypothesis to explain the reasons why 
firms with excess cash reserves tend to make value-decreasing takeovers. Free cash 
flow is the surplus of financial resources after all investment opportunities available 
are fully funded. Firms with high free cash flow suffer from more serious agency cost 
than others. This is because shareholders and managers have conflicts of interest on 
how best to distribute the free cash flow. Shareholders prefer the free cash flow to be 
distributed as dividends. On the other hand, managers want to retain as much of the 
free cash flow as possible as managers’ power and compensation are directly linked to 
the amount of financial resources they control. Managers of a firm with high free cash 
flow are therefore encouraged to spend the excess financial resources to grow the firm 
beyond the optimal size. As mentioned before, M&A is always one of the optimal 
choices to achieve rapid growth. However, managers of firms with high free cash flow 
conduct M&A to spend the cash rather than to maximise synergies. As a result, the top 
manager of firms with high free cash flow are more likely to conduct value-destroying 
investment. M&A conducted by managers in the oil industry in the 1980s is consistent 
with this free cash flow hypothesis. These firms received huge cash inflows as the 
price of crude oil increased tenfold from 1973 to the end of the decade. This excess 
financial capacity fuelled the merger and diversification program conducted by top 
manager of firms in the oil industry in 1980s. The outcome turned out to be 
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value-destroying, as suggested by the free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen (1986) also 
suggests that the disciplinary power of debt can substantially reduce the agency cost 
caused by free cash flow. Issuing debt enables shareholders to strictly monitor 
managers’ performance. Through debt creation, shareholders are authorized to bring 
the firm into bankruptcy once managers fail to deliver the profit they promised. The 
managers are also under pressure to repay that debt and any interest it bears on time. 
As a result, managers in firms with debt tend to be more efficient than others.  
 
By studying 177 tender offers conducted from 1980 to 1986, Smith and Kim (1994) 
provide empirical evidence to support the free-cash-flow hypothesis. Initially, they 
categorize bidders into high free cash flow and slack poor bidders by two accounting 
status: liquidity measured by operating income to total assets ratio (i/a), and growth 
measured by earnings per share to price ratio (e/p). Firms with high liquidity and low 
growth potential are considered as high free cash flow bidders. They are more likely 
to suffer from overinvestment problems. Firms with low liquidity and high growth 
potential are defined as slack poor bidders. They are more likely to suffer from 
underinvestment problems. By investigating the influence of free cash flow and 
financial slack on announcement abnormal returns, they find that high free cash flow 
bidders obtain significantly negative announcement abnormal returns (-1.61%), 
whereas slack poor bidders gain significantly positive announcement abnormal returns 
(1.69%). The result also suggests that acquiring a target with a high free cash flow 
leads to higher total returns than acquiring other firms. Slack poor bidders who 
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acquire targets with high free cash flow achieve the highest returns (16.88%) in all 
bidder-target pairs. High free cash flow bidders’ returns are positively related to debt 
increases, liquidity reductions and slack poor targets. Slack poor bidders’ returns are 
positively related to debt decreases, liquidity increases and high free cash flow targets. 
Smith and Kim’s (1994) study, however, has two main limitations. Firstly, their 
sample only covers tender offers. The result may change if other modes of takeover 
were taken into consideration. Secondly, it is insufficient to measure merger 
participants’ financial conditions with two accounting ratios. Firms’ financial 
condition can be substantially altered by market valuation, the industry in which they 
operate, and payment of dividends.  
 
In an inefficient market, it is beneficial for managers to maintain an amount of 
flexible internal finance. This is not only because the cost of external financing is high, 
but also because investment opportunities may be missed due to the delay while 
acquiring external financing. However, high cash reserves raise a series of problems 
in addition to their benefits, such as agency cost and overconfidence. Harford (1999) 
supports the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) by studying the effect of cash 
holding on the likelihood of conducting M&A. They initially use a baseline model to 
identify whether bidders are cash-rich, and then examine whether cash-rich top 
management are more likely to conduct takeover transactions, and whether these deals 
made by cash-rich bidders tend to be value-destroying. They find that cash-richness is 
significantly positively related to the probability of being a bidder; managers with 
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excess cash holdings are more likely to conduct diversifying deals. Thus cash-richness 
is found to have a significant but negative impact on bidder announcement returns. 
Additionally, post-merger long-term abnormal operating performance for cash-rich 
bidders is significantly negative, but that for cash-poor bidders is not significantly 
different from zero. In other words, cash-rich companies tend to conduct 
value-destroying takeovers.  
 
By analysing the investment decisions and personal characteristics of Forbes’ 500 
CEOs, Malmendier and Tate (2005) reveal to what extent corporate investment 
distortions result from managerial overconfidence. Overconfident CEOs are 
overoptimistic about their company’s future and their managerial skills; they 
persistently impose their personal influence on investment decision-making and risk 
assessment. More technically, Malmendier and Tate (2005) define overconfident 
CEOs as CEOs who continuously hold the stock after the value drops to 67% of 
original value, continuously hold the stock five years after option expiry date, and 
constantly pile up the firm’s stock. After analysing a sample including 477 large 
publicly traded US firms from 1980 to 1994, their findings strongly support the hubris 
hypothesis. Their evidence shows that there is a strong and positive relation between 
CEO overconfidence and free cash flow. High cash reserves significantly fuel CEO 
overconfidence. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate investment returns and 
avoid adopting external funds. As a result, overconfident managers tend to overinvest 
when they have abundant internal funds but underinvest when they require external 
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financing. Consequently, deals conducted by overconfident CEOs with high free cash 
flow are most likely to be value destroying. This finding is consistent with Smith and 
Kim (1994). To analyse to what extent CEO overconfidence influences M&A 
decisions, Malmendier and Tate (2008) Malmendier and Tate (2008)extend their 
original study by dividing the sample into quintiles and find that overconfident CEOs 
in the most unconstrained quintiles tend to conduct takeover transactions, thereby 
leading to negative market reactions around the announcement. Nevertheless, in the 
most constrained quintile, the relationship between CEO overconfidence and the 
probability of making an acquisition is insignificant.  
 
According to the literature mentioned above, it can be concluded that mergers do 
create value, except for bidders with overconfident CEOs and high free cash flow. 
Acquirers and targets’ financial condition are essential for acquisition performance. 
Jensen (1986) introduces the free cash flow hypothesis and suggests that financially 
unconstrained acquirers, indicated by their higher cash reserves, are more likely to 
conduct value-destroying deals. Lang et al. (1991)find that high free cash flow leads to 
negative announcement returns for bidders with a low Tobin’s Q ratio in the tender offer. 
Furthermore, Smith and Kim (1994) documented a negative relationship between high 
free cash flow and bidders’ abnormal announcement returns. Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) divided the sample into quintiles on the basis of financial constraints and find 
that high free cash flow fuels CEO overconfidence and leads to value-destroying deals. 
It is widely accepted that firms with a lack of financial resources cannot act as bidders 
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in the corporate control market. However, deals conducted by bidders with excessive 
financial resources tend be value-destroying. There is a lack of research on how the 
disparity of bidders’ and targets’ financial condition influences acquisition 
performance.  
 
To reveal the relationship between firms’ managerial performance and takeover returns, 
Lang et al. (1989) studied a sample of 87 tender offers conducted from 1968 to 1988. 
The firms’ managerial performance is measured by the Tobin’s Q ratio, which is 
defined as the firm’s market value over the replacement cost. A high Tobin’s Q ratio 
indicates good managerial performance. For the full sample, they find that the targets 
are poorly managed they have a Tobin’s Q ratio below one. Well-managed bidders 
(high Q bidders) can achieve positive gains from tender offers. These gains will be 
substantially higher if the target is poorly managed (low Q ratio) because low Q 
bidders have great improvement potential. On the other hand, a high Q target benefits 
less from a tender offer by a low Q bidder.  
 
Servaes (1991) expands and reinforces Lang et al. (1989)’s research by using a sample 
including 704 complete takeovers between 1972 and 1987. The results show that Lang 
et al. (1989) findings are robust when takeover and other control variables are taken 
into consideration. Servaes (1991) categorises the sample into different subsamples on 
the basis of deal attitude, means of payment and multiple bidders, estimates the 
abnormal return in each subsample, and uses industrial average Tobin’s Q ratios to 
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define good and poor managerial performance. A low Q indicates that the firm is poorly 
managed; a high Q indicates that the firm is well managed. The result shows that a low 
Q target acquired by low Q bidders gain a 32.7% abnormal return – 17% higher than 
that of a high Q target acquired by a low Q bidder. The bidder has a 6.36% increase in 
abnormal returns if its Q ratio is high. Bidders obtain an additional 4.44% increase if 
the target has a low Q ratio. This finding indicates that well-managed firms gain more 
when taking over a poorly managed target. In addition, for the control variables, using 
cash instead of stock in a takeover increases bidder abnormal returns by 11%. A 
hostile takeover decreases the abnormal return by 8%. 
 
In contrast, by studying a sample of 3,169 mergers and 348 tender offers announced 
and completed between January 1980 and December 1991, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
examine to what extent bidder pre-merger stock performance, means of payment and 
merger type can influence bidder abnormal return. They rank each bidder as ‘glamour’, 
‘neutral’ or ‘value’ bidder on the basis of their market-to-book ratio. The results show 
the post-merger long-run performance of glamour (high market-to-book) and value 
(low market-to-book) bidders and find that glamour bidders underperform in the long 
run. They explain the result as past good performance rendering managers 
overconfident, which in turn make the market to overestimate bidders’ capacities. 
Glamour bidders in mergers significantly underperform other glamour firms in the 36 
months following the acquisition, earning negative bias-adjusted abnormal returns of 
-17% on average in our unrestricted sample. Glamour bidders in tender offers earn 
 29 
statistically insignificant bias-adjusted abnormal returns of 4% in the three years after 
the acquisition. However, value acquirers outperform other firms with a similar size 
and book-to-market ratio by earning statistically significant positive bias-adjusted 
abnormal returns of 15.5% for tender offers and 7.64% for mergers. Glamour firms 
underperformed regardless of the payment method. Additionally, Dong et al. (2006) 
use market-to-book and market-to-residual income value as their measures of market 
valuation to examine both the Tobin’s Q and misvaluation hypotheses. They find that 
highly valued bidders generally gain lower announcement returns.  
 
There are many factors could potentially influence takeover outcome; these must 
therefore be controlled for in our research. Morck et al. (1990) use stock price runup as 
the measure of bidder pre-deal performance and find that bidder runup is positively 
related to bidder announcement returns. In contrast, Rosen (2006) finds that bidder 
runup is negatively related to both short-run and long-run abnormal returns for bidders. 
Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) investigate the relationship between capital 
structure and M&A returns. They find that bidders with higher leverage gain higher 
announcement returns and argue that debt helps to alleviate the agency problem and 
therefore improve the quality of M&A decision-making. Kohers & Kohers (2001) 
analyse takeovers of high-tech firms and find a positive relationship between ROE and 
long-run abnormal returns to bidders. In addition, Travlos (1987) highlights the 
signalling effect caused by the usage of stock as payment in M&As. He shows that 
bidders that completed their deal with stock payments faced substantially lower 
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announcement returns than others because stock payment signals overvaluation of the 
bidders' share. Loughran and Vijh (1997) estimate how bidders' post-acquisition return 
is affected by the means of payment, via analysing 947 completed deals from 1970 to 
1989. They found that mergers paid for in stock led to 25% reductions in bidders' 
abnormal returns within five years of the deal completion, whereas tender offers 
completed in cash lead to a 67% increase. Furthermore, Moeller et al. (2004) 
emphasises the size effect in M&As; they suggest that announcement returns for 
smaller bidders are 2% less than those of bidders of average size. This finding holds 
constant after controlling for firms and deals characteristics.  
 
Other deal-specific factors including diversification, and deal attitude have also been 
found that could alter deal outcome. Morck et al. (1990) suggested that bidders receive 
a lower abnormal return if they conduct diversifying deals. Villalonga (2004) applies 
data selected from the Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) to study what 
actually happens to firms that diversify away from their original business area. BITS 
define an establishment as ‘a single physical location where business is conducted or 
where services or industrial operations are performed’ However, it can be argued that 
Villalonga (2004) studied diversification without specifying diversification achieved 
through M&A. Servaes (1991) documented that hostile takeovers lead to an 8% 
reduction in bidders' gains. However, Schwert (2000) points out that hostile takeovers 
are used by a bidder or target's management to maximize transaction gains, and there is 
no significant evidence of a relationship between hostility and bidders' abnormal 
 31 
returns.  
 
Previous studies offer many approaches to estimate firms' financial constraints. In this 
section, we review investment–cash flow sensitivities (Fazzari et al., 1988), the KZ 
index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) and the WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006). Fazzari 
et al. (1988) estimate firms' financial constraints by categorizing firms based on their 
investment–cash flow sensitivities. A firm is considered as being financially 
constrained if it seeks external financial resource at a high cost of capital. Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) pointed out the limitations of using investment–cash flow sensitivity to 
measure financial constraint. Instead, they introduced the KZ index. The KZ index is an 
estimation function which weighs firms' cash reserve to capital ratio, free cash flow to 
capital ratio, Tobin's Q, leverage to capital ratio and dividends to capital ratio. By 
studying a sample of 49 low-dividend firms from 1970 to 1984, Kaplan and Zingales' 
(1997) results show that relatively unconstrained firms exhibit higher investment-cash 
flow sensitivity than others. Whited and Wu (2006) argue that the estimation of 
financial constraints should take external factors into consideration, such as firm size 
and sales growth at both the firm and industry level. In this study, we use the KZ index 
as a measurement of financial constraint. This is not only because the KZ index is more 
focused on firms' accounting conditions but also because it is one of the most 
commonly used financial constraint measurements in the field of M&A research. The 
KZ index is used as a financial condition measurement, following in Lamont, Polk and 
Sa´a-Requejo (2001), Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
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and Malmendier and Tate (2008). 
 
Many studies focus on the factors that influence bidders return. However, these do not 
analyse how the financial condition of the acquirer and target will affect their 
acquisition performance. In addition, previous studies analyse bidders' returns in the 
short and long run separately, and do not analyse to what extent the disparity of acquirer 
and target financial condition influences acquisition performance. 
 
2.3. Hypothesis Construction  
According to the literature reviewed above, firms with high free cash flow are more 
likely to conduct value-destroying takeovers. In contrast, financially constrained firms 
tend to make acquisition decisions elaborately, thereby achieving synergies. In this 
case, we construct the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Financially constrained bidders are more likely to obtain better short-term 
acquisition performance than unconstrained bidders. 
H1b: Financially constrained bidders are more likely to obtain better long-term 
acquisition performance than unconstrained bidders. 
 
As stated in the previous literature, acquiring financially constrained targets gives a 
negative signal to the market. This is because bidder needs extra investment to boost 
target performance. However, financially constrained targets tend to be undervalued 
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firms with high growth potential. It takes time to fully realise its true value. We 
therefore construct the following hypotheses:  
 
H2a: Acquiring financially constrained target has negative effect on bidders’ merger 
and acquisition performance in the short run.  
H2b: Acquiring financially constrained target has positive effect on bidders’ merger 
and acquisition performance in the long run.  
We define the difference between bidder and target financial constraint as the 
difference between bidders’ and targets’ KZ value. According to the cash flow 
hypothesis, negative abnormal returns are created when financially unconstrained 
bidders acquire financially constrained targets. A positive abnormal return is created 
when a financially constrained bidder acquires a financially unconstrained target. 
Therefore the greater the difference in financial constraint, the greater its influence on 
bidders’ abnormal return will be. Based on the analyses and predictions above, we 
construct the following hypotheses:  
 
H3a: The difference between bidder and target financial constraint is positively related 
to bidders’ abnormal return in the short run.  
H3b: The difference between bidder and target financial constraint is positive related to 
bidders’ abnormal return in the long run.  
 
Finally, bid premium is defined as the difference between the deal price and the target 
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stock price four weeks prior to the announcement day divided by the target stock price 
four weeks prior to announcement day. Bid premium measures how much the bidder 
has paid to complete the deal. Previous literature suggests that financially constrained 
bidders are less likely to suffer from overconfidence and conduct the deal carefully. 
As a result, financially constrained bidders tend to pay lower premiums than 
financially unconstrained bidders. Furthermore, an acquirer will pay a lower premium 
when acquiring a financially constrained target. This is because acquirers try to 
acquire financially constrained targets for the considerable growth potential that target 
may have, especially a target holding patents. These targets lack the financial 
resources to achieve further growth. In this case, a financially constrained target has 
less bargaining power than the acquirer. Finally, the disparity of bidder and target 
financial constraints may have a significant impact on the premium offered in M&A. 
For example, the more financially constrained a bidder is, the lower the premium it 
will pay. Financially unconstrained bidders, on the other hand, tend to overpay the 
target due to their overconfidence. Based on the analyses and predictions above, we 
construct the following hypotheses:  
H4a: Acquirer’s financial constraint is negatively related to bid premium 
H4b: Target’s financial constraint is positively related to bid premium 
H4c: Financial constraint disparity is negatively related to bid premium.
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2.4. Data and Methodology  
2.4.1 Sample Selection 
We use a sample of US merger and acquisition deals announced over the period 1 
January 1990 to 31 December 2009 from Thomson One Banker. Both bidders and 
targets are US firms; the original sample includes 178,839 deals. Bidders are required 
to be public and targets are required to be public, private, or subsidiaries. Using these 
criteria gives us a sample of 97,343 deals. Takeover transaction values are required to 
be greater than or equal to $1 million, yielding a sample of 53,646 deals. Because we 
study short- and long-run bidders’ acquisition performance, all deals should be 
completed, which reduces the sample to 35,263 deals. Following the standard 
procedure, we exclude financial and utility firms with Standard Industrial 
Classification codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999; these firms are in regulated 
industries. This leaves us with a sample of 25,099 deals. We also remove deals 
completed with the following merger and acquisition techniques: bankruptcy 
acquisitions, going-private transactions, leveraged buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, 
restructurings, reverse takeovers and privatizations. This produces a sample of 22,701 
deals. To control for deal characteristics, we require that deal information, such as 
deal attitude, deal type and means of payment, be recorded by Thomson One Banker, 
yielding 14,195 deals. We use cumulative abnormal return and buy and hold abnormal 
returns to measure short-run and long-run acquisition performance respectively. The 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database should have sufficient records 
about a bidder’s stock price data, which reduces the sample to 7,682 deals. We require 
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bidder to have sufficient accounting information recorded by the Compustat database 
so that we can estimate firm characteristics, such as market-to-book ratio, 
price-to-earnings ratio and KZ index, leaving a sample of 5,150 observations. Since 
we analyse to what extent financial constraint can influence merger and acquisition 
performance, target financial information is also required, yielding a sample of 1,633 
deals. Due to the small economic meaning, we remove 11 non-public listed targets, 
giving a final sample of 1,622 deals.  
2.4.2 Methodology  
2.4.2.1 Univariate Test  
Both a univariate test and multivariate regression model are employed to analyse the 
impact of financial constraints on bidder’s abnormal returns in the short and long run. 
We categorise the sample into three groups on the basis of financial constraint 
difference. The financial constraint difference (ATDKZ) is defined as bidder’s KZ 
value minus target’s KZ value. As mentioned before, the higher the KZ value, the more 
financially constrained the firm is. The value of ATDKZ is positive when a financially 
constrained bidder is acquiring a financially unconstrained target. We categorise the 
deals into three groups based on the difference in bidder and target KZ value 
difference. The highest third of deals ranked by ATDKZ, where ATDKZ is greater than 
0.22, are the group of constrained bidders acquiring rich targets (CBRT). The lowest 
third of deals, where ATDKZ is lower than -2.02, is categorised as unconstrained 
bidders acquiring poor targets (UCBPT). The middle third of deals is classified as the 
neutral group.  
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In the univariate test, we compare the mean of the short-term and long-term abnormal 
returns obtained by each deal group. We use a different approach to estimate the 
abnormal return in the short run and long run. For the short run, we choose time 
windows of 3, 5 and 11 days to calculate CARS. CARS in each time window are 
estimated by the market model, market-adjusted model, Fama-French model and 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model separately. For the long run, we use market model and 
the size-adjusted model estimate BHAR. As mentioned before, we use two approaches 
to estimate size-adjusted BHAR.  We also compare bidder and target firm 
characteristics. Run-up measures the pre-acquisition stock performance, defined as 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to bidders over the window [-365, -6] before the 
acquisition announcement day. The returns are calculated based on the market-adjusted 
model. The market-adjusted model employs the CRSP value-weighted index and its 
parameters are estimated over 255 days, ending 366 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement.  
 
The return on equity (ROE) ratio measures the bidder’s profitability, and is defined as 
net income divided by common and preferred equity – COMPUSTAT 
Item18/(Item10+Item11); M/B, the market to book ratio, measures the market 
valuation of bidder’s stock, and is defined as the annual closing price multiplied by the 
common shares outstanding and divided by the total common equity – COMPUSTAT 
Item24*Item25/Item60; P/E, the price to earnings ratio, measures net income per share, 
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and is defined as the annual closing price divided by the earnings per share – 
COMPUSTAT Item24/Item58; cash flow/total assets, which is a ratio of cash flow over 
equity, measures the amount of free cash being held by a company, and is defined as the 
sum of a company’s income before extraordinary items and depreciation minus 
dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by the total assets – 
COMPUSTAT(Item18+ Item14- Item19- Item21)/(Item6); debt/total asset, the debt 
over asset ratio, measures to what extent a company is leveraged, and is defined as 
long-term debt divided by total assets – COMPUSTAT Item9/Item6. We also include a 
leverage ratio, defined as COMPUSTAT (Item 9+Item34)/(Item 9+Item34+Item216), 
and both bidder and target KZ value. 
 
For each group, we compare the deal-specified characteristics. Experience Bidder 
measures bidders who have conducted M&A in the past five years; Relative 
Transaction Value measures the relative size of the deal; Stock denote the percentage of 
deals completed with stock; and cash, which measures the percentage of deals 
completed with cash. Hostile measures the deal attitude, and Competing bid measures 
the percentage of deals involved multiple bidders. Diversification whether the bidder 
and the target share the same first two digits of primary SIC code. Tender offer 
measures deal type. For market environment, We use Yung et al. (2008)’s approach to 
estimate the market heat degree. We also use Bouwman et al. (2009) approach to 
measure the market valuation level.  
2.4.2.2 Multivariable Test 
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Univariate tests are insufficient to reveal the true relationship between financial 
constraints and abnormal returns. It does not estimate the interactive relationship 
among firm characteristics, deal characteristics and market environment. Therefore, we 
use following multivariable regression model:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 1   
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 2 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝐾𝐷𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 3  
Regression models 1 to 3 measure the relationship between financial constraints and 
abnormal returns. Regression model 1 analyses the relationship between acquirers’ 
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financial constraints and acquirers’ abnormal returns. The key explanatory variable is 
acquirers’ financial constraints (𝐴𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡)  measured by the KZ index. Regression 
model 2 analyses the relationship between targets’ financial constraints and acquirers’ 
abnormal returns. The key explanatory variable is the target’s financial constraints 
(𝑇𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡) measured by the KZ index. Regression model 3 analyses the relationship 
between financial constraint disparity and acquirers’ abnormal returns. The key 
explanatory variable is the financial constraint difference (𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡), which is defined 
as the bidders’ KZ value minus the targets’ KZ value. As mentioned before, the higher 
the KZ value, the more financially constrained the firm will be. The value of ATDKZ is 
positive when a financially constrained bidder is acquiring a financially unconstrained 
target. 
Previous literature suggests that firms characteristics, such as, Market to book, 
Leverage, Price to equity, and free cash flow to equity, affect M&A outcomes.  
However, these variables are used in the calculation of the KZ Value. Since the KZ 
value is an independent variable in the regression model, to avoid endogeneity, the 
control variables in the firm characteristics are RUNUP ratio and experienced bidder.  
For deal characteristics, we use Relative Transaction Value to control deal size; 
Dummy variable Stock mark the means of payment; Hostile capture the deal attitude, 
Competing Bid highlight the deal which has more than one bidders. Tender offers 
present deal type. Diversification defines the deal that bidder and target oriented in the 
different industry. To control market environment, we estimate the market Heat 
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Degree and stock market valuation. Market Heat Degree controls the clustering effect 
of M&A deals. The stock market valuation is categorised by the dummy variables 
High and Low.  
In order to the analyse the impact of financial constraints on bidder’s return in the long 
run, we rerun the regressions by replacing bidders’ CAR with bidder’s BHAR as a 
dependent variable. We use regression models 4, 5 and 6 shown below:  
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 4 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 5 
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𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 6 
The dependent variables of the buy and hold ratio (BHAR) measures bidders’ abnormal 
returns in the long run. We have estimated three BHARs with the event window [0, 12], 
[0,24], [0,36], which measure bidders’ abnormal returns in the first 12, 24 and 36 
months after the month of announcement. We also include the same variable in 
regressions 1, 2, 3 to control for firm, deal, and market environment. 
To examine the impact of bidder and target financial constraints and financial 
constraint disparity on bid premium, we run the regressions with bid premium as 
dependent variable.  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 7 
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 8 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛼8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑤
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model  
2.4.2.3 Measures of financial constraint  
This paper uses the Kaplan–Zingales (KZ) index to measure financial constraint. 
Using a sample of 49 low-dividend firms from 1970 to 1984, Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) introduced a comprehensive approach to measure firms’ financial constraints. 
By analysing annual reports and management discussions, they identify constrained 
and unconstrained firms.  
 
Further, they reveal that firm characteristics such as ratio of cash flow to capital, 
Tobin’s Q, leverage, ratio of dividends to capital, and ratio of cash to capital are 
essential to financing constraints. They use these firm characteristics to estimate an 
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ordered logit regression. The KZ index is formulated by using the parameters of the 
regression, thereby measuring a firm’s level of financial constraint (Lamont et al., 
2001). A firm with a high KZ index indicates that the firm has a lower cash flow and 
dividends and higher debt compared with a low KZ firm; therefore, firms with a high 
KZ index are more financially constrained.  
 
Following the aforementioned research, we calculate the KZ index using the following 
formula: 
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = −1.001909 ×
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
+ 0.2826389 × 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 3.139193 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
− 39.3678 ×
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
− 1.314759 ×
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
 
where CFit/Kit-1 is cash flow (Compustat item18+14) over lagged capital (Compustat 
item8), Qit is Tobin’s Q ratio (Compustat item (6+24×25-60-74)/6)), Leverageit is the 
leverage ratio (Compustat item (142+34)/(142+34+144)); Divendendit/Kit-1 is 
dividends (Compustat item 21+19) over lagged capital (Compustat item 141), and 
Cit/Kit-1 is cash (Compustat item 1) over lagged capital (Compustat item 141).  
2.4.2.4 Measure of short-term performance 
We use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to measure bidder’s short-term M&A 
performance. The market model defines cumulative abnormal return 2 days 
surrounding announcement day as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−2,2 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)]
2
𝑡=−2
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Where Rit represent firms’ daily return; Rmt represent daily market index return. 
(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) is the market return estimated by market model. Therefore, the 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of bidder’s daily abnormal return 
during the event window two days before and two days after the announcement day.  
 
Bouwman et al. (2009) point out that bidders may conduct multiple deals within the 
sample period. To address this issue, we estimate the market-adjusted CAR. The 
market-adjusted CAR 2 days surrounding announcement day is defined as the sum of 
daily abnormal return within the event window [-2,2];  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−2,2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
2
𝑡=−2
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Where ARit is the daily abnormal return that is defined as firm’s daily return minus 
value-weighted daily market return.  
  
2.4.2.5 Measure of long-term performance 
Bidders’ acquisition performance in the long run is measured by buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). Initially, we use the market adjust model to estimate 
bidder’s buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). But, Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) suggest that market adjusted BHAR has many biases, 
such as rebalancing bias, new-listing bias, and skewness bias. Moreover, Lyon, Barber, 
and Tsai (1999) and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) believe that size-adjusted 
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BHAR is a more reliable indicator for bidder’s long-term M&A performance. To 
address this issue, we estimate both Markets adjusted and Size adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). Market adjusted Buy-and-hold abnormal return 36 month 
after deal announcement is defined as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,0,36 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑗𝑡)
36
𝑡=0
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡)
36
𝑡=0
 
Where Rjt denotes firm’s monthly stock return starting from the month of deal 
announcement. Rmt denotes the monthly value-weighted monthly return.  
 
On the other hand, we use the function below to estimate Size-adjusted BHAR 36 
months after deal announcement: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,0,36 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑗𝑡)
36
𝑡=0
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑝𝑡)
36
𝑡=0
 
Rjt denotes firm’s monthly stock return starting from the month of deal announcement. 
Rpt denotes the return of size adjusted reference portfolio. To build the size-adjusted 
portfolio, all CRSP firms are sorted in descending order and separated into 10 groups 
by market capitalisation. Then, we sort each group by Market to book ratio and split 
each group into quintiles. Finally, we have 50 size adjusted reference portfolios. The 
portfolio return is shown below,   
𝑅𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑅𝑘𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
Rkt denotes firm K’s monthly stock return. N denotes the number of firms in the 
reference portfolio to which firm K belongs. Therefore, the portfolio return 𝑅𝑝𝑡, is 
the average return of all firms in the portfolio excluding firm K.
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2.5 Results and Discussion  
2.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of bidders’ abnormal returns in both the long and 
short run for the full sample and three subsamples, namely, CBRT, Neutral and UCBPT.  
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
Panel A shows bidders’ abnormal returns in the short run. To accurately calculate 
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns, we use four different methods: the market 
model, market-adjusted model, Fama-French model andCarhart(1997) four-factor 
model. For the full sample, acquirers have positive abnormal returns in the short run. 
The highest cumulative abnormal return appears on the five days surrounding the 
announcement day – 1.069% for CAR[-5,5] estimated by the market-adjusted model. 
This is contributed by deals in the neutral group, which gain positive CARs. Deals in 
other groups have negative CARs in all event windows. The highest CARs appear in 
the neutral deal at 3.016%, 3.055%, 3.225% for CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2] and CAR[-5,5] 
respectively. 
Panel A also shows the differences in acquirer announcement abnormal returns between 
deals completed by bidders in CBRT and bidders in neutral. Constrained acquirers 
acquiring rich targets (CBRT) receive significantly lower short-term returns than 
acquirers that acquire targets with similar financial constraints (NEUTRAL). The 
CAR[-2,2] difference shows that acquirers in the CBRT group underperform acquirers 
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in the neutral group by 4.028% (p = 0.000). This result can be mainly attributed to the 
good performance of neutral acquirers and the bad performance of constrained 
acquirers. Specifically, constrained acquirers acquiring rich targets lead to a -0.974% 
cumulative abnormal return two days surrounding announcement day. Acquirers in the 
neutral group have 3.55% cumulative abnormal returns two days surrounding the 
announcement day. The results is robust in all three estimate methods.   
Panel B shows the long-term performance (BHAR) for different estimate methods. We 
use the market-adjusted model and size-adjusted model to calculate buy and hold ratios 
in three different event windows (BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24], BHAR[0,36]). The 
figure suggests that bidders receive negative abnormal returns in the long run. The 
longer the time away from the month of announcement, the lower the BHAR will be. 
The lowest BHAR appears in month 36 after the month of announcement (-27.742% for 
BHAR[0,36]). Constrained acquirers acquiring rich targets (CBRT) receive 
significantly lower long-term returns than acquirers that acquire targets with similar 
financial constraints (NEUTRAL).  
 
For BHAR estimated by the size-adjusted model, BHAR[0,36] for acquirers in the 
neutral group is -13.38%, compared with -36.049% for constrained acquirers acquiring 
rich targets (CBRT). Acquirers in neutral significantly outperform acquires in CBRT by 
8.172% (p = 0.004) 12 months after the month of announcement, 18.623% 24 months 
after the month of announcement (p = 0.000) and 22.670% (p=0.000) 36 months after 
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the month of announcement. The negative sign in front of a BHAR indicates that het 
bidder’s abnormal return in the long run is negative. However, acquirers in neutral have 
less negative BHAR than acquirers in CBRT. Table 1 suggests that a constrained bidder 
acquiring a rich target tends to be value-destroying. A bidder acquiring a target with 
similar financial conditions is value-enhancing.  
 
Table 2 presents statistics for firm characteristics for the full sample and three 
subsamples, namely, CBRT, Neutral and UCBPT. 
[Insert Table 2.2 Here] 
The average KZ value for acquirers is -9.686 over the sample period (1990–2009) and 
the average of the KZ value for all of the US firm–years is -7.7109. This result proves 
that acquirers are more unconstrained than other firms. There is no significant 
difference between the KZ value of bidders in CBRT and KZ value of bidders in neutral. 
This result indicates that the significant difference in acquirers’ abnormal returns can be 
caused by target characteristics, such as target financial condition.  
Furthermore, compared with acquirers in the Neutral group, constrained acquirers 
acquiring rich targets (CBRT) have a significantly higher market-to-book ratio and 
RUNUP ratio. This result suggests that bidders in CBRT have a higher market valuation 
and better stock performance. This result indicates that constrained acquirers will take 
the opportunity of high market valuation to acquire financially unconstrained targets. It 
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also indicate that bidders with high market-to-book ratio underperform bidders with 
low market-to-book ratio in the long run (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). They explain the 
results as past good performance rendering managers overconfident and making the 
market overestimate bidders’ capacities. Bidders in the CBRT group also have a 
significantly lower return-to-asset ratio (ROA) and lower cash flow to asset ratio 
(CF/TA) than bidders in neutral. A target firm’s characteristics show that the target in 
the CBRT group tends to be undervalued by the market and has less debt than others. 
This is because targets in the CBRT group have a lower market-to-book ratio than 
targets in the neutral group. Although the difference is insignificant, the result indicates 
that targets in the CBRT group have the lowest market valuation in all of the samples. 
Targets in the CBRT group are also less leveraged than those in the neutral group. The 
debt to asset ratio of targets in the CBRT group averages 9.5% compared with 21.6% in 
neutral. The respective leverage ratios of the two groups are 12.1% compared with 
35.9%.  
Table 3 presents statistics for deal characteristics for the full sample and three 
subsamples, namely, CBRT, Neutral and UCBPT.  
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
 
Acquirers in the CBRT group have more merger and acquisition experience than 
acquirers in neutral. Some 75.83% of acquirers in CBRT have previously conducted 
M&A deals compared to 70.795% of acquirers in Neutral. Acquirers in the CBRT group 
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tend to use more stock as their means of payment than acquirers in Neutral. Some 
37.638% of deals in CBRT are completed using stock as the means of payment. Only 
16.266% of deals in neutral are paid using stock. Some 57.116% of deals completed by 
acquirers in neutral are paid with cash. This result is associated with acquirers in CBRT 
having a higher market-to-book ratio than acquirers in neutral. In addition, deals 
completed by acquirers in CBRT tend to not to be tender offers, and are often more 
diversifying. For the market environment, we did not detect significant differences in 
terms of M&A heat degree or a high/low market.  
Overall, constrained acquirers acquiring rich targets tend to be value-destroying; they 
have the lowest return in both the long and short run. This is because constrained 
bidders tend to buy solid assets with their overvalued stock. The figures in Table 1 show 
that constrained acquirers in CBRT have the highest market valuation. The 
market-to-book ratio of constrained bidders acquiring rich targets is significantly 
higher than that of bidders in the others group. This is consistent with Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998). They separated bidders into glamor and value bidders on the basis of 
their market-to-book ratio. By examining bidders’ post-merger long-run performance, 
they highlight that bidders with a high market-to-book ratio (glamour bidders) 
underperform bidders with a low market-to-book ratio in the long run. They explain as 
past good performance rendering managers overconfident and making the market 
overestimate bidders’ capacities. Constrained acquirers in CBRT also tend to use stock 
more as the means of payment for deals. This is another reason why constrained 
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acquirers have lower abnormal returns than others. Travlos (1987) highlights the 
signalling effect caused by the usage of stock as a means of payment in M&As. He 
shows that bidders that complete deals using stock payments face substantially lower 
announcement returns than others because paying in stock signals an overvaluation of 
the bidder’s share. On the other hand, targets in the CBRT group tend to be less 
leveraged. The lower leverage ratio indicates that the target in CBRT is more likely to 
be a solid asset. In addition, the KZ values of bidders in CBRT are not significantly 
different from the KZ value of bidders in neutral. This result indicates that target 
financial conditions are essential for bidders’ abnormal returns in both the long and 
short run.  
 
Furthermore, unconstrained acquirers acquiring poor targets also generate negative 
abnormal returns in both the long and short run. This is because, as suggested by the 
cash flow and hubris hypotheses, unconstrained bidders tends to suffer from 
overconfidence and conduct value-destroying deal. Smith and Kim (1994) examine the 
influence of free cash flow and financial slack on announcement abnormal returns. 
Their study shows that high free cash flow bidders obtain significantly negative 
announcement abnormal returns, whereas slack poor bidders gain significantly positive 
announcement abnormal returns. The returns to bidders are highest in the acquisition of 
high free cash flow targets by slack poor bidders. Malmendier and Tate (2008) divide 
the sample into quintiles and find that overconfident CEOs in the most unconstrained 
quintiles tend to conduct takeover transactions, thereby leading to negative market 
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reaction around announcement. Nevertheless, constrained bidders are less likely to 
have CEO overconfidence and the probability of making an acquisition is insignificant.  
 
All of these results suggest that constrained bidders may gain in merger and acquisition 
deals if they choose a target with similar financial constraints. Although a constrained 
bidder can take the opportunity of market overvaluation to pursue a less leveraged 
target, they will receive significant losses in both the long and short run. 
 
2.5.2 Regression Results 
Due to the limitations of univariable tests, the results may be unreliable. Therefore, 
we carry out multivariate regressions. Initially, we examine the relation between 
acquirer financial constraint and abnormal returns in both the long and short run. Then 
we analyse how target financial constraint is related to bidders’ short- and long-term 
abnormal returns. Finally, we estimate to what extent the difference in acquirer and 
target financial constraints can influence bidders’ gains from mergers.  
Acquirer financial constraint and abnormal returns in the short run 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of regression model 1. Regressions 1 to 3 
estimate the impact of acquirer financial constraints on acquirer cumulative abnormal 
returns in 3, 5 and 11-day event windows respectively. All of the CARs are estimated 
using the market-adjusted model.  
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[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
The key independent variable in regressions 1 to 3 is AKZ value, which measures 
bidders’ financial constraint. The results show that, for the regression of acquirer 
financial constraint and acquirer CARs [-2,2], the coefficient of acquirers’ KZ value 
(AKZ) is significantly positive. A one-unit increase in AKZ will increase bidders’ 
CAR[-2,2] by 2.08%. The results indicate that a more constrained acquirer will 
achieve higher abnormal returns. However, the significant value only appears on 
CARs[-2,2], which indicates that merger gains in the short run are heavily influenced 
by arbitrage. The deals conducted by constrained bidders tend to be value-enhancing 
opportunities for all investor. Experienced bidders, relative size, stock payment, 
hostile deal and diversification are significantly negative, while tender offer is 
significantly positive. These results suggest that a bidder tends to receive positive 
abnormal returns in the short run when it is financially constrained, when the deal has 
a smaller relative transaction value, when they use cash rather than stock as a means 
of payment, and when they make a tender offer and avoid diversification or hostile 
deals.  
 
The results in Table 4 suggest that an acquirer’s financial constraint is a determinant 
of achieving positive abnormal returns in the short run. Stock and relative size are 
significantly negative. In addition, the coefficients of stocks and relative size are 
much greater than the coefficient of AKZ. This indicates that constrained acquirers 
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will lose when they conduct large deals using overvalued stock. The positive effect of 
being a constrained bidder will therefore be offset.   
Overall, more constrained acquirers tend to receive positive abnormal returns. These 
results suggest that constrained acquirers are rational in M&A deals because they are 
not suffering from overconfidence. This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis: 
H1a: Financially constrained bidders are more likely to obtain better short-term 
acquisition performance than unconstrained bidders. 
 
Target financial constraint and Acquirer’s abnormal return in the short run  
Table 5 shows the results of the short-term multivariate analysis. Specifications 1 to 3 
represent the regressions of CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2, 2], CAR[-5,5] on target financial 
constraint (TKZ) respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
 
Target KZ value – the key explanatory variable of the regressions in table 5 – is 
significantly negative in regression 1 but insignificant in regressions 2 and 3. The 
magnitude of the coefficient of TKZ is also much smaller in regression. The significant 
negative coefficient for TKZ in regression 1 indicates that acquiring a financially 
constrained target is value-destroying in the short run. A one-unit increase in TKZ will 
decrease CAR[-1,1] by 1.18%. This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis H2a: 
 56 
Acquiring financially constrained target has negative effect on bidders’ merger and 
acquisition performance in the short run.  
 
In contrast, acquiring a financially unconstrained target increases bidder returns. 
Decreases in TKZ indicate that a target is less financially constrained. This is because 
acquiring a financially unconstrained target gives a positive signal to the market 
because the bidder has successfully transferred their overvalued stock into a solid asset. 
However, the effect only take places on the CARs three days surrounding the 
announcement day. This is because constrained bidders acquiring a rich target tend to 
have a high market-to-book ratio and use stock as means of payment.  
 
For the control variables, experienced bidders result in a decrease in short-run 
abnormal returns of 1.69% for CAR[-1,1], 2.33 for CAR[-2,2] and 1.58% for 
CAR[-5,5]. The results suggest that a bidder that conducts multiple deals in a 
relatively short period of time will be less welcomed by the market. Acquiring a large 
target also leads to a decrease in short-term abnormal returns. The coefficient of 
relative transition value suggests that a 1% increase in a relative transaction value 
leads to a 1.37% decrease in CAR[-1,1] and a 1.6% decrease in CAR[-5,5]. 
Furthermore, stock payment has a negative impact on bidders’ short-term abnormal 
returns, and leads to a 2.48% decrease in CAR[-1,1], a 2.66% decrease in CAR[-2,2] 
and a 2.41% decrease in CAR[-5,5]. Hostile deals reduce short-term abnormal returns 
CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2] and CAR[-5,5] by 1.9%, 2.47% and 2.69% respectively. The 
 57 
coefficients of diversification are also significantly negative but the magnitude is less 
than 1%. Conducting a tender offer has a significantly positive impact on bidders’ 
abnormal returns in the short run. Making a tender offer will increase CAR[-1,1], 
CAR[-2,2] and CAR[-5,5] by 3.52%, 3.22% and 3.53% respectively.  
Experienced bidders, relative size, stock payment, a hostile deal and diversification 
are significantly negative, while tender offer is significantly positive. These results 
suggest that a bidder will increase their abnormal returns in the short run when they 
acquire a financially unconstrained target, when the deal has a smaller relative 
transaction value, when they use cash rather than stock as the means of payment, 
when they make a tender offer and when they avoid diversification or hostile deals.  
Financial disparity and acquirer’s abnormal return in the short run 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of regression model 3. Regressions 1 to 3 
estimate to what extent the difference between acquirer and target financial 
constraints can influence acquirer cumulative abnormal returns in 3, 5 and 11-day 
event windows respectively. All of the CARs are estimated using the market-adjusted 
model.  
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
The key independent variable is acquirer target KZ value difference (ATDKZ). As 
mentioned before, ATDKZ is defined as acquirer KZ value minus target KZ value. 
The higher the KZ value, the more financially constrained the firm will be. ATDKZ 
will be positive when a constrained bidder (high KZ value) acquires an unconstrained 
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target (low KZ value). ATDKZ will be negative when an unconstrained bidder 
acquires a constrained target. ATDKZ absolute value shows disparity in financial 
constraint between bidder and target. 
 
The results show that financial constraint disparity (ATDKZ) is significantly positive 
in regressions 1 and 2. The results also suggest that a one-unit increase in financial 
constraint disparity (ATDKZ) will lead to an increase of 1.79% for CAR[-1,1] and 2.3% 
for CAR[-2,2]. These results indicate that a constrained acquirer will achieve higher 
abnormal returns when they acquire a financially unconstrained target. The larger the 
financially constrained disparity is, the larger bidder gain in the short run will be. The 
significant coefficient appears on both CARs [-1,1] and CARs [-2,2]; this indicates 
that the merger gain received by a constrained bidder acquiring a rich target is positive 
and robust. Constrained bidders will conduct value-enhancing deals if their target is 
less financially constrained than itself.  
There are a number of factors that have a significant impact on bidder short-term 
abnormal return. If the bidder is classified as an experienced bidders, the short-run 
abnormal return CAR [-1,1], CAR[-2,2] and CAR[-5,5] by 1.81%, 1.70% and 2.39% 
respectively. We define experienced bidder as the acquirer having conducted three or 
more M&A deals in the five-year period before the acquisition in our sample. Our 
results suggests that the market downgrades a bidder who has conducted multiple deals 
in a relatively short period of time even though they have built takeover knowledge and 
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experience. Acquiring a large target also leads to a decrease in short-term abnormal 
return. The results suggest that a 1% increase in the relative transaction value will lead 
to a 1.36% decrease in CAR[-1,1] and a 1.58% decrease in CAR[-2,2].  
Furthermore, using stock as the means of payment will lead to a 2.39% decrease in 
CAR[-1,1] and a 2.33% decrease in CAR[-2,2]. A hostile deal reduces the short-term 
abnormal returns CAR[-1,1] and CAR[-2,2] by 1.95% and 2.27%. The coefficients of 
diversification are also significantly negative but the magnitude is small. Conducting 
a tender offer has a significantly positive impact on bidder abnormal return in the 
short run. Making a tender offer will increase CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2] and CAR[-5,5] 
by 3.51%, 3.50% and 3.23% respectively. These results suggest that a bidder tends to 
receive positive abnormal returns in the short run when it is financially constrained, 
when the deal has a smaller relative transaction value, when cash is used rather than 
stock as the means of payment, when a tender offer is made, and when diversification 
or hostile deals are avoided.  
The results in Table 6 suggest that the positive disparity between acquirer financial 
constraint and target financial constraint is a determinant of whether or not a positive 
abnormal return will be achieved in the short run. This is consistent with the cash flow 
hypothesis. Financially unconstrained bidders tend to conduct value-destroying deals 
as they choose their target unwisely and suffer from overconfidence. Alternatively, 
constrained bidders receive cash inflows when they acquire a financially 
unconstrained target. It can be argued that constrained bidders need to pay a high 
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premium when acquiring unconstrained bidders. However, the results in the 
univariable test suggest that constrained bidders acquiring a rich target tend to have 
overvalued stock and thus do not hesitate to use their stock as a means of payment to 
complete the deal.  
Overall, constrained acquirers tend to receive positive abnormal returns when 
acquiring a financially unconstrained target. These results also suggest that the larger 
the disparity between acquirer and target financial constraint, the higher bidders’ 
abnormal returns in the short run will be. This empirical evidence supports hypothesis 
H3a: the difference between bidder and target financial constraint is positive related 
to bidders’ abnormal return in the short run.  
 
Acquirer financial constraint and abnormal return in the long run  
Table 7 presents the estimation results of the regression model 4. Regressions 1 to 3 
estimate the impact of acquirers’ financial constraints on acquirers’ buy and hold ratio 
(BHAR) in event windows of 12, 24 and 36 months after the month of announcement. 
All of the BHAR figures are estimated using the size-adjusted model.  
 
[Insert Table 2.7 here] 
 
The key variable – acquirers’ KZ value (AKZ) – is insignificant in regression 1 but 
significant in regressions 2 and 3 with an increasing coefficient. The results show that 
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a one-unit increase in an acquirer’s KZ value will raise bidders’ long-term abnormal 
return – BHAR[0,24] and BHAR[0,36] – by 10.4% and 15.31% respectively. The 
results indicate that a more constrained acquirer will achieve a higher abnormal return 
in the long run. However, the significant value only appears on BHAR[0,24] and 
BHAR[0,36]. This is because the deals conducted by constrained bidders tend to be 
value-enhancing as management are more rational when choosing a target than for 
unconstrained bidders. However, it take time for a bidder to realize any synergies 
from M&A deals. Therefore the impact of bidders’ financial constraint will appear 24 
and 36 months after the month of announcement.  
 
The RUNUP ratio has a negative impact on bidders’ abnormal returns in the long run. 
The coefficients are increasing with time eclipse. A one-unit increase in the RUNUP 
ratio will reduce BHAR[0,24] by 11.36% and BHAR[0,36] by 18.07%. These 
increasing RUNUP coefficients indicate that bidders with good pre-merger stock 
performance will suffer from a negative abnormal return in the long run. As suggested 
by Rosen (2006), a bidder can take advantage of stock overvaluation in the short run 
but the price will eventually back to its fundamental value in the long run. In this case, 
such bidders may not choose a synergy-maximizing target as they tend to complete 
the deal when their stock price still high. This is also supported by the regression 
results for stock payment, which are significant negative with a high magnitude 
coefficient. The results show that using stock as the means of payment will lead to a 
10.3% decrease in BHAR[0,24] and a 13.23% decrease in BHAR[0,36]. In addition, 
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diversification is significantly negative. A diversifying deal causes BHAR[0,12], 
BHAR[0,24] and BHAR[0,36] to decrease by 6.02%, 12.52% and 15.18% 
respectively. These results suggest that a bidder tends to receive positive abnormal 
returns in the long run when it is financially constrained, avoids using stock as the 
means of payment, and avoids conducting diversifying deals.  
 
Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that the acquirer’s financial constraint is a 
determinant of whether or not they will achieve a positive abnormal return in the long 
run. More constrained acquirers tend to receive a positive abnormal return in the long 
run. These results suggest that constrained acquirers are rational in M&A deals as they 
are not suffering from overconfidence. Using stock as the means of payment has a 
negative impact on long-term abnormal return. The coefficient of the Run-up ratio 
indicates that a constrained acquirer will lose when it conducts a large deal using 
overvalued stock. The positive effect of being a constrained bidder will therefore be 
offset. This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis H1b: Financially constrained 
bidders are more likely to obtain better long-term acquisition performance than 
unconstrained bidders. 
Target financial constraint and long-term performance 
Table 8 shows the results of regression model 5, which analyses how target financial 
constraint influences bidder long-term abnormal return. Regressions 1 to 3 represent 
the regression of BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0, 24], BHAR[0,36] on target financial 
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constraint (TKZ), respectively. 
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
Target KZ value – the key explanatory variable of regressions in Table 8 – is 
significantly positive for all regressions. The results show that a one unit increase in the 
TKZ value leads to a 8.95% increase in BHAR[0,12], a 12.13% increase in BHAR[0,24] 
and a 14.52% in BHAR[0,36]. The magnitude of the coefficient of TKZ increases when 
the long-term return is estimated 12, 24 and 36 months after the month of 
announcement. These results indicate that acquiring a financially constrained target is 
value-enhancing in the long run. In contrast, acquiring a financially unconstrained 
target decreases bidder’s return. This is because a financially constrained target has less 
bargaining power in a merger deal. The bidder chooses the target rationally as a 
financially constrained target does not provide extra cash inflow. As shown in the 
univariable test, a financially constrained target is less leveraged and has a lower 
market-to-book ratio than the acquirer. Acquiring a financially constrained bidder 
therefore means buying a solid asset. Our result suggests that these assets tend to be 
productive in the long run. This empirical evidence supports hypothesis H2b: 
Acquiring financially constrained bidders has positive effect on bidders’ merger and 
acquisition performance in the long run.  
A positive coefficient in the RUNUP ratio suggests that a bidder with good past stock 
performance tends to receive negative abnormal returns. The coefficient of the RUNUP 
ratio only appears as significant in regressions 2 and 3. The result suggests that a 1% 
increase in bidders’ past stock performance will cause an 11.05% decrease in 
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BHAR[0,24] and a 17.76% decrease in BHAR[0,36]. Using stock as the means of 
payment also has a negative impact on bidders’ long-term abnormal returns. Using 
stock as the means of payment leads to a 10.43% decrease in BHAR[0,24] and a 13.6% 
decrease in BHAR[0,36]. Using stock as the means of payment signals that the bidder 
stock is overvalued. The market will therefore bring the bidder’s stock price back to its 
fundamental value. Diversifying deals are harmful for a bidder’s long-term abnormal 
returns. The results shows that diversification causes BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24] and 
BHAR[0,36]  to decrease by 5.56%, 11.89% and 14.45% respectively. This is 
consistent with Morck et al. (1990). Their result suggests that a bidder will receive a 
lower abnormal return if they conduct diversifying deals. Although acquiring a 
financially constrained target tends to be value-enhancing in the long run, a bidder 
should avoid stock payment and diversifying deals.  
Financial disparity and acquirer’s abnormal return in the long run 
Table 9 presents the estimation results of regression model 6. Regressions 1 to 3 
estimate to what extent the difference between acquirer and target financial 
constraints can influence acquirer abnormal returns in the long run. Regressions 1 to 3 
represent the regression with the dependent variable BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24] and 
BHAR[0,36] respectively. All the BHARs are estimated using the size-adjusted 
model.  
                       [Insert Table 2.9 here] 
The key independent variable is acquirer target KZ value difference (ATDKZ). The 
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results in Table 9 suggest that the disparity between acquirers’ and targets’ financial 
constraint is insignificant to bidders’ abnormal return in the long run. This is 
consistent with the results of the univariable test. The deals in the neutral group 
generate the highest bidder abnormal returns in both the long and short run. 
Financially constrained bidders can benefit from acquiring a financially unconstrained 
target in the short run but not in the long run. This is because it is initially positive 
news for the market, as acquiring an unconstrained target indicates cash inflow to the 
bidder. However, the positive impact of a acquiring target with large financial 
constraint disparity will soon vanish as the market will bring the price back to its 
fundamental value. This result is similar to that of Rau and Vermaelen (1998). They 
separate bidders into glamor and value bidders on the basis of their market-to-book 
ratio. By examining bidders’ post-merger long-run performance, they highlight that 
bidders with a high market-to-book ratio (glamour bidders) underperform bidders with 
a low market-to-book ratio in the long run. As mentioned before, acquirers in the CBRT 
group have a higher market-to-book ratio than average.  
 
Bidders’ long-term abnormal returns are determined by the productivity of the 
combined firm. On the other hand, the free cash flow and hubris hypotheses suggest 
that unconstrained bidders tend to be irrational in M&A deals. It takes great effort to 
transform a financially constrained target into a profitable and productive asset. An 
unconstrained bidder suffering from overconfidence tends to make value-destroying 
deals when acquiring a constrained target.  
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Overall, a constrained bidder acquiring a constrained target will have a positive 
impact on bidder long-term returns. This causes the coefficient of disparity between 
acquirer and target financial constraints (ATDKZ) to be insignificant. This empirical 
evidence there does not supports the hypothesis H3b: The difference between bidder 
and target financial constraint is positive related to bidders’ abnormal return in the 
long run.  
 
Table 10 presents the estimation results of regression models 7 to 9. Regression 1 
estimates to what extent the acquirer’s financial constraint can influence bid premium. 
Regression 2 analyses the effect of target financial constraint on bid premium. 
Regression 3 shows to what extent the financial constraint disparity between acquirer 
and target can alter bid premium. Regressions 1 to 3 represent the regression with the 
dependent variable bid premium, which measures how much an acquirer has paid to 
complete the deal, and the independent variables AKZ, TZK and ATDKZ, which 
measure acquirer and target financial constraint and financial constraint disparity 
respectively.  
[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
The key independent variable in regression 1 is acquirer target KZ value (AKZ). The 
results of regression 1 suggest that a more financially constrained bidder will pay a 
lower premium; the coefficient of AKZ suggests that a one-unit increase in acquirer 
KZ value leads to a 0.9% decrease in the premium paid. Although this result is 
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statistically insignificant, the negative sign indicates the negative relationship between 
acquirer financial constraint and bid premium.  
 
The results of regression 2 suggest that a bidder has to pay a higher premium when 
acquiring a financially constrained target. The coefficient of TKZ shows that a 
one-unit increase in the target KZ value results in an 8.77% increase in bid premium. 
This results support hypothesis H4b: Target’s financial constraint are positively 
related to bid premium.  
 
A financially constrained target tends to receive a high premium. This is because the 
market, as shown in Table 2, undervalues financially constrained targets. The average 
market-to-book ratio of targets (3.623) is lower than the average market-to-book ratio 
of acquirers (4.257). This undervaluation indicates the high potential stock price 
growth of financially constrained targets in the future. Such undervaluation gives 
targets extra bargaining power in M&A. It can be argued that the market values the 
target correctly but that the target is financially constrained by its poor performance. 
The average return-to-asset ratio of a target is negative. However, financially 
unconstrained bidders tend to overpay the target, especially in deals where a 
financially unconstrained bidder is acquiring a constrained target. The average 
premium paid by a financially unconstrained bidder when acquiring a constrained 
target is 51.630%, which is significantly greater than the average premium paid by a 
financially constrained bidder (43.568%).  
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The results of regression 3 show that the disparity between an acquirer’s financial 
constraint and a target’s financial constraint (ATDKZ) is significantly and negatively 
related to the bid premium paid. The coefficient suggests that a one-unit increase in 
the financial constraint disparity (ATDKZ) causes a 9.63% decrease in bid premium. 
These results strongly support the hypothesis H4c: The financial constraint disparity 
are negatively related to bid premium.  
 
According to the definition of ATDKZ, a one-unit increase in ATDKZ indicates that a 
bidder is more financially constrained than a target. This indicates that the more 
constrained a bidder is, the lower the premium it will pay. This is consistent with the 
free cash flow and hubris hypotheses. The free cash flow hypothesis predicates that a 
bidder with a large cash reserve tends to conduct value-destroying deals. As the hubris 
hypothesis suggests, bidders with a large cash reserve suffer from overconfidence and 
tend to overpay for targets.  
 
A number of factors have a significant impact on bid premium. It will rise by 5.39% if 
the relative transaction value increases by one unit. A bidder will also pay more when 
acquiring a larger target. The appearance of multiple bidders will increase the bid 
premium by 22.14%. It is a fact that a competing bid will raise the bargaining power 
of the target and consequently the bid premium as the winner will be the participant 
that offers the highest bid. Furthermore, the bid premium rises by 10.2% if the deal is 
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diversifying. Bidders will pay a higher bid premium for a diversifying deal because 
they may overvalue the target due to a lack of operating experience in the target 
industry. If a bidder makes a tender offer, the bid premium decreases by 4.9%. A 
tender offer eases the resistance from the target. Bidders who complete deals in a high 
market valuation period will pay a 9.79% lower premium. This is because bidders are 
fully aware that their target is overvalued so make a discounted offer. In turn, the 
target is aware that the overvaluation will soon revert back to its fundamental value, 
and they tend to accept the discounted offer before the market returns to a low 
valuation period.  
 
Overall, a bidder’s financial constraint has an insignificant impact on bid premium, 
though the sign of the coefficient indicates a negative relationship. Furthermore, target 
financial constraint is positively related to bid premium. A one-unit increase in the 
target KZ value results in an 8.77% increase in bid premium. Finally, the results show 
that the disparity between acquirer target financial constraints (ATDKZ) is negatively 
related to bid premium. The results also suggest that a financially constrained bidder 
will pay a lower premium when acquiring a financially unconstrained target. A 
one-unit increase in the financial constraint disparity (ATDKZ) causes a 9.63% 
decrease in the bid premium. In addition, relative transaction value, competing bid 
and diversification significantly raise bid premium. A high market valuation and 
making a tender offer substantially reduce the premium paid. 
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2.5.6 Robustness Test 
The main finding of this paper is that a constrained bidder outperforms an 
unconstrained bidders in both the long and short run. Acquiring a financially 
unconstrained target will therefore increase an acquirer’s announcement return but 
acquiring a financially constrained target tends to maximize the acquirer’s abnormal 
return in the long run. Financial disparity between the acquirer and target is positively 
related to acquirer abnormal return in the short run. The results suggest that a 
constrained acquirer acquiring a financially unconstrained target will receive a higher 
abnormal return than one acquiring a financially constrained target. However, due to 
signalling effect and time eclipse, the deal in the neutral group generates the highest 
abnormal return for the acquirer.  
To test the robustness of our results, we use different ways to define firms’ financial 
constraint. We replace the KZ value with free cash flow and the free cash flow to total 
asset ratio. The results are robust. We also test for robustness via replacing the KZ index 
(continuous variable) with a dummy variable of financial constraint. Specifically, the 
unconstrained (constrained) dummy equals one when the KZ index of the bidder is 
smaller (greater) than the median KZ index of all of the firm-years (extracted from 
Compustat) over the period 1990–2009. The results remain unchanged, which shows 
that a constrained bidder outperforms an unconstrained bidder in both the long and 
short run.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
By using one of the most comprehensive samples, which covers US M&A deals 
conducted from 1990 to 2009 and makes use of detailed acquirer and target financial 
information, this paper sheds new light on how acquirers and targets’ financial 
conditions affect acquisition performance in both the long and short run. Following the 
measurement of financial condition in Lamont, Polk and Sa´a-Requejo (2001), Baker, 
Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), we use the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) to measure acquirer and 
target financial constraint. In order to study how the disparity of acquirer and target 
financial conditions can influence acquisition performance, we sort our sample on the 
basis of differences in bidder and target financial condition. Financially constrained 
bidders acquiring a financially constrained target are categorised as CBRT. Financially 
constrained bidders acquiring a financially constrained target are categorised as 
UCBPT. Deals conducted by an acquirer and target with similar financial conditions are 
categorised as neutral.  
 
We find that a constrained bidder outperforms an unconstrained bidders in both the long 
and short run. Acquirers’ KZ value (AKZ) is significantly positively related to 
acquirer cumulative abnormal return five days surrounding the announcement day. A 
one-unit increase in the AKZ value leads to a 2.08% increase in CAR[-2,2]. This 
result suggests that a more constrained acquirer will achieve a higher abnormal return 
than a financially constrained bidder. This result is consistent with Smith and Kim 
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(1994), Harford (1999), Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier and Tate (2008). 
The result implies that constrained firms do not suffer from overconfidence. Rather, 
they choose their target and implement their acquisition strategy more carefully and 
effectively than financially unconstrained bidders. This is supported by the empirical 
results regarding the relationship between financial constraint and long-term 
acquisition abnormal returns. We found that a more constrained acquirer will achieve a 
higher abnormal return in the long run. Acquirer’s financial constraint (AKZ value) is 
positively related to acquirer long-term abnormal return, estimated by BHAR[0,24] 
and BHAR[0,36]. A constrained bidder will receive a 15.31% higher long-term 
abnormal return (BHAR[0,36]) than an unconstrained bidder. This is because the 
deals conducted by constrained bidders tend to be value-enhancing as they are more 
rational when choosing a target than unconstrained bidders. However, it takes time for 
a bidder to realize any synergies from M&A deals. The impact of bidders’ financial 
constraints therefore appears 24 and 36 months after the month of announcement. 
This empirical evidence supports the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) and the cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986).  
 
We also find that target financial constraint is significantly negatively related to 
bidders’ announcement return three days surrounding the announcement day. A 
one-unit increase in the TZK value will decrease CAR[-1,1] by 1.18%. This result 
indicates that acquiring a financially unconstrained target has a positive influence on 
bidders’ abnormal return in the short run. This is because acquiring a financially 
 73 
unconstrained target is a sign of cash inflow to the bidder. This positive signal raises 
bidders’ stock return in the short run. Our results also show that a financially 
constrained acquirer acquiring a financially unconstrained target has a substantially 
higher market-to-book value than the full sample average. This indicates that a 
financially constrained acquirer tends to be overvalued by the market. The purpose of 
acquiring a financially unconstrained target is to transfer overvalued stock into a solid 
asset. On the other hand, acquiring a financially constrained target tend to positively 
influence an acquirers’ abnormal return in the long run. A one-unit increase in TKZ 
will increase BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24] and BHAR[0,36] by 8.95%, 12.13% and 
14.52% respectively. This is because a financially constrained target has less 
bargaining power in a merger deal. The bidder chooses the target rationally as a 
financially constrained target does not provide extra cash inflow. As shown in the 
univariable test, a financially constrained target is less leveraged and has a lower 
market-to-book ratio than the acquirer. Therefore acquiring a financially constrained 
bidder means buying a solid asset. Our results suggest that these assets tend to be 
productive in the long run.  
Finally, we define financial constraint disparity between acquirer and target (ATDKZ) 
as bidder KZ value minus target KZ value. As mentioned earlier, the higher the KZ 
value, the more financially constrained the firm will be. The value of ATDKZ is 
positive when a financially constrained bidder is acquiring a financially unconstrained 
target. Our result suggests that the financial condition disparity between acquirer and 
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target (ATDKZ) has a positive and significant impact on acquirer’ acquisition 
performance in the short run, but not in the long run. Financially constrained bidders 
can benefit from acquiring a financially unconstrained target in the short run. This is 
because it is positive news for the market when a bidder acquires an unconstrained 
target as it indicates cash inflow to the bidder. The positive impact of acquiring a 
target with large financial constraint disparity will soon vanish as the market will 
bring the price back to its fundamental value. Bidders’ long-term abnormal return is 
determined by the productivity of the combined firm post the deal. On the other hand, 
the free cash flow and hubris hypotheses suggest that unconstrained bidders tend to be 
irrational in M&A. It also takes a great deal of effort to transform a financially 
constrained target into a profitable and productive asset. An unconstrained bidder 
suffering from overconfidence tends to make value-destroying deals when acquiring a 
constrained target.  
 
In addition, bidder financial constraint has an insignificant impact on bid premium 
though the sign of the coefficient indicates a negative relationship. Target financial 
constraint is positively related to bid premium. A one-unit increase in target KZ value 
results in 8.77% increase in bid premium. Disparity between acquirer and target 
financial constraint (ATDKZ) is negatively related to bid premium. The results 
suggest that a financially constrained bidder pays a lower premium when acquiring a 
financially unconstrained target. A one-unit increase in the financial constraint 
disparity (ATDKZ) causes a 9.63% decrease in the bid premium. Experienced bidders, 
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relative size, stock payment, hostile deal and diversification are significantly negative, 
while tender offer is significantly positive. These results suggest that a bidder tends to 
receive positive abnormal returns in the short run when it is financially constrained, 
when the deal has a smaller relative transaction value, when they use cash rather than 
stock as means of payment, when they make a tender offer, and when they avoid 
diversification or hostile deals.  
 
Overall, this paper finds that a constrained acquirer outperforms an unconstrained 
bidder in both the long and short run. Acquiring a financially unconstrained target is 
found to increase acquirers’ announcement return but acquiring a financially 
constrained target tends to maximise acquirers’ abnormal return in the long run. 
Financial disparity is positively related to acquirer abnormal return in the short run. The 
results suggest that a constrained acquirer acquiring a financially unconstrained target 
will receive a higher abnormal return than an acquirer acquiring a financially 
constrained target. The influence of bidder financial constraint on acquisition 
performance can only be realized in the long run. This is because a financially 
constrained bidder does not suffer from overconfidence and therefore conduct deals 
more diligently than unconstrained bidders. However, it takes time to assimilate the 
synergies generated from M&A and improve bidder performance. Our results support 
the free cash flow hypothesis, which states that firms with high free cash flow tend to 
conduct value-destroying deals. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2.1 Summary statistics for acquirer short-and long-term Abnormal Return.  
Table 1 represent acquirer’s short- and long-term abnormal returns for the full sample and the subsample of The Constraint Bidder Acquiring Rich Target (CBRT), 
natural (N) and Unconstraint Bidder Acquiring Poor Target (UCBPT). Panel A reports short-term abnormal return CAR[-1,1],CAR[-2, 2] CAR[-5,5] are the 3-day, 5-day 
and 11days cumulative abnormal returns around announcement. We use Market Model, Market Adjusted Model, Fama-French Model andCarhart(1997) four-factor 
model to estimate acquirers CARs. Panel B represent acquirer’s performance in the long run. Long-term abnormal returns is measured by Buy and hold ratio, 
BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24], BHAR[0,36] are the post-merger 12-month, 24-month, 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns. We use two different approaches to 
estimate Size Adjusted BHAR and Market Adjusted BHAR For the full sample, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
ALL 
 
CBRT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
UCBPT 
 
Difference 
(CBRT-NEU) 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Mean Pro 
Panel A           
Market Model           
CAR[-1,1] 1622 0.181% 542 -1.288% 541 2.932% 539 -1.104% -4.220% 0.000% 
CAR[-2,2] 1622 0.011% 542 -1.478% 541 2.893% 539 -1.383% -4.372% 0.000% 
CAR[-5,5] 1612 0.247% 540 -1.529% 537 3.383% 535 -1.106% -4.913% 0.000% 
Market Adjusted           
CAR[-1,1] 1622 0.361% 542 -0.956% 541 3.016% 539 -0.981% -3.972% 0.000% 
CAR[-2,2] 1622 0.350% 542 -0.973% 541 3.055% 539 -1.035% -4.028% 0.000% 
CAR[-5,5] 1612 1.069% 540 -0.506% 537 3.705% 535 0.014% -4.211% 0.000% 
Fama-French           
CAR[-1,1] 1622 0.158% 542 -1.301% 541 2.870% 539 -1.098% -4.171% 0.000% 
CAR[-2,2] 1622 -0.032% 542 -1.461% 541 2.785% 539 -1.422% -4.246% 0.000% 
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CAR[-5,5] 1612 0.133% 540 -1.611% 537 3.225% 535 -1.209% -4.836% 0.000% 
Fama-French-M           
CAR[-1,1] 1622 0.192% 542 -1.291% 541 2.881% 539 -1.017% -4.172% 0.000% 
CAR[-2,2] 1622 0.047% 542 -1.374% 541 2.856% 539 -1.343% -4.230% 0.000% 
CAR[-5,5] 1612 0.248% 540 -1.446% 537 3.317% 535 -1.123% -4.763% 0.000% 
Panel B           
Size Adjusted 1           
BHAR[0,12] 1622 -2.572% 542 -3.595% 541 0.153% 539 -4.278% -3.748% 20.020% 
BHAR[0,24] 1622 -7.788% 542 -13.053% 541 0.009% 539 -10.318% -13.063% 0.190% 
BHAR[0,36] 1622 -10.986% 542 -17.359% 541 -1.779% 539 -13.819% -15.580% 0.510% 
Size Adjusted 2 
          
BHAR[0,12] 1622 -7.928% 542 -10.658% 541 -2.486% 539 -10.645% -8.172% 0.420% 
BHAR[0,24] 1622 -18.265% 542 -25.486% 541 -6.863% 539 -22.449% -18.623% 0.000% 
BHAR[0,36] 1622 -27.742% 542 -36.049% 541 -13.380% 539 -33.805% -22.670% 0.000% 
Market Adjusted 
          
BHAR[0,12] 1622 0.034% 542 -1.523% 541 3.849% 539 -2.230% -5.371% 7.540% 
BHAR[0,24] 1622 -1.889% 542 -7.462% 541 6.923% 539 -5.131% -14.385% 0.110% 
BHAR[0,36] 1622 -1.048% 542 -7.965% 541 9.745% 539 -4.926% -17.710% 0.180% 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics for acquirer and targets firms characteristics 
Table 2 present acquirer and target firm characteristics for the full sample and the subsample of The Constraint Bidder Acquiring Rich Target (CBRT), 
Neutral (N) and Unconstraint Bidder Acquiring Poor Target (UCBPT). KZ Index is Kaplan and Zingales Index measured at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book ratio 
measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity, 
COMPUSTAT Item24*Item25/Item60; P/E, the price to earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by 
earnings per share, COMPUSTAT Item24/Item58; Cash flow/Total asset, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the 
company, is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by total 
asset, COMPUSTAT(Item18+ Item14- Item19- Item21)/(Item6); Debt/Total Asset, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is 
leveraged, is defined as long term debt divided by total asset, COMPUSTAT Item9/Item6; we also include leverage ratio defined as defined as 
COMPUSTAT (Item 9+Item34)/( Item 9+Item34+Item216). 
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ALL 
 
CBRT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
UCBPT 
 
Difference  
(CBRT-NEUTRAL) 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Mean Pro 
Acquirer 
Characteristics 
          
KZ value 1622 -9.686 542 -3.583 541 -3.770 539 -21.761 0.187 86.750% 
Runup 1622 0.153 542 0.204 541 0.072 539 0.183 0.132 0.000% 
M/B 1622 4.257 542 4.889 541 2.444 539 5.442 2.446 0.000% 
P/E 1618 22.283 540 23.708 541 17.201 537 25.970 6.507 67.440% 
ROA 1622 0.027 542 0.011 541 0.038 539 0.031 -0.027 0.700% 
D/TA 1622 0.174 542 0.185 541 0.203 539 0.136 -0.018 10.630% 
CF/TA 1622 0.058 542 0.057 541 0.077 539 0.039 -0.020 3.590% 
Leverage 1622 0.293 542 0.313 541 0.338 539 0.229 -0.025 16.870% 
Target Characteristics           
KZ value 1622 -9.829 542 -24.416 541 -3.203 539 -1.813 -21.212 0.000% 
Runup 901 0.073 264 0.076 393 0.036 244 0.130 0.039 27.760% 
M/B 1622 3.623 542 2.766 541 4.129 539 3.975 -1.363 52.750% 
P/E 1620 14.239 542 13.899 540 18.575 538 10.228 -4.676 40.730% 
ROA 1622 -0.074 542 -0.032 541 0.011 539 -0.201 -0.043 1.690% 
D/TA 1622 0.170 542 0.095 541 0.216 539 0.200 -0.121 0.000% 
CF/TA 1622 -0.030 542 -0.004 541 0.055 539 -0.142 -0.059 0.080% 
Leverage 1622 0.305 542 0.121 541 0.359 539 0.435 -0.239 0.000% 
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics for acquirer and targets deal characteristics and market environment.  
Table 3 present deal characteristics and market environment for the full sample and the subsample of The Constraint Bidder Acquiring Rich Target 
(CBRT), Neutral (N) and Unconstraint Bidder Acquiring Poor Target (UCBPT). RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] 
window prior to announcement. Experience bidder denotes whether bidders have conducted M&A deals in the past five years; Relative transaction value 
denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Stock denote that the deal is paid by 100% 
stock; and Cash for 100% cash payment. Hostile measures deal attitude.  Competing bid indicate the appearance of multiple bidders. Diversification 
indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer.  For market environment, Heat Degree is defined 
as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2009. Dummy variable High 
and Low represent whether the deal announced in the High or Low market valuation period. Bid premium denote the percentage of bidder overpayment 
on the basis target stock price one month before the deal announcement. For the full sample, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
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ALL 
 
CBRT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
UCBPT 
 
Difference 
(CBRT-NEUTRAL) 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Mean Pro 
Experienced  1622 72.935% 542 75.830% 541 70.795% 539 
72.171
% 5.035% 6.110% 
Relative Size  1622 29.703% 542 30.206% 541 32.945% 539 
25.943
% -2.738% 28.010% 
STOCK 1622 29.593% 542 37.638% 541 16.266% 539 
34.879
% 21.372% 0.000% 
CASH 1622 42.663% 542 36.716% 541 58.226% 539 
33.024
% -21.510% 0.000% 
Hostile 1622 2.035% 542 1.845% 541 2.588% 539 1.670% -0.743% 40.690% 
Competing Bid 1622 3.453% 542 3.321% 541 2.773% 539 4.267% 0.548% 60.000% 
Tender 1622 33.724% 542 21.033% 541 57.116% 539 
23.006
% -36.083% 0.000% 
Diversification 1622 31.258% 542 37.269% 541 19.617% 539 
37.106
% 17.753% 0.000% 
Heat Degree 1622 149.005% 542 148.962% 541 150.228% 539 
147.665
% -12.654% 47.040% 
High 1622 27.497% 542 28.044% 541 26.580% 539 
28.015
% 1.464% 58.96% 
Low 1622 23.181% 542 22.878% 541 24.163% 539 
22.263
% -1.290% 61.89% 
Bid Premium 1468 43.332% 542 43.568% 541 35.130% 539 
51.630
% 8.440% 0.110% 
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Table 2.4 OLS regression results impact of acquirer financial constraints on acquirer short run 
abnormal returns 
The table shows OLS regression results for the impact of acquirer financial 
constraints on bidders short run abnormal returns. The sample includes acquisitions 
conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2009. The 
sample data is selected from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. Dependent variables is CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2], CAR[-5,5] which are the 
cumulative abnormal returns estimated by 3, 5, 11 days surrounding announcement 
day. Independents variables are AKZ value measures bidders’ financial constrains; 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Experience bidder denotes whether bidders have conducted M&A 
deals in the past five years; Relative transaction value denotes the relative size of the 
deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Stock 
denote that the deal is paid by 100% stock; Hostile measures deal attitude.  Competing 
bid indicate the appearance of multiple bidders. Tender offer denote the deal type is 
tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry. 
For market environment, Heat Degree is defined as the quarterly moving average of 
deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 
2009. Dummy variable High and Low represent whether the deal announced in the 
High or Low market valuation period. The year fix effect is controlled for all 
regressions. Figures in parentheses refer to T-statistic adjusted by controlling 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. The number of observations (N) for all 
regressions is also shown in this table.  
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 CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-5,5] 
AKZ Value 0.0103 0.0208** 0.0078 
 
(0.132) (0.022) (0.512) 
   
RUNUP -0.0106* -0.0090 -0.0052 
 
(0.074) (0.186) (0.535) 
   
Experienced_Bidder -0.0181*** -0.0177*** -0.0242*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
   
Relative Transaction Value -0.0138* -0.0159** -0.0049 
 
(0.054) (0.041) (0.572) 
   
STOCK -0.0234*** -0.0220*** -0.0257*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Hostile -0.0200** -0.0282** -0.0254* 
 
(0.049) (0.021) (0.088) 
   
Competing Bid -0.0094 -0.0111 -0.0218 
 
(0.327) (0.295) (0.206) 
   
Tender 0.0356*** 0.0357*** 0.0325*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Diversification -0.0079* -0.0085* -0.0066 
 
(0.051) (0.063) (0.221) 
   
Heat Degree 0.0006 -0.0067 -0.0785 
 
(0.987) (0.879) (0.151) 
   
High -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0065 
 
(0.362) (0.456) (0.559) 
   
Low 0.0056 0.0094 0.0444*** 
 
(0.525) (0.385) (0.000) 
   
Constant 0.0128 0.0143 0.0906 
 
(0.763) (0.763) (0.124) 
Obs 1622 1622 1612 
R-sq 0.153 0.136 0.095 
  p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.5 OLS regression results impact of Target financial constraints on bidders short run 
abnormal returns. 
The table shows OLS regression results for the impact of Target financial constraints 
on bidders short run abnormal returns. The sample includes acquisitions conducted by 
US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2009. The sample data is 
selected from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Dependent variables is CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2], CAR[-5,5] which are the cumulative 
abnormal returns estimated by 3, 5, 11 days surrounding announcement day. 
Independents variables are TKZ value measures Target’ financial constrains; RUNUP 
is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Experience bidder denotes whether bidders have conducted M&A 
deals in the past five years; Relative transaction value denotes the relative size of the 
deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Stock 
denote that the deal is paid by 100% stock; Hostile measures deal attitude.  Competing 
bid indicate the appearance of multiple bidders. Tender offer denote the deal type is 
tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry. 
For market environment, Heat Degree is defined as the quarterly moving average of 
deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 
2009. Dummy variable High and Low represent whether the deal announced in the 
High or Low market valuation period. The year fix effect is controlled for all 
regressions. Figures in parentheses refer to T-statistic adjusted by controlling 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. The number of observations (N) for all 
regressions is also shown in this table.  
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CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-5,5] 
TKZ Value -0.0118* -0.0070 -0.0090 
 
(0.083) (0.486) (0.248) 
RUNUP -0.0114* -0.0058 -0.0098 
 
(0.056) (0.490) (0.153) 
Experienced_Bidder -0.0169*** -0.0233*** -0.0158*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
Relative Transaction Value -0.0137* -0.0049 -0.0160** 
 
(0.057) (0.578) (0.041) 
STOCK -0.0248*** -0.0266*** -0.0241*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hostile -0.0190* -0.0247* -0.0269** 
 
(0.060) (0.096) (0.028) 
Competing Bid -0.0094 -0.0219 -0.0118 
 
(0.320) (0.204) (0.270) 
Tender 0.0352*** 0.0322*** 0.0353*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0087** -0.0071 -0.0092** 
 
(0.035) (0.193) (0.049) 
Heat Degree 0.0001 -0.0792 -0.0079 
 
(0.998) (0.147) (0.858) 
High -0.0076 -0.0071 -0.0075 
 
(0.306) (0.524) (0.388) 
Low 0.0068 0.0453*** 0.0114 
 
(0.438) (0.000) (0.291) 
Constant 0.0113 0.0899 0.0131 
 
(0.790) (0.126) (0.784) 
OBS 1622 1622 1612 
R-sq 0.154 0.131 0.095 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.6 OLS regression results impact of financial constraints disparity on bidders short run 
abnormal returns. 
The table shows OLS regression results for the impact of financial constraints 
disparity on bidders short run abnormal returns. The sample includes acquisitions 
conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2009. The 
sample data is selected from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. Dependent variables is CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2], CAR[-5,5] which are the 
cumulative abnormal returns estimated by 3, 5, 11 days surrounding announcement 
day. Independents variables are ATDKZ value measures disparity of Acquirer and 
Target’ financial constrains The financial constraint difference (ATDKZ) is defined as 
bidders KZ value minus target KZ value; RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted 
CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Experience bidder denotes 
whether bidders have conducted M&A deals in the past five years; Relative 
transaction value denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of 
deal value over bidders market value; Stock denote that the deal is paid by 100% stock; 
Hostile measures deal attitude.  Competing bid indicate the appearance of multiple 
bidders. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates 
bidder and target oriented in different industry. For market environment, Heat Degree 
is defined as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average 
quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2009. Dummy variable High and 
Low represent whether the deal announced in the High or Low market valuation 
period. The year fix effect is controlled for all regressions. Figures in parentheses 
refer to T-statistic adjusted by controlling heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. 
The number of observations (N) for all regressions is also shown in this table.  
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CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-5,5] 
ATDKZ Value 0.0179*** 0.0230*** 0.0080 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.453) 
RUNUP -0.0113* -0.0099 -0.0056 
 
(0.059) (0.143) (0.508) 
Experienced_Bidder -0.0181*** -0.0170*** -0.0239*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Relative Transaction Value -0.0136* -0.0158** -0.0049 
 
(0.058) (0.044) (0.576) 
STOCK -0.0239*** -0.0233*** -0.0262*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hostile -0.0195* -0.0272** -0.0250* 
 
(0.055) (0.026) (0.093) 
Competing Bid -0.0087 -0.0106 -0.0217 
 
(0.359) (0.314) (0.209) 
Tender 0.0351*** 0.0350*** 0.0323*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0088** -0.0097** -0.0070 
 
(0.029) (0.034) (0.195) 
Heat Degree 0.0014 -0.0061 -0.0784 
 
(0.970) (0.889) (0.151) 
High -0.0071 -0.0071 -0.0067 
 
(0.343) (0.416) (0.545) 
Low 0.0062 0.0108 0.0450*** 
 
(0.478) (0.315) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0108 0.0117 0.0897 
 
(0.798) (0.804) (0.126) 
OBS 1622 1622 1612 
R-sq 0.157 0.137 0.095 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.7 OLS regression results impact of acquirer financial constraints on acquirer long run 
abnormal returns 
The table shows OLS regression results for the impact of acquirer financial 
constraints on bidders long run abnormal returns. The sample includes acquisitions 
conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2009. The 
sample data is selected from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. Dependent variables are BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24], BHAR[0,36], which 
are the post-merger 12-month, 24-month, 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
Independents variables are AKZ value measures bidders’ financial constrains; 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Experience bidder denotes whether bidders have conducted M&A 
deals in the past five years; Relative transaction value denotes the relative size of the 
deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Stock 
denote that the deal is paid by 100% stock; Hostile measures deal attitude.  Competing 
bid indicate the appearance of multiple bidders. Tender offer denote the deal type is 
tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry. 
For market environment, Heat Degree is defined as the quarterly moving average of 
deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 
2009. Dummy variable High and Low represent whether the deal announced in the 
High or Low market valuation period.  The year fix effect is controlled for all 
regressions. Figures in parentheses refer to T-statistic adjusted by controlling 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. The number of observations (N) for all 
regressions is also shown in this table.  
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BHAR[0,12] BHAR[0,24] BHAR[0,36] 
AKZ Value 0.0820 0.1040* 0.1531** 
 
(0.114) (0.068) (0.015) 
RUNUP -0.0270 -0.1136** -0.1807*** 
 
(0.496) (0.019) (0.003) 
Experienced_Bidder 0.0131 -0.0086 -0.0174 
 
(0.692) (0.853) (0.773) 
Relative Transaction Value -0.0420 -0.0490 -0.0169 
 
(0.271) (0.386) (0.823) 
STOCK -0.0430 -0.1030** -0.1323** 
 
(0.199) (0.025) (0.033) 
Hostile 0.0244 0.1407 0.2239 
 
(0.730) (0.213) (0.258) 
Competing Bid -0.0405 -0.0296 0.0169 
 
(0.402) (0.724) (0.897) 
Tender 0.0130 0.0597 0.0527 
 
(0.657) (0.155) (0.334) 
Diversification -0.0602** -0.1252*** -0.1518*** 
 
(0.021) (0.001) (0.003) 
Heat Degree -0.0600 0.0011 0.3760 
 
(0.815) (0.997) (0.293) 
High -0.0162 0.0497 -0.0171 
 
(0.772) (0.512) (0.844) 
Low -0.0865 -0.1406 -0.1369 
 
(0.199) (0.128) (0.302) 
Constant -0.0052 -0.0481 -0.4450 
 
(0.985) (0.879) (0.228) 
Obs 1622 1622 1622 
R-sq 0.032 0.058 0.057 
  p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.8 OLS regression results impact of target financial constraints on bidders long run abnormal 
returns. 
The table shows OLS regression results for the impact of acquirer financial 
constraints on bidders long run abnormal returns. The sample includes acquisitions 
conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2009. The 
sample data is selected from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. Dependent variables is BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24], BHAR[0,36] which are 
the post-merger 12-month, 24-month, 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
Independents variables are TKZ value measures Target’ financial constrains; RUNUP 
is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Experience bidder denotes whether bidders have conducted M&A 
deals in the past five years; Relative transaction value denotes the relative size of the 
deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Stock 
denote that the deal is paid by 100% stock; Hostile measures deal attitude.  Competing 
bid indicate the appearance of multiple bidders. Tender offer denote the deal type is 
tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry. 
For market environment, Heat Degree is defined as the quarterly moving average of 
deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 
2009. Dummy variable High and Low represent whether the deal announced in the 
High or Low market valuation period. The year fix effect is controlled for all 
regressions. Figures in parentheses refer to T-statistic adjusted by controlling 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. The number of observations (N) for all 
regressions is also shown in this table.  
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BHAR[0,12] BHAR[0,24] BHAR[0,36] 
TKZ Value 0.0895*** 0.1213*** 0.1452*** 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
RUNUP -0.0248 -0.1105** -0.1776*** 
 
(0.537) (0.023) (0.004) 
Experienced_Bidder 0.0173 -0.0034 -0.0089 
 
(0.596) (0.940) (0.881) 
Relative Transaction Value -0.0456 -0.0538 -0.0231 
 
(0.229) (0.341) (0.760) 
STOCK -0.0444 -0.1043** -0.1360** 
 
(0.189) (0.024) (0.029) 
Hostile 0.0238 0.1395 0.2237 
 
(0.737) (0.218) (0.260) 
Competing Bid -0.0475 -0.0387 0.0046 
 
(0.330) (0.644) (0.972) 
Tender 0.0146 0.0620 0.0552 
 
(0.618) (0.139) (0.312) 
Diversification -0.0555** -0.1189*** -0.1445*** 
 
(0.034) (0.002) (0.005) 
Heat Degree -0.0666 -0.0073 0.3640 
 
(0.797) (0.980) (0.313) 
High -0.0151 0.0513 -0.0160 
 
(0.785) (0.497) (0.853) 
Low -0.0822 -0.1353 -0.1282 
 
(0.226) (0.146) (0.333) 
Constant 0.0054 -0.0336 -0.4279 
 
(0.984) (0.915) (0.250) 
OBS 1622 1622 1622 
R-sq 0.033 0.059 0.057 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.9 OLS regression results impact of financial constraints disparity on bidders long run 
abnormal returns. 
The table shows OLS regression results for the impact of acquirer financial 
constraints on bidders long run abnormal returns. The sample includes acquisitions 
conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2009. The 
sample data is selected from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. Dependent variables is BHAR[0,12], BHAR[0,24], BHAR[0,36] which are 
the post-merger 12-month, 24-month, 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns.. 
Independents variables are ATDKZ value measures disparity of Acquirer and Target’ 
financial constrains The financial constraint difference (ATDKZ) is defined as bidders 
KZ value minus target KZ value; RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over 
the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Experience bidder denotes whether 
bidders have conducted M&A deals in the past five years; Relative transaction value 
denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over 
bidders market value; Stock denote that the deal is paid by 100% stock; Hostile 
measures deal attitude.  Competing bid indicate the appearance of multiple bidders. 
Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and 
target oriented in different industry. For market environment, Heat Degree is defined as 
the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter frequency 
of deals conducted from 1990 to 2009. Dummy variable High and Low represent 
whether the deal announced in the High or Low market valuation period.  The year 
fix effect is controlled for all regressions. Figures in parentheses refer to T-statistic 
adjusted by controlling heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. The number of 
observations (N) for all regressions is also shown in this table.  
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BHAR[0,12] BHAR[0,24] BHAR[0,36] 
ATDKZ Value -0.0125 -0.0216 -0.0306 
 
(0.803) (0.722) (0.661) 
RUNUP -0.0285 -0.1153** -0.1832*** 
 
(0.479) (0.018) (0.003) 
Experienced_Bidder 0.0203 0.0009 -0.0035 
 
(0.534) (0.984) (0.953) 
Relative Transaction Value -0.0436 -0.0512 -0.0201 
 
(0.250) (0.364) (0.790) 
STOCK -0.0493 -0.1110** -0.1441** 
 
(0.146) (0.016) (0.022) 
Hostile 0.0279 0.1451 0.2304 
 
(0.694) (0.200) (0.245) 
Competing Bid -0.0452 -0.0359 0.0078 
 
(0.357) (0.670) (0.953) 
Tender 0.0126 0.0593 0.0521 
 
(0.667) (0.156) (0.340) 
Diversification -0.0602** -0.1250*** -0.1515*** 
 
(0.021) (0.001) (0.003) 
Heat Degree -0.0665 -0.0075 0.3633 
 
(0.799) (0.980) (0.316) 
High -0.0190 0.0461 -0.0223 
 
(0.734) (0.543) (0.798) 
Low -0.0793 -0.1314 -0.1234 
 
(0.241) (0.157) (0.351) 
Constant -0.0044 -0.0464 -0.4427 
 
(0.987) (0.885) (0.237) 
OBS 1622 1622 1622 
R-sq 0.029 0.055 0.054 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.10 OLS regression results for the impact of financial constraints on premium. 
This table shows OLS regression results for the impact of acquirers/target financial 
constraints and financial constraint disparity on bid premium. The sample includes 
acquisitions conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 
2009. The sample data is selected from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database. Dependent variables are bid premium, which denote the 
percentage of bidder overpayment on the basis target stock price one month before the 
deal announcement. Independents variables are AKZ which is acquirer’s financial 
constraint measured by acquirers KZ value, TZK which is target’s financial constraint 
measured by Target KZ value; ATDKZ value measures disparity of Acquirer and 
Target’ financial constrains The financial constraint difference (ATDKZ) is defined as 
bidders KZ value minus target KZ value;   RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted 
CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Experience bidder denotes 
whether bidders have conducted M&A deals in the past five years; Relative 
transaction value denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of 
deal value over bidders market value; Stock denote that the deal is paid by 100% stock; 
Hostile measures deal attitude.  Competing bid indicate the appearance of multiple 
bidders. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates 
bidder and target oriented in different industry. For market environment, Heat Degree is 
defined as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter 
frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2009. Dummy variable High and Low 
represent whether the deal announced in the High or Low market valuation period.  
The year fix effect is controlled for all regressions. Figures in parentheses refer to 
T-statistic adjusted by controlling heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. The 
number of observations (N) for all regressions is also shown in this table 
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AKZ -0.0093 
  
 
(0.859) 
  TKZ 
 
0.0877** 
 
  
(0.011) 
 ATDKZ 
  
-0.0963** 
   
(0.021) 
RUNUP 0.0326 0.0356 0.0340 
 
(0.368) (0.325) (0.343) 
Experienced Bidder 0.0189 0.0165 0.0227 
 
(0.515) (0.564) (0.425) 
Relative Transaction Value 0.0539* 0.0522* 0.0519* 
 
(0.087) (0.098) (0.099) 
STOCK 0.0083 0.0132 0.0078 
 
(0.805) (0.693) (0.815) 
Hostile 0.0766 0.0715 0.0753 
 
(0.296) (0.332) (0.306) 
Competing Bid 0.2214*** 0.2185*** 0.2155*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Tender -0.0490* -0.0464 -0.0470 
 
(0.094) (0.114) (0.107) 
Diversification 0.1020*** 0.1072*** 0.1063*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Heat Degree 0.3182 0.3202 0.3069 
 
(0.157) (0.153) (0.168) 
High -0.0979** -0.0954** -0.0992** 
 
(0.038) (0.041) (0.034) 
Low 0.0673 0.0640 0.0681 
 
(0.453) (0.475) (0.449) 
Constant 0.2499 0.2570 0.2628 
 (0.301) (0.289) (0.275) 
N 1468 1468 1468 
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Chapter 3: Recommendation Consensus and M&A 
Returns 
 
3.1. Introduction  
We have estimated to what extent financial constraints can influence the outcomes of 
mergers and acquisitions. The results show that financially constrained firms 
outperform financially unconstrained firms in M&As. In chapter 2, we try to explore 
how analysts’ coverage will influence the outcome of M&As.  
 
The reputation-concern hypothesis (Lazear and Rosen, 1979, Fama, 1980, Holmström, 
1999) states that security analyst reputation is a career-long concern. Investors give 
extra credit to security analysts with a high reputation. A security analysts’ reputation 
is based on the accuracy of their forecasts and the length of their forecasting record. 
To maintain a high reputation, security analysts should possess superior 
information-processing abilities. Herding may exist but experienced security analysts 
give forecasts earlier than inexperienced analysts (Hong et al., 2000). According to 
the theory, we believe that security analysts have superior information processing 
abilities. Therefore, they can successfully predict M&A performance and give 
recommendations accordingly. By studying a sample of 8,889 US M&A deals from 
1993 to 2010, we firstly examine to what extent recommendation consensus can 
influence an acquirer’s short-term abnormal return. To prove that analysts have 
superior information-processing abilities, we estimate the relationship between the 
changes in recommendation consensus before deal announcement and acquirer 
short-term M&A performance. We also reveal how analysts respond to acquirers’ 
short-term abnormal returns after the deal announcement. Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(Reg-FD) (2000) is a game-changing regulation and has limited selective disclosure. 
Bagnoli et al. (2008) argue that analysts’ superior performance in issuing correct 
recommendations and earnings forecast is due to strong links between analysts and 
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management. To reveal the true power of a security analyst, we examine to what 
extent their recommendations can affect bidders’ short-term abnormal returns after the 
enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000) 
 
Previous literature suggests that the true influence of analyst recommendations on 
stock prices remains inconclusive. According to Trueman (1994) model, analysts’ 
compensation relies on how many profitable recommendations they make for their 
clients. Chen et al. (2005) suggest that investors use two indicators to assess analysts: 
analysts’ forecasting performance and the length of analysts’ forecast record. Investors 
will favour analysts who provide more accurate forecasts and have a longer 
forecasting record. Investors will also continue to upgrade their opinions about 
analysts with high forecasting accuracy as the length of their forecasting records 
increases. Analyst’s reputations – a career-long concern – will force analysts to 
provide the most precise recommendations they can. McNichols and O'Brien (1997) 
suggest that analysts tend to cover firms for which they predict a good performance. 
Therefore, we estimate whether analyst recommendations affect bidders’ short-term 
abnormal returns.  
Furthermore, analysts issue stock recommendations and earning forecast for the firms 
they cover. According to their own assessment of firm performance, analysts will 
upgrade or downgrade their recommendation level. M&A significantly changes 
bidder and targets’ stock performance. It can generate huge portions of information in 
a short period of time. To precisely process this information and provide accurate 
recommendations, analysts have to have superior information-processing abilities. In 
this paper, we examine whether analyst recommendations influence M&A 
performance and whether analysts can successfully predict M&A performance and 
provide accurate recommendations. We conjecture that acquirer analysts will issue the 
right recommendations before the announcement day of a pending deal if they can 
foresee the forthcoming M&A deal and accurately forecast the outcomes of the 
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transaction. Therefore, changes in recommendation level three months before the 
announcement day affect bidders’ short-term abnormal return.  
 
Hilary and Hsu (2013) suggest that analysts maintain their consistency by applying a 
low-ball strategy. In essence, analysts can maintain their consistency if they always 
give optimistic forecasts. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) suggest that analysts 
give pessimistic earnings forecast so that management can meet their targets. 
According to the analyst reputation-concern theory, if analysts do have superior 
information-processing abilities, to maximum their clients’ interests they will not only 
provide accurate recommendations but also update their recommendations on time. 
Thus, analysts will change their recommendations based on bidders’ short-term 
abnormal returns shortly after announcement day. 
 
Previous studies suggest that accurate recommendations result from selective 
disclosure. There was a strong linkage between analysts and management before the 
year 2000 and recommendations given before the introduction of Reg-FD mainly 
resulted in selective disclosure. However, after the enforcement of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg-FD) in October 2000 by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the gap between public accessible information and private information 
communicated among professional investors narrowed. Bagnoli et al. (2008) suggest 
that Reg-FD builds up a more efficient competitive environment by removing analysts’ 
privilege of accessing private information. Even though some analysts’ success was 
rooted in selective disclosure before year 2000, we believe that analysts have superior 
information-processing abilities regardless of the impact of Reg-FD. Therefore, the 
true influence of analyst recommendations on bidder abnormal returns should remain 
unchanged after the enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in many respects. Stickel (1995) and 
Womack (1996) measure how prices respond to changes in recommendation. They 
document that changes in recommendation prompt converse returns at 
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recommendation announcement day. Our interest focuses on how acquirers’ 
short-term abnormal returns are related to analyst recommendations. Berchar and 
Juergens (2007) find that a positive recommendation leads to positive acquirer returns. 
However, they estimate the influence of positive announcements and negative 
recommendations on acquirer performance separately. The potential existence of 
selection bias may alter the result. In this paper, we trace all acquirers’ 
recommendations one year before deal announcement and estimate the 
recommendation consensus. This recommendation consensus is more reliable to 
reveal the true power of analysts’ recommendation. Barber et al. (2001) study how 
prices react to the recommendation consensus. However, they focus on portfolio 
returns rather than M&A returns.  
 
We also study whether analysts update their recommendations on time. The bank 
affiliation theory suggests that analysts tend to give optimistic recommendations to 
acquirers. The conflict between brokers and investors does exist. Analysts tend to give 
favourable recommendations to affiliate brokerage houses. It can be argued that career 
concern will discipline such behaviour. Empirical evidence regarding the reliability of 
analyst recommendations is inconclusive. From the investors’ perspective, we 
estimate whether analysts have a superior trading ability and whether trading in 
accordance with analyst recommendations brings a profit. Reg-FD creates a more 
efficient competitive environment by removing analysts’ privilege of accessing 
private information. Instead of using earnings forecasts, we use consensus 
recommendations to estimate how analysts’ performance regarding predictions for 
acquirer announcement return changed after the implementation of Reg-FD. 
 
This paper analyses the extent to which recommendation consensus influences 
acquirer M&A performance in both the long and short run by studying a sample of US 
M&A deals from 1992 to 2010. Instead of using general recommendation consensus, 
we use one-year time intervals surrounding the deal announcement day to estimate the 
recommendation consensus. This enables us to estimate the power of security analysts’ 
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recommendations more precisely. Our results show that acquirers with high 
recommendation consensus before announcement day outperform acquirers with low 
recommendation consensus in the short run. Analysts are therefore found to 
successfully predict incoming M&A deals and adjust their recommendations 
accordingly, supporting the reputation concern theory. Moreover, our results suggest 
that acquirer short-term M&A performance is directly linked to adjustments in 
recommendations after announcement day. The effect of recommendations on 
acquirers’ M&A short-term performance remains unchanged after the implementation 
of Regulation Fair Disclosure. 
 
This paper’s main finding is that recommendation consensus has a positive influence 
on acquirers’ short-term performance. Changes in recommendation consensus before 
announcement day are positively related to acquirer short-term performance, and 
trading in line with recommendation consensus is found to be profitable, supporting 
the reputation concern theory.  
Acquirers with a high recommendation consensus before announcement day 
outperform acquirers with a low recommendation consensus in the short run. A 
one-unit increase in recommendation consensus from 365 to 0 days before 
announcement day increases bidders CAR[-5,5] by 1.19%. Acquirers’ short-term 
abnormal returns increase if analysts issue more buy or strong buy recommendations.  
 
This is because analysts are considered to have superior information-processing 
abilities as they are more rational and skilful when valuing acquirer performance. 
However, analyst recommendations can be biased, therefore a recommendation 
consensus is more accurate and influential than a recommendation from a single 
analyst. This result suggests that even though an analyst may suffer from affiliation, 
recommendation consensus still reflects the true growth potential of an acquirer. Our 
results support the reputation concern hypothesis  
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Furthermore, changes in recommendation consensus before announcement day are 
positively related to acquirer short-term performance. More information is available 
when the deal is due to be announced. Given their concern for their reputation, analysts 
will carefully process this information and give more accurate recommendations to the 
public. This indicates that analysts adjust their recommendations in accordance with 
their most recent assessment of an acquirer’s growth potential. Our results suggest that 
a one unit increase in recommendation consensus 90 days before announcement day 
increases bidders’ CAR[-5,5] by 1.71%. These results prove that a recommendation 
consensus close to the announcement day has a stronger influence than others. This 
supports the conjecture that acquirer analysts issue the right recommendation if they 
foresee forthcoming M&A deals and accurately forecast M&A outcomes.  
On the other hand, our results also reveal how analysts respond to acquirer short-term 
abnormal returns. Acquirers’ short-term abnormal returns are positively related to 
recommendation consensus. Analysts are more likely to upgrade their 
recommendations towards a strong buy rating for an acquirer that achieves positive 
short-term abnormal returns. This is because to maintain their reputation, analysts will 
quickly respond to changes in the market as they can update their recommendations 
quickly.  
 
Finally, analysts’ recommendation consensus is still positively related to acquirers’ 
short-term performance after the implementation of Reg-FD. Our results shows that a 
one-level upgrade in recommendation consensus (Rec365) increases acquirers’ 
short-term abnormal returns by approximately 1.18%. Even though Reg-FD is a 
game-changing regulation, the true influence of analyst recommendations on bidder 
abnormal return should remain unchanged after the enforcement of the regulation. For 
the control variables, acquirers will achieve a better short-term abnormal return if 
relative-size is larger and deal type is a tender offer. A negative short-term 
performance may produce an abnormal return if the deal is diversifying and the target 
is a publicly listed firm. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a 
comprehensive literature review and construct the main hypothesis. Section 3 shows 
the data selection procedure, sample description and methodology. Section 4 includes 
univariate and multivariate results. Section 5 presents a robustness test. Section 6 sets 
out our conclusion for the chapter. 
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3.2. Literature Review 
We have estimated to what extent financial constraints can influence the outcomes of 
M&A deals. The results show that financially constrained firms outperform 
financially unconstrained firms in M&As. In chapter 2, we try to explore how analysts’ 
coverage influence the outcome of M&A. To be more specific, we tend to compare 
the magnitude of analysts’ influence with that of firms’ financial conditions on M&A 
outcomes.    
 
Barber et al. (2007) estimate the impact of NASD 2711 on the financial market. Due 
to the extreme distribution of buy and hold/sell stock rating from investment banks 
and brokerage firms, NASD 2711 was imposed on 7 February 2002. NASD Rule 
2711 requests all investment banks and brokerage firms to disclosure their stock 
rating distributions. By using a sample of over 438,000 recommendations issued by 
463 brokerage firms on more than 12,000 different firms from January 1996 to June 
2003, Barber et al. (2007) confirm that recommendation profitability can be predicted 
by broker’s rating distribution. Following the implementation of NASD 2711, buy 
recommendations fell by 5.4% and holds/sells increased by 6.6%. This result proves 
that NASD 2711 has had a statistically significant impact on the decline of buy 
recommendations. Before the implementation of NASD 2711, banks sanctioned under 
the Global Research Analyst Settlement offered 1.7% more buy recommendations 
than non-sanctioned firms. After the implementation of NASD 2711, sanctioned 
banks’ buy recommendations fell 13% more than those of non-sanctioned banks. 
Brokers’ stock rating distributions can be used to predict the profitability of analyst 
recommendations, especially for the time after the implementation of NASD 2711. 
However, the predictability of the distribution is diminishing in the quarters after the 
implementation of these regulations. 
 
Ryan and Taffler (2004) prove that there is a strong linkage between large price 
movements to information shocks. An information proxy can be constructed by using 
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larger price movements. Following Ryan and Taffler (2004), Conrad et al. (2006) 
study a sample of 81,939 return events to study how analysts’ recommendations 
respond to public information shocks. They firstly construct three hypotheses then 
estimate empirical models of recommendation levels, conditioned on the sign of the 
information shock, to determine which hypothesis is most consistent with the data.  
 
Conrad et al. (2006) constructs the hypothesis under two main assumptions: first, 
analysts’ recommendations are based on price-to-value comparisons; second, the 
market is information-efficient. Under these two main assumptions, the first 
hypothesis states that analysts do not have any information privilege that other market 
participants do not have. Their recommendations are unbiased. A large stock price 
movement will therefore have no effect on the probability of a change in an analyst’s 
recommendation level. The second hypothesis states that analysts have private 
information that others cannot access, so they downgrade (upgrade) in response to 
positive (negative) price shocks. This is because positive price shocks lead to market 
overvaluations, analysts who can access private information can more accurately 
estimate fundamental values. They tend to downgrade in response to a positive price 
shock and vice-versa. There is a symmetrical relationship between recommendation 
change and market shock. Finally, based on the assumptions of H2, conflicts of 
interest between analysts and their employers do exist so that recommendations given 
by analysts will be biased. Under H3, analysts may downgrade their recommendations 
for negative price shocks. There will be an asymmetrical relationship between 
recommendation change and market shock. 
 
Conrad et al. (2006) tests these hypotheses by carrying out univariate and multivariate 
tests. If the results support H1 and H2, no conflict of interest exists. There will be a 
symmetric reaction between analyst recommendation and subsequent positive and 
negative information shocks. On the other hand, if the results support H3, there is a 
conflict of interest with the asymmetric response. They document that analyst 
recommendations change with large price shocks. There is an asymmetrical 
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movement between recommendation changes and stock prices during both bull and 
bear markets. Analysts are equally likely to upgrade in a bull market. However, they 
are more likely to downgrade in a bear market. The results indicate that a conflict 
between analysts and their employers does exist.  
 
Conrad et al. (2006) also provide empirical evidence to support the herding theory. 
‘Herding’ is defined as individual market participants conducting similar trading 
strategies at the same time. Trueman (1994) suggests that analysts’ compensation 
relies on how many profitable recommendations they make for their clients. Thus, 
analysts making unprofitable recommendations tend to herd with those who make 
profitable recommendations regardless of the information received. Jegadeesh and 
Kim (2009) introduce a new approach to analyse the herding phenomenon that 
appears when sell-side analysts give stock recommendations. Herding results from all 
trading participants making the correct reaction based on receiving the same 
information. However, due to analysts’ optimistic bias, some are unwilling to 
downgrade their recommendations even if the firm covered performs poorly. 
 
Bagnoli et al. (2008) reveal a strong linkage between analysts and management before 
2000. Recommendations given before the introduction of Reg-FD are mainly the 
result of selective disclosure; Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg-FD), introduced by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in October 2000, aims to eliminate the 
gap between publicly accessible information and private information communicated 
among professional investors. During the first year of imposing Reg-FD, turnover of 
Institutional Investor (I/I) ranking intensified, with only 68.16% of I/I ranked analysts 
remaining ranked after Reg-FD compared with 79.27% before Reg-FD. The changes 
in turnover of I/I indicate that Reg-FD builds up a more efficient competitive 
environment by removing analysts’ privilege of accessing private information. Mark 
Bagnoli et al. (2008) conclude that Reg-FD has seriously changed the trading 
behaviour of institutional investors, hedge funds and financial analyst, especially for 
I/I rankings. Thus, we estimate whether the effect of recommendations on bidder 
 106 
abnormal return is changed by Reg-FD. In addition, Conrad et al. (2006) do not 
directly estimate the relationship between information shocks and recommendation 
changes. Alternatively, they construct a proxy for new information shock by changes 
in price. This may lead to biased results as a change in price is driven by different 
factors.  
 
Conflicts of interest between analysts and employers do exist. A reluctance to make 
changes to recommendations is proved by Barber et al. (2007). They examines the 
recommendation performance of independent research firms and investment banks 
from January 1996 to June 2003. The results show that buy recommendations from 
independent research firms outperform those from investment bank. Simultaneously, 
the hold and sell recommendations from independent research firms underperform 
those of investment banks. By using a sample of 335,000 recommendations issued on 
more than 11,000 companies by 409 securities firms from first call, Barber et al. 
(2007) compare the recommendation performance of sanctioned banks and 
non-sanctioned banks and conclude that the Global Research Analyst Settlement may 
be unjustified. They acknowledge that there is a reluctance to downgrade stock during 
bear markets, as addressed in the Global Research Analyst Settlement. However, the 
recommendation performance of sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks shows that the 
buy recommendations of each investment-banking category significantly 
underperform those of the independent research firms. Buy recommendations of 
independent research firms outperform those of investment banks by an average of 
3.1 basis points per day and 6.9 basis points daily during a bear market. It therefore 
takes time for analysts to change their recommendation; this delay should be marked.  
 
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) study the relationship between media coverage and 
stock market reactions by analysing investors’ behaviour as a result of differences in 
access to information. By using a comprehensive sample matching earnings 
announcements, local media coverage and trading volumes of retailing investors, 
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) conduct several series of regressions and reveal the 
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relationship between media coverage and trading volume. To begin with, they firstly 
estimate to what extent household trading can be influenced by media coverage. The 
results show that local media coverage has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on long-dollar trading volume. This result is robust after controlling for firm 
size, earnings surprise and local media coverage. The result also revealed an intuitive 
finding: the more extreme an earnings surprise is, the more trading volumes will 
fluctuate. They push the research further by dividing the sample into buy-side and 
sell-side. The results shows that local media coverage has a significant impact on 
trading volume in both the sell side and buy side, but trading volume on the selling 
side is slightly lower than that of the buying side. To estimate the pure effect of media 
coverage, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) control local trading, pre-existing demand 
and ‘home biases’. The result shows that the pure effects of media coverage on 
trading volume are around 28%. To reveal the causality effect, they identify high 
frequency variation. As the information distribution relies on physical delivery during 
the sample period, they controls for extreme weather conditions using weather data 
collected from the National Climatic Data Centre. The result shows that the 
interaction between extreme weather and media coverage has a significant negative 
effect on trading volume. This impact is large enough to offset the positive impact of 
media coverage on trading volume. The results indicate that there is no positive 
correlation between media and pre-existing relations.  
 
They conclude that the causality effect between trading volume and local media 
coverage does exist. The market reaction for given earnings announcements is heavily 
dependent on local media coverage. Based upon the intensity of local media coverage, 
daily trading volume will surge from 8% to 50%. This effect remains for both buying 
and selling activity. However, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) do not directly estimate 
the causality effect between media coverage and trading volume. They reveal the 
causal impact by removing co-existing impacts such as pre-existing relations, local 
media coverage, home bias and high frequent variation. Furthermore, the content of 
media reports should be more specified. For instance, the impact of media reports that 
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cover firms’ detailed financial conditions on trading volume may be different from the 
impact of reports that only relate general stories. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) 
analyse the impact of local media on local trading volume; the results may be varied if 
we take the whole market into consideration. Finally, we ask how analysts react to 
media coverage, whether they will alter their recommendation level based on volume 
of media coverage.  
 
By developing a model which links managerial skill to managers’ reliance on public 
information (RPI), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) directly estimate the relation between 
changes in stock holding and returns. To analyse the same question, previous studies 
have firstly estimated which type of information leads to changes in stock holding, 
then move to the relation between changes in stock holding and returns. By using this 
unique design, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) estimate the relation between traditional 
performance measures and managerial skills. They believe that the magnitude of 
reliance on public information is related to managerial skills. The model implies that 
skilled managers are less likely to change their portfolio holding in response to public 
information. Therefore, skilled managers will exhibit low RPI.  
 
By analysing a comprehensive sample that covers 1,696 actively managed US equity 
funds over the period 1993 to 2002, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007)  find that 
traditional performance measurement may not fully reflect managerial skill, as 
investors tend to chase funds with low reliance on public information (RPI). After 
controlling for market, size, value and momentum, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007)  
find that mutual funds with a lower RPI tend to obtain significantly higher returns. 
This is because funds with superior information-processing skills exhibit a superior 
stock-picking ability. they also find that funds with a low RPI are rewarded with 
higher money flows after controlling for past fund performance and other 
fund-specific characteristics. Funds with a high RPI face higher systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk than funds with low RPI. The results imply that institutional 
investors should disclose more information about the magnitude of RPI when there is 
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a lack of transparency. RPI may be useful in setting new portfolio managers’ 
rewarding system as the abnormal performance rewarding system is biased.  
 
The ability to time the market is the main reason why informed hedge fund managers 
outperform others. Engelberg (2008) considers the type of information used in 
financial research rather than merely focusing on agent type. Tetlock (2007) 
developed General Inquirer (GI) to estimate the qualitative content of financial media. 
It counts the frequency at which words appear in text and classifies the words into 
categories determined by the Harvard IV-4 psychological dictionary. Negative 
fraction is defined as total negative words from firm I on day T divided by the total 
words for firm I on day T. By using a unique design – negative fraction – to measure 
the textural data, they estimate the relation between the role of information-processing 
cost and post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Engelberg (2008) divides the data 
into qualitative information (information distributed in text) and quantitative 
information (information spread in data form). Soft information is text-based 
information such as news reports and earnings statements. Hard information is 
data-based, such as accounting information and market returns.  
 
By studying a sample containing 51,207 earnings announcements from 4 January 
1999 to 18 November 2005 by 4,700 unique firms, Engelberg (2008) reveals that 
qualitative information has more predictive power than quantitative information. The 
qualitative information embedded in the DJNS contains more information than 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE); this information needs time to diffuse into 
the market. Qualitative information has more power concerning predicting returns at 
longer horizons. By estimating the profit from five trading strategies based on 
negative fraction, Engelberg (2008) finds that a trading strategy combining SUE and 
negative fraction leads to additional profit. Negative fraction’s influence on CAR[2,81] 
declines institutional ownership increases. This is because institutional investors are 
better information processers and access to newswires is costly. Engelberg (2008) also 
uses a baseline regression model to estimate how the CAR of high-tech firms react to 
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negative fraction. The results shows that the coefficient of NF is -0.5893 for high-tech 
firms and -0.0606 for non-high tech firms.  
 
Engelberg (2008) gives a detailed map on how to use textural data in financial 
research. He not only introduces negative fraction in research but also uses NLP to 
capture reports’ characteristics. He also provides very comprehensive research on the 
predictability of soft information and hard information. His research deals with 
multiple aspects on this topic, such as: comparing the predictability of soft and hard 
information; how institutional investors and analysts react to soft and hard 
information; and how negative influences high-tech firms’ abnormal returns. 
Engelberg (2008)  suggests that analyst may have different attitudes regarding the 
predictability of soft information on future returns, as soft information can be used to 
make predication on future earnings. However, processing soft information is costly 
and complex. He points out that researchers should take information type into account 
when exploring the effect of agent type on asset pricing. 
 
Chen et al. (2005) introduce a model to study how investors estimate the predictive 
ability of analysts. The result suggests that investors rely on two indicators: analysts’ 
forecasting performance and the length of analysts’ forecast record. The analyst 
forecast record is referred to as analysts’ series of forecast errors. According to the 
model provided by Chen et al. (2005), investors will give more weight to an analyst 
who provides more accurate forecasts and less weight when forecast error is revealed 
(Bayesian learning). The length of forecasting record is also important for investors to 
estimate analysts’ predictive ability. Investors will upgrade their views on analysts 
with high forecasting accuracy in their record as the length of the record increases. 
Chen et al. (2005)  empirical result suggests that analysts’ reputation is a career-long 
concern and that it seriously influences their behaviour.  
 
By analysing a sample including 5,941 analysts and 20,239 analyst year observations 
from 1993 to 2005, Emery and Li (2009) estimate how sell-side analysts are ranked 
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by Institutional Investor magazine and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and what the 
determining factors of analyst rankings are. They also estimate the performance of 
analysts after having achieved their star rankings from I/I or the WSJ and compared 
the performance of star analysts and non-star analysts. To avoid industry-by-industry 
bias in the star rankings, industry benchmarks are chosen to estimate analyst 
performance. Analyst performance is measured using information ratios and accuracy. 
Accuracy is defined as the relative accuracy of an analysts’ earnings forecasts, which 
was originally developed by Hong and Kubik (2003). To reveal the true determinant 
force of star ranking, Emery and Li (2009)  controlled for analyst aggressiveness, 
boldness and past ranking record. Broker size and firm size were also included.  
 
Emery and Li (2009) suggest that recommendation performance has an insignificant 
impact on the possibility of becoming a star analyst but that it is important for an 
analyst to retain their star ranking. Accuracy has a small effect on star ranking but it is 
more significant for analysts to move up the I/I ranking list. The statistical 
significance and pronounced effects of IISTAR (212.26%), BROKERSIZE (40.02%), 
IPOREP (27.24%), WSJSTAR (24.04%), and TOP300 (16.55%) are consistent with 
the idea that recognition is the dominating aspect of being an I/I star. 
 
To retain the star ranking, the industry-adjusted performance of investment 
recommendations is statically significant in WSJ rankings. However, the 
recommendation performance of a repeated star is worse than others; to be ranked as a 
WSJ star analyst, recommendation performance is vitally important, as the WSJ is 
performance-focused. Emery and Li (2009) result suggested that INFORATIO is 
statically significant for all regressions, which indicates that in the WSJ ranking 
system, recommendation performance is the main determinant of being a WSJ star 
and moving up or down the WSJ ranking list, especially for a repeating WSJ star 
ranking. However, it also suggested that variables measuring recognition are also 
significant in the WSJ ranking. Recognition is a critical factor in meeting WSJ’s 
eligibility requirements and, as such, recognition is a driving force in the WSJ’s 
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rankings, albeit only for non-WSJ stars. 
 
The recommendation performances of star analysts are not significantly different from 
those of non-star analysts. There is no significant improvement in analysts’ 
performance after becoming an I/I star. On the other hand, WSJ star performance is 
found to worsen after obtaining a star ranking. I/I and WSJ stars are less biased in 
their investment recommendations than non-stars. Simultaneously, however, the 
investment banking business reduces the relative objectiveness of star analysts. The 
results provide additional evidence that star analysts may trade their compensation 
from having a better personal reputation for higher compensation as a result of 
promoting investment-banking deals. Overall, Emery and Li (2009) provide overall 
broad picture of the determinants of the star analyst ranking system, and their 
empirical results suggest that star rankings for both I/I and the WSJ are rely heavily 
on recognition.  
 
There are two types of analysts: the first is the analyst who makes consistent forecast 
errors; the second is the analyst with higher stated accuracy. Hilary and Hsu (2013) 
estimate to what extent stock price can be affected by forecasts given by these two 
types. They document that the first type of analyst has a greater capability to affect 
price than the second. Consistency of forecasting error is better than stated accuracy, 
because investors can use consistent errors from analysts as a benchmark for their 
own stock valuation.  
 
Hilary and Hsu (2013) find that consistency increases forecast informativeness rather 
than accuracy. Their findings imply that: first, consistent analysts are less likely to be 
downgraded and more likely to be nominated as an all-star analyst. Consistency 
improves the likelihood of being ranked as an I/I star, which is 10% higher than that 
of accuracy. Consistency also significantly decreases the likelihood of being demoted, 
which is much stronger than accuracy. Secondly, analysts can manipulate their 
consistency by strategically giving downward-biased forecasts. Thirdly, institutional 
 113 
investors favour analysts with a high consistency and trading strategy. Hilary and Hsu 
(2013) show that consistent analysts are rewarded by I/I rankings. However, Emery 
and Li (2009) suggest that I/I ranking mainly relies on analyst recognition. It remains 
inconclusive as to how I/I ranks analysts with high consistency but low recognition 
and what the combined effect of these two factors is. 
 
Furthermore, Hilary and Hsu (2013) suggest that analysts maintain their consistency 
by applying a low-ball strategy. They can maintain their consistency by always giving 
optimistic forecasts. Conrad et al. (2006) suggest that recommendations provided by 
analysts tend to be sticky in response to major news (interest conflict). Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar (2014) suggest that analysts give pessimistic earnings forecast so 
that management can meet targets (strategic distortion). Questions arise regarding 
how analyst maintain their consistency when there is institutional interference.   
 
Kim et al. (1997) study the trading mechanism of the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
and find that a highly centralized call market takes relatively shorter time to reflect 
private information in stock prices than a competitive but fragmented dealer market. 
The trading mechanism of the NYSE/AMEX involves floor brokers and specialists. 
The specialists set up an order execution price for each stock by studying the volume 
of limit orders and market-on-open orders. They also have the duty of maintaining 
price stability and continuity. After the market opens, there will be continued auctions 
on given stocks. In this case, NYSE/AMEX is known as a call market. The main 
advantage of a call market is that both public and private information is efficiently 
reflected by execution price at market opening. It takes approximately five minutes to 
realize the value of private information in a call market. The trading mechanism of the 
NASDAQ involves a number of dealers who equally assess the market. They 
simultaneously quote the bid and ask price and competing by given utility maximizing 
price. The main feature of the NASDAQ is that competing and fragmented dealers 
conduct trading. It thus takes approximately 15 minutes for stock prices to reflect 
private information.   
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The Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW) has recorded the time of news releasing. The 
records show that VIPs of brokerage houses can possess recommendations from 
analysts before they are publicly announced. In this case, VIPs of brokerage houses 
are considered informed traders as they have private information. By studying a 
sample of 87 observations, Kim et al. (1997) suggest that initial coverage and buy 
recommendations push stock prices up by approximately 4% for the NYSE/AMEX 
and 7% for the NASDAQ. These results indicate that buy recommendations given by 
analysts in brokerage houses have a positive effect on firms’ stock price. In this case, 
as long as the profit generated by the initial coverage can offset the cost of initial 
covering, managers are willing to pay analysts just to give the right recommendations 
at the right time. 
 
Furthermore, information asymmetry caused by initial coverage and information 
leakage before the market opens lead to strong positive reactions in stock prices. 
According to their evidence, private information has more influential power than 
public information. The release of public information has no effect on stock price. The 
NYSE/AMEX – the call market – is more efficient at incorporating private 
information into stock price than the NASDAQ (a dealer market). The effect of 
private information is concentrated on opening trade. Informed traders obtain most of 
the gains at the initial trade; gains from subsequent trading barely cover the 
transaction cost. Although the NASDAQ tends to less efficient at reflecting private 
information into stock prices, informed traders have approximately 3% gains after the 
opening trades. It takes less than 15 minutes after the opening transactions in each 
market for private information to be incorporated into stock prices. The competition 
among informed traders is the reason why private information takes effect so fast. 
This is because the market rewards the first informed traders who complete the deal 
with the highest prize. The competition among informed traders shortens the time 
needed for private information to be incorporated into stock prices. Kim et al. (1997) 
suggest that DJNW records the times that VIP brokers access private information and 
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the public release of the same information. The timing of recommendation delivered 
should therefore be taken into consideration when evaluating analyst recommendation 
ability.  
 
There are two types of views on short-sellers’ trading advantage. One group of 
literature believes that information asymmetry does exist, and that short-sellers are 
informed traders. The second group believes that there is no information asymmetry 
but rather market participants interpret public news differently. By combining the 
corporate news archive and daily short-selling information, Engelberg et al. (2012) 
reveal the root of short-sellers’ trading advantages. Short-sellers have superior 
information-processing abilities, which is the reason why they can achieve abnormal 
returns in their trades. There is no evidence to support the claim of short-sellers 
manipulating news or spreading rumours. Their result also suggests that the timing of 
short-selling on news day is approximately the same as for other participants, i.e. the 
ratio of short volume to total volume is 0.196, which drops to 0.177 on negative news 
days and rises to 0.208 on days with positive news. During the days up to news day, 
the ratio is smaller or the same under the conditional mean. During the days after 
news day, the ratio increases. This proves that short-sellers trade on or after news 
release dates. They also found that the magnitude of a negative relationship between 
short sales and future returns is doubled on news day and four times as large as on 
negative news days. 
 
By analysing a sample of 216 jobs changes among I/I star analyst, Clarke et al. (2007) 
estimate to what extent analyst behaviour can be influenced by bank relationship and 
whether analyst behaviour affects investment banking deal flow.  
 
By studying the changes of analysts’ behaviour around job-changing periods, Clarke 
et al. (2007) directly examine to what extent investment banks can influence analysts 
to give favourable recommendations. Their evidence shows that investment banks do 
not influence analysts’ recommendations. Clarke et al. (2007) show that a star 
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analyst’s choice of firm coverage is influenced by the investment bank’s relationship 
with the firm. The possibility of being covered by a star analyst is high for firms with 
a prior investment banking relationship, particular for underwriting or M&A advisory. 
Analyst reputation has statistically significant effects on investment banking deal flow 
but the effect only appears in equity transactions. The bank hiring the star analyst 
significantly increases its market share in the industry covered by the analyst relative 
to the bank losing the star analyst. There is no evidence that the optimistic earnings 
forecasts or recommendations affect investment banking deal flow.  
 
After job changes, analysts may choose to only cover stocks that generate profit for 
their new employer and provide more optimistic reports during job changes. However, 
Clarke et al. (2007)  suggest that analysts are less likely to change their optimism 
levels and recommendation ratings for the firms they cover at the new bank; their 
level of optimism remains unchanged after changing job. The relationship between 
investment bank and firm as well as job changes therefore do not influence analysts’ 
earnings forecasts; neither star nor non-star analysts upgrade their recommendation 
levels around job-changing periods.  
 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) study a sample of analyst recommendations, 
annual earnings forecasts, the corresponding earnings-per-share realization, 
information related to analyst identities and brokerage firms from February 1994 to 
2002. They estimate whether analysts give different recommendations and earnings 
forecasts for different audiences, and whether recommendations and earnings forecast 
distortion result from the trading strategy among firms, institutional investors and 
analysts.  
 
By sorting analysts into affiliated analysts and non-affiliated analysts by their 
relationship with large investment institutions, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) 
find that affiliated analysts give more positive recommendations than those that are 
unaffiliated. When consensus is chosen as a benchmark, affiliated analysts give less 
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optimistic earnings forecast. Both large and small investors take symmetric reactions 
in response to changes in recommendation grade. Small traders ignore the content of 
forecasts and tend to exert buy pressure for forecast updates; large investors tend to 
make symmetric reactions towards positive/negative earnings forecast. The 
over-optimism expressed by unaffiliated analysts remains unchanged for their 
recommendation and earnings forecast. On the other hand, affiliated analysts show 
over-optimism in their recommendations and pessimism in their earnings forecasts. 
This proves that strategic distortion determines the behaviour of affiliated analysts, 
and strategic distortions are found to exist in the recommendations and forecasts given 
by both unaffiliated and affiliated analysts. Studying such distortions can help 
investors to assess the quality of the recommendations and earnings forecast given by 
particular analysts.  
 
Strategic distortion is defined as the disparity between the recommendations and 
forecasts given by one analyst for the same stock. The results show that non-strategic 
distorters give optimistic recommendations and earnings forecasts but strategic 
distorters give optimistic recommendations and pessimistic earnings forecasts. This 
disparity is extended to affiliated analysts too. In addition, the distortion is persistent 
for all analysts.  
 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) did not estimate the characteristics of 
recommendations and earnings forecasts given by analysts, but they can be separated 
into consistency and accuracy. Hilary and Hsu (2013) show that analysts who 
constantly give downwards recommendations tend to have more predictability than 
those with high accuracy. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) prove that analysts 
speak in two tongues. They ignore the fact that the different information-processing 
skills among investors play a strong role in their investment behaviour. However, 
using investment size to classify investors is not efficient enough to reveal the true 
effect.  
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Teo and Chung (2011) reveal the relationship between hedge funds, sell-side analysts 
and star analyst rankings. They indicate that sell-side analysts are commission-driven. 
The researchers find that sell-side analysts tend to provide favourable 
recommendations on stocks held by hedge funds. In turn, hedge funds support biased 
analysts to be ranked as star analysts. Teo and Chung (2011) therefore suggest that 
star rankings fail to give unbiased rankings for analysts. The strong cooperation 
between hedge funds and analysts will lead to market failure in the future.  
 
The paper’s results shows that analysts are 14.8% more likely to issue buy and strong 
buy recommendations (upgrade) for stocks that are held or being increasing held by 
hedge funds, and 13.3% more likely to issue sell and strong sell recommendations 
(downgrade) for stocks sold or being decreasing held by hedge funds. Sell-side 
analysts tend to provide flattering buy and strong buy recommendations to stock that 
are held by hedge funds. This result is consistent with Boni and Womack (2003).  
 
This is because sell-side analysts’ incentives come from brokerage commissions. 
Hedge funds will short their stock holdings when the sell-side analysts’ buy and 
strong buy recommendations open up trading opportunities. The results of the study 
show that when the mean analyst consensus for a stock is equal to or greater than a 
buy, hedge funds are 11.1% more likely to offload the recommended stock. Ceteris 
paribus, others are 25.2% less likely to sell a stock. Sell-side analysts tend to upgrade 
and downgrade their recommendations based on this trading mechanism.  
 
Teo and Chung (2011) also suggest that high dollar-turnover hedge funds can get 
their most wanted recommendations more easily than others as sell-side analysts are 
commission-driven. Finally, giving biased recommendations may damage sell-side 
analysts’ reputation. However, hedge fund will compensate biased analysts by voting 
for or supporting them to be ranked as an all-star analyst. As stated earlier, this ill 
trading mechanism may lead to market failure in the future. 
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Teo and Chung (2011) do not cover how individual investors and other institutional 
investors respond to analyst recommendations. Individual investors have their own 
judgments on analyst recommendation. Investor trading behaviour may be influenced 
by analyst recommendations. However, the magnitude of that influence is unknown.  
 
Main theory: Reputation concern theory  
Security analysts’ reputation is a career-long concern. Investors give extra credit to 
security analysts with a high reputation. Their reputation is based on their forecast 
accuracy and length of forecasting record. To maintain a high reputation, security 
analysts must possess superior information-processing abilities. Herding may exist but 
experienced security analysts give forecasts earlier than inexperienced (Hong et al., 
2000). According to the theory, we believe that security analysts have superior 
information-processing abilities. Therefore, they can successfully predict merger and 
acquisition performance and give recommendations accordingly.   
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3.3. Hypothesis Construction 
Previous studies suggest that the true influence of analyst recommendations on stock 
prices remains inconclusive. According to Trueman (1994)’s model, analysts’ 
compensation relies on how many profitable recommendations they make for their 
clients. Chen et al. (2005) suggest that investors use two indicators to assess analysts: 
the analysts’ forecasting performance and the length of their forecast record. Investors 
will favour an analyst who provides more accurate forecasts and has a longer 
forecasting record. Investors will also upgrade their views on an analyst who has a 
high forecasting accuracy in their record. Analysts’ reputation therefore forces them to 
provide the most precise recommendations possible. McNichols and O'Brien (1997) 
suggest that analysts tend to cover firms for which they predict good performance. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that analyst recommendations have an impact on bidders’ 
short-term abnormal returns.  
H1: Analyst recommendation has statistically significant impact on bidder short-term 
abnormal return.  
 
Analysts issue stock recommendations and earnings forecast for the firms they cover. 
According to their own assessment of firm performance, analysts will upgrade or 
downgrade their recommendations. M&A significantly change bidders’ and targets’ 
stock performance. It can generate huge portions of information in a short period of 
time. To precisely process this information and provide accurate recommendations, 
analysts must have superior information-processing abilities. In this paper, we 
examine whether analyst recommendations influence M&A performance and whether 
analysts can successfully predict M&A performance and provide accurate 
recommendations. We conjecture that acquirer analysts will issue the right 
recommendations before the announcement day if they can foresee forthcoming M&A 
deals and accurately forecast their outcomes. We hypothesise that: 
H2: Changes in recommendation level three months before announcement day affect 
bidders’ short-term abnormal return.  
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Hilary and Hsu (2013) suggest that analysts maintain their consistency by applying 
the low-ball strategy. This consistency can be maintained if analysts always give 
optimistic forecasts. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) suggest that analysts give 
pessimistic earnings forecasts so that management can meet their targets. According 
to the analyst reputation concern theory, if analysts have superior 
information-processing abilities, to maximum their clients’ interests they will not only 
provide accurate recommendations but also update their recommendations on time. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H3: Analysts will change their recommendations based on bidders’ short-term 
abnormal return within a three-month period after announcement day. 
 
Previous studies suggest that accurate recommendations result from selective 
disclosure. There was a strong linkage between analysts and management before the 
introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000. Recommendations prior to 
Reg-FD mainly resulted in selective disclosure (Bagnoli et al., 2008); however, after 
the enforcement of Reg-FD, the gap between publicly accessible information and 
private information communicated among professional investors narrowed. Bagnoli et 
al. (2008) conclude that Reg-FD has built up a more efficient competitive 
environment by removing analysts’ privilege of accessing private information. 
Although some analysts’ success is rooted in their performance prior to 2000, we 
believe that they continue to have superior information-processing abilities. Therefore, 
the true influence of analyst recommendations on bidder abnormal return should 
remain unchanged after the enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure. We 
hypothesise that:  
H4: Analyst recommendations affect bidders’ short-term abnormal return after the 
enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000). 
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3.4. Data and Methodology  
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
In this paper, we estimate the relationship between bidders’ short-term returns and 
analyst recommendations. Therefore, we need to combine the deal sample and 
recommendation sample. The initial deal sample includes 281,335 US M&A deals. 
We require all deals to have been announced over the period 1 January 1992 to 31 
December 2010 from Thomson One Banker. Both bidders and targets must be US 
firms, thus the original sample yielded 175,027 deals. Bidders are also required to be 
public companies; targets can be public, private or subsidiaries. This reduces the 
sample to 94,387 deals. Takeover transaction values must be greater than or equal to 
$1 million, lowering the sample to 52,273 deals. Following the standard procedure, 
we exclude financial and utility firms with Standard Industrial Classification codes 
6000–6999 and 4900–4999 as these firms are in regulated industries. This leaves us a 
sample of 36,758 deals. We also remove deals completed using the following M&A 
techniques: bankruptcy acquisitions, going-private transactions, leveraged buyouts, 
liquidations, repurchases, restructurings, reverse takeovers, and privatisations. This 
reduces the sample to 25,645 deals. As we study bidders’ short-term acquisition 
performance, all deals should be completed, which reduced the sample further to 
35,263 deals. 
 
We collect all of the available analyst recommendations from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The recommendation recordings range from 29 October 
1993 to 18 April 2013. IBES ranks recommendations by a numerical system using the 
IBES recommendation code: 1=strong buy, 2=buy, 3=hold, 4=sell, 5=strong sell. To 
ease the potential confusion, we use Jegadeesh et al.’s (2004) approach to reverse the 
code into: 5=strong buy, 4=buy, 3=hold, 2=sell, 1=strong sell. To estimate the effect 
of recommendations on bidder performance, we need to match the recommendation 
with bidders’ firm characteristics and deal characteristics. Therefore, we collect 
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company name, analyst name and estimator ID. To guarantee data accuracy, we obtain 
both recommendation announcement day and review day. The initial recommendation 
sample includes 2,205,401 observations, which covers 58,263 companies and 21,658 
analysts. These two samples are matched by deal number, analyst name, company 
name and recommendation announcement day. As one acquirer will receive many 
recommendations from different analysts, after the combination, the sample yields to 
463,046 observations. Furthermore, analysts will upgrade or downgrade their 
recommendations over time. A strong buy recommendation given two years ago has a 
limited impact on bidder performance today. Therefore, we introduce a time variable 
gap. This gap is defined as the calendar day difference between the recommendation 
announcement day and deal announcement day. We keep the recommendation given 
365 days before the deal announcement and 365 days after the deal announcement day, 
which yields 318,320 observations. Nonetheless, we estimate the recommendation 
consensus and drop all duplicate deals, reducing our sample to 25,645 observations.  
 
To control deal characteristics, we require that deal information, such as deal attitude, 
diversification, deal type and means of payment, be recorded by Thomson One 
Banker, yielding 18,782 deals.  
 
To control for firms’ characteristics, we require that The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database has sufficient recorded information about bidder 
stock price data. We use cumulative abnormal return 3, 5 and 11 days surrounding the 
announcement day to measure bidders’ short-term abnormal return, which reduces the 
sample to 15,803 deals. We require that bidders have sufficient accounting 
information, as recorded by the Compustat database, so that we can estimate firm 
characteristics such as leverage ratio, run-up ratio, market to book ratio, price to 
earnings ratio and relative size, leaving a sample of 10,666 observations. Since we 
analyse to what extent financial recommendations influence M&A performance, 
recommendation censuses are also required, yielding a sample of 9,649 deals. To 
estimate the post-merger recommendation changes, we require all deals to have been 
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completed, and thus remove 760 uncompleted deals, giving a final sample of 8889 
deals. 
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3.4.2 Methodology  
3.4.2.1 Univariate Test  
Both univariate tests and multivariate regression models are employed to analyse the 
impact of recommendation consensus on bidders’ short-term abnormal returns. We 
categorise the sample into two groups on the basis of deal announcement day. To 
estimate whether recommendation consensus can influence bidder short-term abnormal 
returns, we need to use the recommendations given before the announcement day. We 
define the recommendation consensus before the announcement day as the average 
recommendation level given from 365 days to 0 days before the deal announcement day. 
We define the recommendation consensus after the announcement day as the average 
recommendation level given from 0 day to 365 days after the deal announcement day.  
 
In the univariate test, we further categorize the sample using the recommendation 
consensus. We define a group of deals as having a Buy recommendation if the acquirers’ 
recommendation consensus is greater than 2; the rest of the sample is labelled as Hold 
or Sell. We then compare the mean of bidders’ short-term abnormal returns obtained by 
acquirer’s recommendation consensus level. We use different approaches to estimate 
abnormal returns in short run. For the short run, we choose 3, 5 and 11-day time 
windows to calculate CARs. CARs in each time window are estimated using the market 
model and the market-adjusted model.  
 
Bidders’ firm-specified characteristics used are:  
(i) Runup, which measures bidders’ past performance and is defined as market 
adjusted cumulative abnormal return 365 to 6 days before deal announcement;  
(ii) ROE, which measures bidders’ profitability and is defined as net income 
divided by common and preferred equity – COMPUSTAT 
Item18/(Item10+Item11);  
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(iii) M/B, the market to book ratio, which measures the market valuation of a 
bidder’s stock, and is defined as annual price close multiplied by the number of 
common shares outstanding divided by the total common equity – 
COMPUSTAT Item24*Item25/Item60;  
(iv) P/E, the price to earnings ratio, which measures net income per share and is 
defined as the annual price close divided by earnings per share – COMPUSTAT 
Item24/Item58; 
(v) Cash flow/total assets, which is the cash flow over the equity ratio, measures the 
amount of free cash held by a company and is defined as the sum of income 
before extraordinary items and depreciation minus dividends of common and 
preferred stock, divided by the total asset – COMPUSTAT(Item18+ Item14- 
Item19- Item21)/(Item6); 
(vi) Debt/equity (debt over asset ratio), which measures to what extent the company 
is leveraged, and is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets – 
COMPUSTAT Item9/Item6;  
(vii) We also include the leverage ratio, which is defined as the total liabilities 
divided by the total assets – defined as COMPUSTAT (Item 9+Item34)/( Item 
9+Item34+Item216).  
 
For each group, we compare the deal-specific characteristics. ‘Relative transaction 
value’ denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value 
over bidders’ market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the type of deal. ‘Hostile’ measures 
deal attitude. ‘Diversification’ indicates bidder and target oriented in different 
industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; ‘public’ denotes a 
publicly listed target. 
 
3.4.2.2 Multivariable test 
Univariate tests are insufficient to reveal the true relationship between recommendation 
consensus and acquirers’ short-term abnormal returns. To reveal the true relationship, 
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we need to control for the interactive effect among firm characteristics and deal 
characteristics. As mentioned before, the first hypothesis states that ‘Analyst 
recommendation has a statistically significant impact on bidder short-term abnormal 
return.’ To test hypothesis 1, we carry out multivariable tests as shown in the following 
regression model.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 1  
Regression model 1 measures the relationship between recommendation consensus 
and acquirer abnormal return. The key explanatory variable is recommendation 
consensus (𝑅𝐸𝐶365𝑖𝑡) measured by average recommendation given 365 days before 
deal announcement day. There will be more information available on the deal 
announcement day. We conjecture that the recommendations given close to the deal 
announcement day have a stronger impact than others. Therefore, in regression 2, we 
recalculate recommendation consensus by the average of the recommendations given 
90 days before the announcement day. The key explanatory variable is 
recommendation consensus (𝑅𝐸𝐶90𝑖𝑡). 
Regression model 2 analyses the relationship between changes in recommendation and 
acquirers’ abnormal return. We conjecture that acquirer analysts will issue the right 
recommendations before announcement day. More information is disclosed on the 
actual announcement day. Analysts can foresee forthcoming M&A deals and 
accurately forecast their outcomes and change or update their recommendations 
accordingly. The second hypothesis is that: Changes in recommendation level three 
months before announcement day affect bidder’s short-term abnormal return. We 
carry out multivariable tests as shown in the following regression model.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠_𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 2  
 128 
The key explanatory variable is changes in recommendation consensus 
(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠_𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡). To estimate 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠_𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 , we initially divide the pre-deal 
announcement day recommendation sample into two groups by different calendar day, 
recommendations given from 365 to 90 days before announcement day, and 
recommendations given from 90 days to 0 days before announcement days. We then 
match the sample by deal number, acquirer ID and analyst ID and calculate the 
recommendation consensus. Next, we use the recommendation consensus 90 days 
before announcement day and subtract the recommendation 365 to 90 days before 
announcement day. We therefore define the changes in recommendation 
(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠_𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) as the difference between the recommendation consensus 90 days 
before announcement day and recommendation 365 to 90 days before announcement 
day. 
 
Regression model 3 analyses how analyst recommendations respond to acquirers’ 
short-term abnormal return. The third hypothesis is that analysts will change their 
recommendation based on bidders’ short-term abnormal return within three months 
after the announcement day. We use a probit model to carry out multivariable tests, as 
shown in following regression model 3.  
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑉𝐿 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 3.  
The dependent variable: recommendation level (RECLVL) in regression model 3 is a 
dummy variable, equal to 1 if the recommendation level is buy or strong buy. The key 
explanatory variable is the cumulative abnormal return, which is estimated at 3, 5 and 
11 days surrounding the announcement day. As mentioned before, analysts respond to 
acquirers’ short-term abnormal return, and will adjust their recommendation in time. 
We look for a positive relationship between acquirers’ post-acquisition abnormal return 
and RECLVL.  
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In order to analyse the impact of REG-FD on the relation between recommendation 
and bidders’ return in the short run, we rerun the regressions by adding a dummy 
variable REG-FD; REG-FD is equal to 1 if the deal announcement day is after 2000 
when REG-FD was implemented. We use regression model 4 to carry out the 
regression shown below:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝐸𝐺_𝐹𝐷 + 𝛼𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression Model 4  
The key explanatory variables are the recommendation consensus (𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) and the 
dummy variable REG-FD. As mentioned before, REG-FD has substantially limited the 
accessibility of private information. Therefore, we expect the dummy variable to have a 
negative impact on bidders’ abnormal return. If analysts perform well due their superior 
information-processing abilities rather than as a result of inside trading, their 
recommendations should continue to affect bidders’ short-term abnormal returns after 
the implementation of REG-FD.  
For each regression model, we have a number of control variables that affect acquirer 
returns; The RUNUP ratio, which measures past stock return, market-to-book ratio 
(M/B), price-to-earnings ratio (P/E), leverage (Leverage), and cash flow-to-equity 
ratio (Cash flows/Equity). The deal specified variable are Relative Transaction Values, 
which measures relative size; Stock, is a dummy variable, denote 100% stock 
payment; tender offers, where the dummy variable measures deal type; and 
diversification, where the dummy variable measures whether the deal is diversifying 
deal.  
 
Short-term performance 
We use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to measure bidder short-term M&A 
performance. The market model defines Cumulative abnormal return 5 days 
surrounding announcement day as: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−5,5 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)]
5
𝑡=−5
 
 
where Rit represent firms’ daily return; Rmt represent daily market index return. 
(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) is the market return estimated by market model. Therefore, the 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of bidder daily abnormal return during 
the event window two days before and two days after the announcement day.  
 
Bouwman et al. (2009) point out that bidder may conduct multiple deals within the 
sample period. To address this issue, we estimate the market-adjusted CAR. The 
market-adjusted CAR 5 days surrounding announcement day is defined as the sum of 
daily abnormal return within the event window [-5,5];  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−5,5 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
5
𝑡=−5
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Where ARit is the daily abnormal return that is defined as firm’s daily return minus 
value-weighted daily market return. We also use the Fama-French three-factor model 
and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model in CAR estimation.  
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3.5. Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Summary Statistics and Univariate Test 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics. The sample includes acquisition deals 
conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 
January 1992 to 31 December 2010. Deal Covered BA represents all of the deals that 
acquirers’ recommendation consensus estimate by recommendation received 365 to 0 
days before announcement day. We also categorise all deals by the recommendation 
level that the acquirers receive. BUY2+ is defined as acquirers receiving an all buy 
and strong buy recommendation consensus. HOLD is defined as all acquirers 
receiving hold to strong sell recommendation consensus.  
 
                        [Insert Table 3.1 Here] 
 
Panel A reports acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by 
cumulative abnormal returns 3, 5 and 11 days surrounding the announcement day. We 
use the market-adjusted model to estimate acquirer CARs, denoted as CAR[-1,1] 
CAR[-2,2],and CAR[-5,5] respectively. The result in Panel A show that acquirers that 
receive buy and strong buy recommendations before the deal announcement day tend to 
outperform acquirers that received hold or sell recommendations. The average 
cumulative abnormal return – CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2], and CAR[-5,5] – for acquirers in 
group BUY2+ is 0.7%, 0.9% and 1.14% higher than that of the acquirers in the Hold 
group. Acquirers that received buy and strong buy recommendations after the deal 
announcement day have the highest cumulative abnormal returns. The short-term 
abnormal return for acquirers that received buys and strong buy recommendations after 
the deal announcement day is significantly higher than those in the Hold group. The 
results indicate that analysts react to short-term M&A outcomes and will upgrade their 
recommendations for acquirers with better short-term merger performance.  
 
Panel B shows firm characteristics. The results shows that acquirers with buy and 
 132 
strong buy recommendations have a higher Runup ratio, market-to-book ratio and 
price-to-earnings ratio. Runup measures acquirers’ past stock performance. Acquirers 
in the Buy2+ group are 23.18% higher than acquirers the Hold group. The 
market-to-book ratio and price-to-earnings ratio indicate acquirers’ market valuation. 
The market-to-book ratio for acquirers in the Buy2+ group is 1.92 higher than those 
of the acquirers in the Hold group. The price-to-equity ratio for acquirers in the 
Buy2+ group is also 6.67 higher than those of acquirers in the Hold group. The results 
indicate that analysts prefer acquirers with high market valuations. This result is 
consistent in both subsamples.  
 
Panel C reports deal characteristics. Relative transaction value is measured as the 
transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity four weeks before the 
announcement. The result shows that the relative size for acquirers in the Buy2+ group 
is 16.63%, which is 1.61% larger than acquirers in the Hold group. 28% of deals 
conducted by acquirers in Buy2+ use stock as the means of payment – 13.34% higher 
than the acquirers in Hold. Some 6.9% of deals in Buy2+ are tender offers compared to 
8.94% in Hold. Some 18.76% of deals in Buy2+ are acquisitions of public targets 
compared to 24.85% in Hold. The result indicates that analysts favour 
market-overvalued acquirers who uses stock to acquire non-public targets. This result is 
consistent in both subsamples.  
 
Panel D shows recommendation consensus, which is defined as the average 
recommendation level given by all analysts covering the same deal. We use the 
reversed recommendation scale: 5 =strong buy to 1=strong sell. The results suggest 
that the analyst gives average recommendations of 3.8764 for all M&A deals. This 
indicates that analysts favour M&A deals. 
 
In Table 2, we categorise the Deals Covered BA and Deals Covered AA by acquirers’ 
cumulative abnormal returns five days surrounding the announcement day. 
                       [Insert Table 3.2 Here] 
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One third of deals with the highest CAR[-5,5] are named good deals. The bottom third 
with the lowest CAR[-5,5] are named bad deals; the rest are neutral. By dividing the 
deals by the acquirers’ CAR, we can identify the determinants of high short-term 
abnormal returns for acquirers. The univariate results show that for Deals Covered 
BA, acquirers in the group High CAR[-5,5] are more leveraged than acquirers in the 
group Low CAR[-5,5]. The leverage ratio is 27.39% for high CAR acquirers, which is 
2.47% higher than the leverage ratio of Low CAR acquirers. In addition, the cash 
flow to equity ratio of High CAR acquirers is significantly higher than that of Low 
CAR acquirer. This indicates that financially constrained bidders are more likely to 
achieve a better performance in M&A. To gain short-term abnormal return, the 
univariate test shows that deal characteristics are also essential. Acquirers are more 
likely to achieve better short-term performance if the size is relatively large. This 
corresponds to 18.79% of the High CAR acquirers and only 16.24% of the Low CAR 
acquirers. Deal type should be tender offer; acquirers should use less stock as the 
means of payment; and they avoid acquiring public targets. Furthermore, acquirers 
that achieve a high short-term performance have high recommendation consensus. 
High CAR acquirers’ recommendation consensus reaches 3.9234, which is 
significantly higher than Low Car acquirers. The results indicate that recommendation 
consensus have a significant impact on acquirers’ short-term performance. The second 
part of Table 2 shows univariate tests for Deals Covered AA. The results indicate that 
recommendation consensus will increase if acquirers achieve a better short-term 
abnormal return. The recommendation consensus reaches 4.02 for High CAR 
acquirers, which is significantly higher than that of Low CAR acquirers. The results 
indicate that acquirers’ short-term abnormal returns will influence analysts’ 
recommendations.  
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3.5.2 Multivariate Test 
The univariate test has many limitations. It does not include the effect of control 
variables. The results may be unreliable. Therefore, we perform multivariable tests to 
reveal the true relationship between acquirers’ short-term abnormal return and 
recommendation consensus. First of all, we examine to what extent acquirers’ 
short-term abnormal return can be influenced by the recommendation consensus. We 
then examine how the changes in recommendation consensus before announcement 
day relate to acquirers’ short-term abnormal returns. Furthermore, we estimate how 
recommendation consensus responds to acquirers’ short-term abnormal return after 
the announcement day. Finally, we study the effect of the implementation of Reg-FD 
on the relationship between recommendation consensus and acquirer short-term 
abnormal return.  
 
Recommendation consensus and acquirers’ short-term abnormal return  
Table 3 presents the regression results of regression model 1. Regressions 1 to 4 
estimate the impact of recommendation consensus on acquirer cumulative abnormal 
return 5 days surrounding announcement day. We add additional control variables for 
each regression. All of the CARs are estimated using the market-adjusted model.  
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
 
The key independent variable in the regressions is the Rec365 value, which measures 
acquirers’ analyst recommendation consensus, which is estimated by 
recommendations received from 365 to 0 days before announcement day. The results 
show that the coefficient of Rec365 is positively related to acquirers’ short-term 
abnormal return, measured by CAR[-5,5]. The recommendation consensus, denoted 
as Rec365, is a continuous variable. Therefore, a one-unit increase in recommendation 
consensus will increase bidders’ CAR[-5,5] by 1.19%. Acquirers’ short-term abnormal 
return would increase if an analyst issues more buy or strong buy recommendations. 
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These results suggest that acquirers tend to receive higher short-term abnormal returns 
when analysts give positive recommendations. 
 
The results also suggest that deal characteristics have a stronger influence on 
acquirers’ short-term abnormal return than firm characteristics. All control variables 
related to firm characteristics are statistically insignificant. However, relative size and 
tender offer are positively related to acquirers’ CAR, while diversification and public 
target are significantly negative.  
Overall, a higher recommendation consensus leads to higher acquirer short-term 
abnormal return. These results suggest that recommendation consensus is one of the 
determinants that affects acquirer merger and acquisition performance. This empirical 
evidence supports hypothesis H1: Analyst recommendation has a statistically 
significant impact on bidder short-term abnormal return.  
 
Following the same research design as in Table 3, Table 4 presents the regression 
results that estimate the impact of recommendation consensus 90 days before 
announcement on acquirer short-term abnormal return. We add an additional control 
variable for each regression. All of the CARs are estimated using the market-adjusted 
model.  
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
 
The key independent variable in regressions is recommendations consensus, measured 
90 to 0 days before announcement day (Rec90). The results show that the coefficient 
of Rec90 is positively related to acquirers’ short-term abnormal return measured by 
CAR[-5,5]. The coefficient for recommendation consensus (Rec90) is 0.0171; after 
controlling for all firm characteristics, the coefficient drop to 0.016. However, the 
coefficients for Rec90 are much higher than the coefficient of Rec360. The results 
suggest that a one-unit increase in recommendation consensus 90 days before 
announcement day will increase bidders’ CAR[-5,5] by 1.71%. These results prove 
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that a recommendation consensus close to the announcement day has a stronger 
influence than at other times. This is because more information will be released before 
the announcement day.  
 
The results also suggest that deal characteristics are the determinants of acquirers’ 
short-term abnormal returns rather than firm characteristics. All control variables 
related to firm characteristic are statistically insignificant. However, acquirers 
conducting a deal with a high relative size and in the form of a tender offer are more 
likely to achieve high acquirers’ CAR, while diversification deals and acquisitions of 
public targets are value-destroying.  
 
Overall, these results support the view that a higher recommendation consensus leads 
to higher acquirer short-term abnormal returns. The recommendation consensus 90 
days before announcement day is more powerful than others. These results indicate 
that analyst recommendations can influence acquirer merger gain in the short run. 
This empirical evidence also supports hypothesis H1: Analyst recommendations have 
a statistically significant impact on bidder short-term abnormal return.  
 
In Table 5, we examine whether changes in recommendation consensus will affect 
acquirers’ short-term abnormal return. We use the subsample Deal Covered BA, the 
key explanation variable is Change_REC.  
 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
 
We define Change_REC as the difference between the recommendation consensus 90 
days before announcement day and recommendation consensus 365 to 90 days before 
announcement day. For instance, analysts’ recommendation consensus for acquirer A 
was a strong sell or score 1 in the recommendation level 365 to 90 days before 
announcement day. Due to incoming M&A deals, analysts upgrade their 
recommendation consensus to strong buy or score 5 in recommendation levels 90 
 137 
days before announcement day. The Change_Rec for acquirer A will be 4. When the 
announcement day is near, there will be more information available for the market. 
We believe that analysts have superior information-processing abilities that enable 
them to foresee incoming events and evaluate the true impact of deals on acquirer 
stock price. They will upgrade or downgrade their recommendation accordingly. By 
studying the changes in recommendation consensus (Change_Rec), we can examine 
whether analysts can foresee incoming M&A deals. The result shows that the 
coefficient for Change_Rec is positively related to acquirers’ CAR[-5,5]. If the 
recommendation consensus is upgraded by one level or Change_rec is equal to one, 
acquirers’ short-term abnormal return will increase by 0.22%.  
 
For the control variables, firm characteristics are measured by five main accounting 
ratios, which are statistically insignificant. However, the control variable for deal 
characteristics suggests that value-enhancing deals tend to be of a large relative size. 
Deal type should be tender offer. Acquiring a public target is also are more likely to 
bring a higher acquirer CAR.  
 
Overall, this supports the view that acquirer analysts will issue the right 
recommendations if they can foresee forthcoming M&A deals and accurately forecast 
their outcomes. This empirical evidence also supports hypothesis H2: Changes in 
recommendation level three months before announcement day affect bidder’s 
short-term abnormal return.  
 
Previous studies suggest that analysts may give biased recommendations or earnings 
forecasts. Analyst recommendations tend to be overoptimistic because they apply a 
low-ball strategy to maintain recommendation consistency(Hilary and Hsu, 2013). 
Analysts may also give recommendations that favour management if they have strong 
links with them. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) suggest that analysts give 
pessimistic earnings forecast so that management can meet their targets. The 
reputation-concern theory suggests that analysts have career-long concerns about their 
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reputation, and that analysts with superior information-processing abilities will 
maximise their clients’ interests. Therefore, they will only react to the market, provide 
accurate recommendations, and update their recommendations on time. 
 
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
 
Table 6 shows regression results that reveal how quickly recommendation consensus 
respond to acquirers’ short-term abnormal returns. The dependent variable is 
RECLVL, which is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the recommendation consensus 
365 days after the announcement day is buy or strong buy. The key explanation are 
CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2] and CAR[-5,5] and acquirer short-term abnormal returns for 
regression 1 to 3 respectively. Acquirers’ CARs are measured using the 
market-adjusted model. The results show that analysts are more likely to upgrade their 
recommendations towards strong buy for acquirers that achieve positive short-term 
abnormal returns. A one-percent increase in CAR[-1,1] , CAR[-2,2], and CAR[-5,5] 
raises the probability of issuing buy and strong buy ratings by 1.15%, 1.18% and 
1.26%, respectively. Run-up ratio, which measures firm past stock performance, is 
negatively related to the probability of issuing buy and strong buy recommendations. 
Analysts will issue buy and strong buy recommendations to acquirers with a high cash 
flow to equity ratio. It is more possible to receive buy and strong buy 
recommendations if the deal is a tender offer and relatively small in size.  
 
Overall, these results support the conjecture that acquirer analysts will react to the 
market. Analysts will upgrade their recommendations based on acquirers’ short-term 
acquisition performance.  
 
It can be argued that recommendation consensus is estimated by all recommendations 
that acquirers receive one year after the deal announcement day. The results may be 
biased as analysts issue recommendations based on events other than the M&A deals 
themselves. To overcome the problem, we rerun the probit model using 
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recommendation consensus 90 days after the announcement day. The results are 
shown in Table 7.  
 
[Insert Table 3.7 here] 
 
In Table 7, the dependent variable is RECLVL, which is a dummy variable, equal to 1 
if the recommendation consensus 90 days after the announcement day is a buy or 
strong buy. The key explanation variables are acquirer market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns estimated at 3, 5, 11 days surrounding the announcement day. The 
results show that cumulative abnormal returns are positively related to the probability 
of a recommendation upgrade. This result is consistent with Table 6. However, Table 
7 shows that the probability of a recommendation being upgraded is more sensitive to 
acquirer short-term abnormal return. The negative coefficient for Run-up ratio, which 
measures firm past stock performance, suggests that analysts are not in favour of 
glamour acquirers. The positive coefficient for cash flow to equity ratios suggests that 
analysts prefer acquirers with good financial health, especially with a high cash inflow. 
Acquirers are more likely to receive a buy or strong buy recommendations if the deal 
is completed using stock as the means of payment. This empirical evidence also 
supports hypothesis H3: Analysts will change their recommendation based on bidders’ 
short-term abnormal return within three month after announcement day.  
 
Table 8 shows to what extent the implementation of Reg-FD can influence analyst 
recommendation consensus effect on acquirers’ short-term abnormal returns. 
[Insert Table 3.8 here] 
 
Bagnoli et al. (2008) argue that there was a strong linkage between analysts and 
management before 2000. The recommendations given before the implementation of 
Reg-FD mainly resulted in selective disclosure. However, after the enforcement of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg-FD), the gap between public accessible information 
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and private information communicated among professional investors narrowed. 
Bagnoli et al. (2008) concludes that Reg-FD builds up a more efficient competitive 
environment by removing analysts’ privilege of accessing private information. We 
believe that analysts may benefit from selective disclosure; however, they do have 
superior information-processing abilities. To examine the impact of Reg-FD, we use a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is announced one year after the implementation 
of Reg-FD. The results show that the coefficient for Reg-FD is negatively related to 
acquirers’ short-term abnormal return. The result indicates that for all analysts’ 
covered deals, there was a 4.83% drop in acquirers’ short-term abnormal return after 
the implantation of Reg-FD.  
On the other hand, analysts’ recommendation consensus is positively related to 
acquirers’ short-term performance after the implementation of Reg-FD. Table 8 
shows that a recommendation consensus (Rec365) upgrade by one level increases 
acquirers’ short-term abnormal return by approximately 1.18%. We can conclude that 
even though Reg-FD is a game-changing regulation, the true influence of analyst 
recommendations on bidders’ abnormal return should remain unchanged after the 
enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure. For the control variables, acquirers will 
achieve better short-term abnormal returns if the relative size of the deal is larger and 
if the deal type is a tender offer. A negative short-term performance means that 
abnormal returns may occur if the deal is diversifying and the target is a publicly 
listed firm. Overall, the result supports hypothesis H4: Analyst recommendations 
affect bidders’ short-term abnormal return after the enforcement of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (2000). 
 
It can be argued that the recommendation consensus is estimated by all 
recommendations 365 day to 0 day before the announcement day. However, it may be 
biased as the estimation period is so long that many events can alter analyst 
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recommendations within that period. To overcome this problem, we estimate the 
recommendation consensus from 90 to 0 days before the announcement day (Rec90).  
[Insert Table 3.9 here] 
The result in Table 9 show that the penalty for Reg-FD is also smaller than in Table 8. 
After the implementation of Reg-FD, acquirers covered by analysts 90 days before 
announcement day receive a 3.74% drop in short-term abnormal return. However, 
analyst recommendation consensus is positively related to acquirers’ abnormal return. 
The coefficient for Rec90, which is 0.018, suggests that a one-level increase in Rec90 
raises acquirers’ abnormal returns by 1.8%. This figure is stronger than that for 
Rec365 in Table 8. It indicated that Rec90 has stronger influential power than that of 
Rec 365 on acquirers’ abnormal return. This is reasonable as there will be more 
information released before the deal announcement day. The recommendation close to 
the deal announcement day can therefore be more accurate and influential.  
For the control variables, relative-size and tender offer are positively related to 
acquirers’ abnormal return. Public target is the only significant variable that has a 
negative coefficient. Overall, the result supports hypothesis H4: Analyst 
recommendations affect bidders’ short-term abnormal returns after the enforcement 
of Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000) 
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3.5.3 Robustness Test  
By studying a sample of 8,889 US M&A deals from 1992 to 2010, the main finding is 
that analysts have superior skills in issuing recommendations and that they can 
foresee incoming M&A deals. The recommendation consensus has a positive impact 
on acquirers’ M&A performance in the short run. Instead of using general 
recommendation consensus, we use a one-year time interval surrounding the deal 
announcement day to estimate the recommendation consensus. 
 
To test the robustness of our results, we use two different ways to define analyst 
recommendation consensus. We change the time interval used in calculating 
recommendation consensus, which confirms that the results are robust. We also test 
robustness via replacing recommendation consensus with a dummy variable for 
recommendation level. Specifically, the recommendation dummy equals one when the 
mean of acquirer recommendation is greater or equal to 3 (Hold). The results remain 
unchanged, which shows that analysts’ buy or strong buy recommendations have a 
positive impact on acquirer abnormal return.  We also use different event windows and 
method to estimate short and long-term performance.  
 
To control endogeneity, we initially perform Hausman test and the results suggest IV 
(2SLS) regression. 
[Insert Table 3.10 here] 
 
we choose 52 week high, which is known as the reference point, as the instrument 
variable. The key explanatory variable is REC365. The IV regression results suggest 
that our results are robust.  
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3.6. Conclusion  
This paper analyses the extent to which recommendation consensus influence 
acquirers’ M&A performance in both the long and the short run by studying a sample 
of US M&A deals from 1992 to 2010. Instead of using general recommendation 
consensus, we use a one-year time interval surrounding the deal announcement day to 
estimate the recommendation consensus. Applying this setting enables us to estimate 
the power of security analysts’ recommendations more precisely. Our results show 
that acquirers with high recommendation consensus before announcement day 
outperform acquirers with low recommendation consensus in the short run; and that 
analysts can successfully predict incoming M&A deals and adjust their 
recommendations accordingly, supporting the reputation-concern theory. Moreover, 
our results suggest that acquirer short-term M&A performance is directly linked to the 
adjustment of recommendations after announcement day. The effect of 
recommendation on acquirers’ M&A short-term performance remains unchanged after 
the implementation of regulation fair disclosure. 
 
This paper’s main finding is that recommendation consensus has a positive influence 
on acquirers’ short-term performance. The changes in recommendation consensus 
before announcement day are positively related to acquirers’ short-term performance; 
trading in line with analysts’ recommendation consensus is therefore profitable, 
supporting the reputation-concern theory.  
 
Acquirers with a high recommendation consensus before announcement day 
outperform acquirers with a low recommendation consensus in the short run. A 
one-unit increase in the recommendation consensus from 365 to 0 days before 
announcement day increases bidders’ CAR[-5,5] by 1.19%. Acquirers’ short-term 
abnormal return increases if analysts issue more buy or strong buy recommendations.  
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This is because analysts have superior information-processing abilities, since they are 
more rational and skilful when valuing acquirer performance. However, analyst 
recommendations can be biased, such that recommendation consensus is more 
accurate and influential than recommendations from a single analyst. This result 
suggests that even analysts may suffer from affiliation; however, recommendation 
consensus can still accurately reflect the true growth potential of acquirers. Our 
results support the reputation-concern hypothesis.  
 
Furthermore, the changes in recommendation consensus before announcement day are 
positively related to acquirers’ short-term performance. There will be more 
information available when the deal is due to be announced. Given analysts reputation 
concern, they will process this information carefully and give more accurate 
recommendations to the public. This result indicates that analysts adjust their 
recommendations according to their newest assessment on acquirers’ growth potential. 
Our results suggest that a one-unit increase in recommendation consensus 90 days 
before announcement day will increase bidders’ CAR[-5,5] by 1.71%. These results 
prove that a recommendation consensus close to the announcement day has a stronger 
influence than others. This result supports the conjecture that acquirer analysts will 
issue the right recommendations if they can foresee forthcoming M&A deals and 
accurately forecast their outcomes. This empirical evidence also supports hypothesis 
H2: Changes in recommendation level three month before announcement day affect 
bidders’ short-term abnormal return. 
On the other hand, our results also reveal how analysts respond to acquirer short-term 
abnormal return. Acquirers’ short-term abnormal return is positively related to 
recommendation consensus. Analysts are more likely to upgrade their 
recommendations towards strong buy for acquirers that achieve positive short-term 
abnormal return. This is because, to maintain their reputation, analysts will quickly 
respond to changes in the market and they can update their recommendation on time. 
Our evidence also supports hypothesis H3: Analysts will changes the recommendation 
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based upon bidders’ short-term abnormal return within three months after the 
announcement day.  
 
Finally, analysts’ recommendation consensus is still positively related to acquirers’ 
short-term performance after the implementation of Reg-FD. Our results show that 
recommendation consensus (Rec365) upgrades by one level increase acquirers’ 
short-term abnormal return by approximately 1.18%. Even though Reg-FD is a 
game-changing regulation, the true influence of analyst recommendations on bidders’ 
abnormal return should remain unchanged after the enforcement of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure. For the control variables, acquirers will achieve better short-term 
abnormal return if the deal is of a relatively larger size and the deal type is a tender 
offer. Negative short-term performance may cause abnormal return if the deal is 
diversifying and the target is a publicly listed firm. Overall, the results support 
hypothesis H4: Analyst recommendations affect bidder’s short-term abnormal return 
after the enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000). 
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Appendix  
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics-- Univariate Test—recommendation consensus oriented  
This table presents summary statistics for the full samples. The full sample includes acquisitions deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus 
from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 2010. The full sample is divided into two subsamples; analyst recommendation consensus before announcement day (Deal Covered BA) and 
analyst recommendation consensus after announcement day (Deal Covered AA). We also categorize the each subsample by the recommendation level. BUY2+ is defined as all the 
acquirer received buy and strong buy recommendation consensus. HOLD is defined as all the acquirer received hold to strong sell recommendation consensus. Diff is the 
difference between BUY+2 and Hold. Panel A reports Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Cumulative Abnormal return, 3, 5 and 11 days surrounding 
announcement day. We use Market Adjusted model to estimate acquirer CARs, denoted as CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2],and CAR[-5,5] respectively. Panel B report firms’ characteristics, 
which include leverage ratio defined as total liability divided by total asset. Runup is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, 
the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; P/E, the 
price to earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by earnings per share; ROE, the return on equity ratio measures the bidder’s 
profitability, is defined as net income divided by common and preferred equity; Debt/Total Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is 
defined as long term debt divided by total asset: Cash flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is defined as the sum 
of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by total asset; Panel C reports deal characteristics. Relative 
transaction value denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value; Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. 
Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry. Stock denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; Public denotes public listed target. Panel D. Rec is 
recommendation consensus, which is defined as the average recommendation level given by all analysis covering same deal; we use the reversed recommendation scale. 5 =strong 
buy to 1=strong sell N stands for the number of observations. For all continuous variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deal Covered BA BUY2+ Hold Diff Pro Deal Covered BUY2+ Hold Diff Pro 
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AA 
Variable Mean Mean Mean 
  
Mean Mean Mean 
  Panel A  
          CAR[-1,1] 0.0114  0.0157  0.0079  0.0078  0.0003  0.0140  0.0197  0.0081  0.0116  0.0000  
CAR[-2,2] 0.0131  0.0186  0.0086  0.0099  0.0001  0.0185  0.0266  0.0099  0.0167  0.0000  
CAR[-5,5] 0.0157  0.0220  0.0106  0.0114  0.0004  0.0210  0.0320  0.0096  0.0223  0.0000  
           
Panel B 
Leverage 0.2692  0.2726  0.2665  0.0062  0.4309  0.2812  0.2852  0.2771  0.0081  0.3883  
RUNUP 0.1806  0.3092  0.0775  0.2318  0.0000  0.2605  0.3721  0.1437  0.2284  0.0000  
M/B 5.2384  6.3067  4.3814  1.9253  0.0000  5.4192  6.4679  4.3214  2.1465  0.0000  
P/E 23.7500  27.4523  20.7800  6.6723  0.0096  19.9127  19.9321  19.8923  0.0398  0.9890  
ROE 0.0102  0.0119  0.0088  0.0031  0.3074  0.0123  0.0092  0.0156  -0.0064  0.0514  
Debt/Equity  0.2129  0.1921  0.2295  -0.0375  0.0007  0.2136  0.1995  0.2284  -0.0289  0.0279  
Cash/Equity  0.0404  0.0367  0.0433  -0.0066  0.0281  0.0438  0.0354  0.0526  -0.0172  0.0000  
Panel C 
          Relative-Size 0.1574  0.1663  0.1503  0.0161  0.0284  0.1743  0.2037  0.1437  0.0600  0.0000  
Tender Offer 0.0690  0.0435  0.0894  -0.0459  0.0000  0.0583  0.0464  0.0709  -0.0245  0.0016  
Diversification 0.3758  0.3851  0.3683  0.0168  0.2134  0.3760  0.3795  0.3722  0.0073  0.6473  
STOCK 0.2061  0.2801  0.1467  0.1334  0.0000  0.2268  0.2809  0.1702  0.1107  0.0000  
Public 0.2214  0.1876  0.2485  -0.0609  0.0000  0.2069  0.1796  0.2355  -0.0559  0.0000  
Panel D 
          Rec 3.8764  4.2790  3.5534  0.7256  0.0000  3.9506  4.3060  3.5786  0.7274  0.0000  
Obs 5221  2324  2897  
  
3668 1876 1792 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics and Univariate Test —Acquirer short-term abnormal return oriented  
This table presents summary statistics for the subsample of Deal Covered BA and Deal Covered AA. We define Deal Covered BA as the deal that acquirer’s analyst 
recommendation consensus is estimated by recommendations before announcement day. Deal Covered AA is defined as the deals that acquirer’s analyst recommendation 
consensus is estimated by recommendations after announcement day. The subsample includes acquisitions deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation 
consensus from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 2010. We categorize the each subsample by acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return 5 days surrounding announcement day. One 
third of deals with highest CAR[-5,5] are named as good deal. Last one third with lowest CAR[-5,5] are named as bad deal. Neutral for the rest of deals. PART ONE is for the 
Deal Covered BA, PART TWO is for the Deal Covered BA. Panel A report firms’ characteristics, which include leverage ratio, defined as total liability divided by total asset. 
Runup is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book ratio, measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, 
is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; P/E, the price to earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is 
defined as annual price close divided by earnings per share; ROE, the return on equity ratio measures the bidder’s profitability, is defined as net income divided by common and 
preferred equity; Debt/Total Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, defined as long term debt divided by total asset: Cash 
flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items and 
depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by total asset; Panel c reports deal characteristics. ‘Relative transaction value’ denotes the relative size 
of the deal and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value. ‘Tender offer’ denote the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ indicates bidder and target oriented 
in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; ‘public’ denotes a publicly listed target. Panel D. Rec is recommendation consensus, which is defined 
as the average recommendation level given by all analysis covering same deal; we use the reversed recommendation scale. 5 =strong buy to 1=strong sell N stands for the 
number of observations. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 95% levels 
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PART ONE  
      
 
DEAL COVER BA HIGH CAR[-5,5] NEUTRAL LOW CAR[-5,5] diff Pro 
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  Panel A     
Leverage 0.2692 0.2739 0.2846 0.2492 0.0247 0.0104 
RUNUP 0.1806 0.2167 0.1362 0.1890 0.0277 0.1445 
M/B 5.2384 5.6092 4.7614 5.3443 0.2649 0.5275 
P/E 23.7500 23.8671 27.5918 19.7911 4.0760 0.1847 
ROE 0.0102 0.0062 0.0247 -0.0003 0.0065 0.1171 
DEBT/Equity 0.2129 0.2298 0.2121 0.1966 0.0331 0.0197 
Cash flow/Equity 0.0404 0.0383 0.0515 0.0312 0.0071 0.0771 
Panel B       
Relative-Size 0.1574 0.1879 0.1219 0.1624 0.0255 0.0069 
Tender offer 0.0690 0.0770 0.0730 0.0569 0.0201 0.0178 
Diversification 0.3758 0.3601 0.3828 0.3845 -0.0243 0.1375 
STOCK 0.2061 0.2051 0.1724 0.2408 -0.0358 0.0113 
Public 0.2214 0.1976 0.2241 0.2425 -0.0449 0.0014 
Panel C 
      Rec 3.8764 3.9246 3.8479 3.8567 0.0679 0.0000 
Obs  5221 1741 1740 1740 
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PART TWO 
 
DEAL COVER AA HIGH CAR[-5,5] NETURAL LOW CAR[-5,5] Diff Pro 
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  Panel D     
Leverage 0.2812 0.2806 0.2993 0.2638 0.0167 0.1483 
RUNUP 0.2605 0.2936 0.1998 0.2883 0.0053 0.8216 
M/B 5.4192 5.5702 4.7840 5.9036 -0.3334 0.5484 
P/E 19.9127 17.6127 23.0055 19.1180 -1.5053 0.6843 
ROE 0.0123 0.0072 0.0225 0.0073 -0.0001 0.9876 
Debt/Equity 0.2136 0.2305 0.2235 0.1869 0.0436 0.0082 
Cash flow/Equity 0.0438 0.0408 0.0532 0.0373 0.0035 0.4163 
Panel E        
Relative-Size 0.1743 0.2184 0.1358 0.1689 0.0494 0.0001 
Tender offer 0.0583 0.0614 0.0638 0.0499 0.0115 0.2151 
Diversification 0.3760 0.3707 0.3802 0.3769 -0.0062 0.7500 
STOCK 0.2268 0.2512 0.1709 0.2584 -0.0072 0.6850 
Public 0.2069 0.1579 0.2134 0.2494 -0.0914 0.0000 
Panel F 
      Rec 3.9506 4.0290 3.8877 3.9352 0.0938 0.0000 
Obs  3668 1222 1223 1223 
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Table 3.3 OLS regression of acquirer’s short-term performance to Recommendation Consensus 365 
This table presents the OLS regression results that reveal the relation between Recommendation Consensus 365 
days before announcement day (Rec365) and acquirer’s short-term abnormal return. We use Deal Covered BA 
subsample that includes acquisitions deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus 
from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 2010. Rec365 is acquirer’s analyst recommendation consensus, which is 
estimated by recommendations received form 365 to 0 days before announcement day. Control variables includes 
Cash flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is 
defined as the sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred 
stock then divided by total asset; M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is 
defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; Runup is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. P/E, the price to earnings 
ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by earnings per share; Debt/Total 
Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is defined as long-term debt 
divided by total asset: ‘Relative transaction value’ denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the 
proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ 
indicates bidder and target oriented in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; 
‘public’ denotes a publicly listed target. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 95% levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 152 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] 
Rec365 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0117*** 0.0113*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
CashFlow/Equity 
 
0.0014 0.0087 0.0094 
  
(0.973) (0.839) (0.827) 
Market To Book 
  
0.0003 0.0002 
   
(0.467) (0.596) 
RUNUP 
   
0.0019 
    
(0.665) 
Return On Equity 0.0380 0.0369 0.0317 0.0312 
 
(0.163) (0.400) (0.472) (0.480) 
Debt To Equity 0.0009 0.0008 0.0012 0.0013 
 
(0.875) (0.898) (0.858) (0.847) 
Relative-size 0.0373*** 0.0373*** 0.0381*** 0.0382*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender offer 0.0317*** 0.0317*** 0.0318*** 0.0319*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0056* -0.0056* -0.0055* -0.0055* 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
STOCK -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0028 
 
(0.609) (0.611) (0.532) (0.509) 
Public -0.0217*** -0.0217*** -0.0218*** -0.0218*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0446*** 0.0446*** 0.0426*** 0.0416*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 5221 5221 5221 5221 
R-sq 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001
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Table 3.4 OLS regression of acquirer’s short-term performance to Recommendation Consensus 90 
This table presents the OLS regression results that reveal the relation between Recommendation Consensus 90 days 
before announcement day (Rec90) and acquirer’s short-term abnormal return. We use Deal Covered BA subsample 
that includes acquisitions deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 
January 1992 to 31 December 2010. Rec90 is acquirer’s analyst recommendation consensus, which is estimated by 
recommendations received form 90 to 0 days before announcement day. Control variables includes Cash 
flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is defined as 
the sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then 
divided by total asset; M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as 
annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; Runup is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. P/E, the price to earnings ratio 
measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by earnings per share; Debt/Total 
Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is defined as long term debt 
divided by total asset: ‘Relative transaction value’ denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the 
proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ 
indicates bidder and target oriented in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; 
‘public’ denote a publicly listed target. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 95% levels 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] 
Rec90 0.0171** 0.0174** 0.0172** 0.0160* 
 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.052) 
CashFlow/Equity 
 
0.0437 0.0727 0.0735 
  
(0.557) (0.342) (0.335) 
Market To Book 
  
0.0010 0.0008 
   
(0.183) (0.286) 
RUNUP 
   
0.0057 
    
(0.563) 
Return On Equity 0.0373 0.0020 -0.0144 -0.0125 
 
(0.564) (0.979) (0.854) (0.873) 
Debt To Equity -0.0013 -0.0043 -0.0031 -0.0032 
 
(0.926) (0.778) (0.842) (0.833) 
Relative-size 0.0490** 0.0480** 0.0513*** 0.0511*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Tender offer 0.0309** 0.0306** 0.0305** 0.0306** 
 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
Diversification -0.0142** -0.0142** -0.0144** -0.0143** 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
STOCK -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0030 -0.0034 
 
(0.866) (0.893) (0.742) (0.705) 
Public -0.0218** -0.0218** -0.0222** -0.0223** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 0.0815*** 0.0812*** 0.0750*** 0.0720*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
N 1133 1133 1133 1133 
R-sq 0.047 0.047 0.049 0.050 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001
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Table 3.5 OLS regression of changes in recommendation consensus and Acquirer’s announcement 
return 
This table shows regression results that reveal the relation between changes in recommendation 
consensus and acquirer’s short-term abnormal return We use Deal Covered BA subsample that includes 
acquisitions deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 
January 1992 to 31 December 2010. Change REC is changes in analyst recommendation consensus 
before announcement day, which is defined by the difference between the recommendation consensus 
90 days before announcement day and recommendation consensus 365 to 90 days before 
announcement day. CAR[-5,5] are Acquirer’s Market adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Return, 11 days 
surrounding announcement day Control variables includes Cash flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity 
ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is defined as the sum of income before 
extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by 
total asset; M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as 
annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; Runup is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. P/E, the price to 
earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by earnings per 
share; Debt/Total Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is 
defined as long term debt divided by total asset. ‘Relative transaction value’ denotes the relative size of 
the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes 
the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ indicates bidder and target oriented in different industries. ‘Stock’ 
denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; ‘public’ denotes a publicly listed target. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 95% levels 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] 
Change_Rec 0.0022*  0.0021*  0.0021* 0.0022* 
 
(0.084) (0.089) (0.089) (0.078) 
Cash Flow To Equity  -0.0707 -0.0683 -0.0690 
  (0.220) (0.243) (0.239) 
Market To Book   0.0001 0.0002 
   (0.779) (0.723) 
RUNUP    -0.0013 
    (0.846) 
Return On Equity 0.0347 0.0932 0.0909 0.0915 
 
(0.452) (0.131) (0.142) (0.140) 
Debt To Equity 0.0169 0.0222* 0.0224* 0.0223* 
 
(0.110) (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) 
Relative-size 0.0374*** 0.0377*** 0.0380*** 0.0381*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Tender Offer 0.0231*** 0.0234*** 0.0234*** 0.0233*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Diversification -0.0052 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0055 
 
(0.300) (0.274) (0.273) (0.270) 
STOCK -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0024 
 
(0.813) (0.775) (0.724) (0.744) 
Public -0.0199*** -0.0199*** -0.0199*** -0.0199*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.0399*** -0.0383*** -0.0390*** -0.0393*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 4438 4438 4438 4438 
R-sq 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.027 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001
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Table 3.6 How recommendation consensus 365 response to acquirer’s CAR after the deal 
announcement 
This table shows regression results that reveal how recommendation consensus response to acquirer’s 
short-term abnormal return. We use Deal Covered AA subsample that includes acquisitions deals 
conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 January 1992 to 31 
December 2010. RECLVL is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the recommendation consensus 
365 days after announcement day is buy and strong buy. CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2],and CAR[-5,5] are 
Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative Abnormal 
Return, 3, 5 and 11 days surrounding announcement day respectively. Control variables includes Cash 
flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is 
defined as the sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common 
and preferred stock then divided by total asset; M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation 
of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total 
common equity; Runup is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. P/E, the price to earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual 
price close divided by earnings per share; Debt/Total Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what 
extent the company is leveraged, is defined as long term debt divided by total asset. ‘Relative transaction 
value’ denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidder’s 
market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ indicates bidder and target oriented 
in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; ‘public’ denotes a publicly 
listed target. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 95% levels.  
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(1) (2) (3) 
 
RECLVL RECLVL RECLVL 
CAR[-1,1] 1.1520*** 
  
 
(0.002) 
  CAR[-2,2] 
 
1.1806*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 CAR[-5,5] 
  
1.2686*** 
   
(0.000) 
RUNUP -0.6399*** -0.6399*** -0.6450*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market To Book 0.0070 0.0070 0.0066 
 
(0.292) (0.297) (0.328) 
Debt To Equity 0.1605 0.1678 0.1714 
 
(0.173) (0.155) (0.147) 
Cash Flow To Equity 1.5962*** 1.5820*** 1.6125*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative-Size -0.8286*** -0.8278*** -0.8073*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender Offer 0.2717*** 0.2692*** 0.2705*** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Diversification -0.0384 -0.0410 -0.0388 
 
(0.441) (0.412) (0.438) 
STOCK 0.0456 0.0516 0.0474 
 
(0.471) (0.416) (0.455) 
Constant -0.9048*** -0.9054*** -0.9234*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3668 3668 3668 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001
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Table 3.7 How recommendation consensus 90 response to acquirer’s CAR after the deal 
announcement 
This table shows regression results that reveal how recommendation consensus response to acquirer’s 
short-term abnormal return. We use Deal Covered AA subsample that includes acquisitions deals 
conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 January 1992 to 31 
December 2010. RECLVL is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the recommendation consensus 
90 days after announcement day is buy and strong buy. CAR[-1,1] CAR[-2,2], and CAR[-5,5] are 
Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative Abnormal 
Return, 3, 5 and 11 days surrounding announcement day respectively. Control variables includes Cash 
flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is 
defined as the sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common 
and preferred stock then divided by total asset; M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation 
of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total 
common equity; Runup is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. P/E, the price to earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual 
price close divided by earnings per share; Debt/Total Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what 
extent the company is leveraged, is defined as long term debt divided by total asset. ‘Relative transaction 
value’ denotes the relative size of the deal and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidder’s 
market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ indicates bidder and target oriented 
in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; ‘public’ denotes a publicly 
listed target. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 95% levels  
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(1) (2) (3) 
 
RECLVL RECLVL RECLVL 
CAR[-1,1] 0.8807 
  
 
(0.182) 
  CAR[-2,2] 
 
1.3122** 
 
  
(0.019) 
 CAR[-5,5] 
  
1.2029*** 
   
(0.009) 
RUNUP -0.7701*** -0.7716*** -0.7782*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market To Book 0.0146 0.0158 0.0155 
 
(0.217) (0.181) (0.189) 
Debt To Equity 0.0748 0.0946 0.1010 
 
(0.725) (0.656) (0.638) 
Cash Flow To Equity 2.6254*** 2.5942*** 2.6147*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative-Size -0.3175 -0.2955 -0.2828 
 
(0.181) (0.214) (0.238) 
Tender Offer 0.2564 0.2506 0.2405 
 
(0.221) (0.236) (0.255) 
Diversification -0.0971 -0.0971 -0.0940 
 
(0.296) (0.297) (0.313) 
STOCK 0.2186* 0.2200* 0.2349* 
 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.052) 
Constant -0.8250*** -0.8097*** -0.8113*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1010 1010 1010 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001
 161 
Table 3.8 The impact of Reg-FD on recommendation consensus 365 and acquirer’s CAR. 
This table shows regression results that reveal how the relation between recommendation consensus and 
acquirer’s short-term abnormal return has been changed by Reg-FD. We use Deal Covered BA subsample that 
includes acquisitions deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 
January 1992 to 31 December 2010. Rec365 is acquirer’s analyst recommendation consensus, which is estimated 
by recommendations received from 365 to 0 days before announcement day. Reg-FD is the dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if the deal is announced after the implementation of Reg-FD. CAR[-5,5] are Acquirer’s 
Market adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Return, 11 days surrounding announcement day Control variables 
includes Cash flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the 
company, is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common 
and preferred stock then divided by total asset; M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s 
stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; Runup 
is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. P/E, the price to 
earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by earnings per share; 
Debt/Total Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is defined as long 
term debt divided by total asset. ‘Relative transaction value’ denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as 
the proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ 
indicates bidder and target oriented in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; 
‘public’ denotes a publicly listed target. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 95% levels.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] 
Rec365 0.0118*** 0.0117*** 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Reg-FD -0.0483*** -0.0483*** -0.0483*** -0.0483*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash Flow To Equity 
 
-0.0171 -0.0157 -0.0158 
  
(0.594) (0.626) (0.625) 
Market To Book 
  
0.0002 0.0002 
   
(0.428) (0.436) 
Runup 
   
-0.0003 
    
(0.956) 
Return On Equity 0.0036 0.0178 0.0163 0.0165 
 
(0.862) (0.593) (0.624) (0.621) 
Debt To Equity 0.0059 0.0070 0.0073 0.0072 
 
(0.232) (0.201) (0.185) (0.186) 
Relative-size 0.0283*** 0.0284*** 0.0288*** 0.0288*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender offer 0.0366*** 0.0367*** 0.0368*** 0.0368*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0056* -0.0056* -0.0056* -0.0056* 
 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) 
Stock -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0035 -0.0035 
 
(0.600) (0.576) (0.502) (0.507) 
Public -0.0229*** -0.0229*** -0.0229*** -0.0229*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0930*** 0.0932*** 0.0921*** 0.0923*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     N 5221 5221 5221 5221 
R-sq 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001
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Table 3.9 The impact of Reg-FD on recommendation consensus 90 and acquirer’s CAR 
This table shows regression results that reveal how the relation between recommendation consensus and 
acquirer’s short-term abnormal return has been changed by Reg-FD. We use Deal Covered BA subsample that 
includes acquisitions deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 
January 1992 to 31 December 2010. Rec90 is acquirer’s analyst recommendation consensus, which is estimated 
by recommendations received from 90 to 0 days before announcement day. Reg-FD is the dummy variable, which 
is equal to 1 if the deal is announced after the implementation of Reg-FD. CAR[-5,5] are Acquirer’s Market 
adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Return, 11 days surrounding announcement day Control variables includes Cash 
flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free cash holding by the company, is defined as 
the sum of income before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then 
divided by total asset; M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as 
annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; Runup is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. P/E, the price to earnings ratio 
measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by earnings per share; Debt/Total 
Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is defined as long-term debt 
divided by total assets. ‘Relative transaction value’ denotes the relative size of the deal and is defined as the 
proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the type of deal. ‘Diversification’ 
indicates bidder and target oriented in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes that the deal is paid by 100% stock; 
‘public’ denotes a publicly listed target. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 95% levels.   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-5,5] 
Rec90 0.0180* 0.0178* 0.0177* 0.0159 
 
(0.072) (0.075) (0.078) (0.125) 
Reg_FD -0.0374** -0.0372** -0.0375** -0.0379** 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) 
Cash Flow To Equity 
 
-0.0349 -0.0299 -0.0281 
  
(0.536) (0.597) (0.616) 
Market To Book 
  
0.0004 0.0003 
   
(0.346) (0.443) 
Runup 
   
0.0076 
    
(0.490) 
Return On Equity 0.0127 0.0394 0.0350 0.0346 
 
(0.796) (0.511) (0.560) (0.560) 
Debt To Equity 0.0100 0.0119 0.0129 0.0130 
 
(0.437) (0.393) (0.354) (0.350) 
Relative-size 0.0396** 0.0400** 0.0414** 0.0417** 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) 
Tender offer 0.0398*** 0.0403*** 0.0402*** 0.0403*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Diversification -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0124 -0.0122 
 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.107) (0.111) 
Stock -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0034 -0.0045 
 
(0.861) (0.847) (0.755) (0.689) 
Public -0.0281*** -0.0280*** -0.0282*** -0.0282*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Constant 0.1234*** 0.1238*** 0.1222*** 0.1168*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     N 1133 1133 1133 1133 
R-sq 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.049 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.10 IV regression of acquirer’s short-term performance to Recommendation Consensus 365 
This table presents the Two Stage Least Square Regression (IV Regression) results that that reveals the 
relation between Recommendation Consensus 365 days before announcement day (Rec365) and 
acquirer’s short-term abnormal return. We use Deal Covered BA subsample that includes acquisitions 
deals conducted by US public bidders and analyst recommendation consensus from 1 January 1992 to 
31 December 2010. Rec365 is acquirer’s analyst recommendation consensus, which is estimated by 
recommendations received from 365 to 0 days before announcement day. Instrument variable is 52 
weeks high. Control variables includes Cash flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the 
amount of free cash holding by the company, is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary item 
and depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by total asset; M/B, the 
market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close 
multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; Runup is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. P/E, the price to earnings 
ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual price close divided by earnings per share; 
Debt/Total Equity, the debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is defined 
as long term debt divided by the total assets. ‘Relative transaction value’ denotes the relative size of the 
deal and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidder’s market value; ‘tender offer’ denotes the 
type of deal. ‘Diversification’ indicates bidder and target oriented in different industries. ‘Stock’ denotes 
that the deal is paid by 100% stock; ‘public’ denotes a publicly listed target. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1% and 95% levels.  
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                                         Stage one             Stage two 
Rec365 
 
0.035* 
  
(0.098) 
Cash Flow To Equity 0.132 -0.029 
 
(0.313) (0.260) 
Market To Book 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.991) (0.183) 
Runup -0.065*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Return On Equity 0.131 0.053** 
 
(0.320) (0.046) 
Debt To Equity -0.043** 0.003 
 
(0.028) (0.456) 
Relative-size -0.040*** 0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.109) 
Tender offer 0.002 0.028*** 
 
(0.910) (0.000) 
Diversification 0.014 -0.004*** 
 
(0.146) (0.024) 
Stock -0.059*** 0.004 
 
(0.000) (0.112) 
Public 0.058*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
52-Weeks-High -0.001*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 Constant 2.223 -0.059 
 
(0.000) (0.207) 
N         5221 5221 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Chapter 4: Divergence Opinion, Information 
Asymmetry and M&A Returns 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter investigates how analyst divergence opinion related to bidder abnormal 
return in both short run and long run. By adding bidder’s pre-merger performance into 
consideration, this chapter further explores the true impact of divergence opinion and 
information asymmetry on bidder merger and acquisition performance.    
 
Analyst earning forecast has been investigated in many previous literature. It is widely 
acknowledged that Divergence opinion theory and information asymmetry hypothesis 
(Miller, 1977, Myers and Majluf, 1984, Travlos, 1987) are vitally important when we 
study the influence of analyst on bidder merger gain. Miller (1977)’s divergence of 
opinion theory assumes that investors have their own identical stock evaluation and 
the short selling is limited. If the divergence opinion is high, the most optimistic 
investor decides the stock price. In the scenario of merger and acquisition, the high 
pre deal divergence opinion indicates overvalued stock. Therefore, high divergence 
opinion will lead to negative bidders announcement return. This is supported by 
number of literatures: Diether et al. (2002) study the return of stocks with different 
analyst divergence opinion, and confirm that high divergence opinion stock has less 
return than others similar stocks, they finds evidence that stock past performance 
enhance the impact of divergence opinion on stock return.  Moeller et al. (2007) also 
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found negative relation between bidder announcement return and divergence opinion, 
after controlling means of payment and target public status, They reveal that the 
negative relation only exist in the deal that stock is the solo payment rather than cash 
payment. Alexandridis et al. (2007) examine how pre-merger divergence opinion 
affect bidders abnormal return, they found that bidder with high pre-merger 
divergence opinion are overvalued by the market. Bidder with high divergence 
opinion underperform bidder with low divergence opinion in both short run and long 
run. To contrary with the literature above, Chatterjee et al. (2012) shows that not all 
the firms follow Miller (1977)’s implication: they found that bidder will achieve 
better post-merger abnormal return (Mark-up) if the target have high divergence 
opinion. This is because target with high pre announcement divergence opinion 
received high premium: it will deter bidders from completing the deal. However, the 
deal will only be completed if value-maximizing bidders truly believe that merger 
synergy is greater than the cost of acquiring target with high divergence opinion. the 
true impact of divergence opinion on bidder abnormal return remain unresolved.  
 
In this study, we estimate whether the impact of divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry on bidder abnormal return changes with bidder pre-merger performance. 
Our results suggest that we need put pre-merger performance into consideration when 
we examine how divergence opinion and information asymmetry affect bidders 
abnormal return. The rational is shown below: According to the trading mechanism 
demonstrated in Miller (1977), low divergence opinion indicates that the firm’s stock 
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price has already been fully realised by the optimistic investors available in the market, 
there is low trading activity and low investor recognition. No matter whether the stock 
price is high or low, there is lack of price movement. The poor past performance also 
shows the same problem. The lack of investor recognition shrinks the number of 
potential buyers. The declining stock price and fixed investment recognition demand 
firms to attract more attention. Investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 1987) 
address that an exogenous event increases stock recognition, the company will lower 
the cost of raising capital and increase the investment opportunity, Merger and 
acquisition is one of such exogenous event. Moreover, Miller (1977)’s view, Increase 
in stock recognition attracts more investors from the buying side. So the value of 
stock increases but the expected return will decrease. Bushee and Miller (2012) 
support that increase in public exposure helps the company to attract more institutional 
investors that boost stock valuation in incoming years. Therefore, the deals conducted 
by bidders with low divergence opinion tend to be value-enhancing.  
 
On the other hand, bidders with high divergence opinion and high pre-merger 
performance receive negative returns. These bidders are like the ‘glamour’ bidder in 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998). They are associated with high P/E ratio, high free 
cashflow, overconfident CEO and high agency cost. Bidders with high cash flow have 
poor acquisition performance. Jensen's (1986) free cashflow hypothesis indicates that 
agency cost in cash rich firms force managers to conduct value-destroying deals. 
Smith and Kim (1994) propose that cash-rich bidders receive negative announcement 
 170 
abnormal returns and ‘slack-poor’ bidders gain positive announcement abnormal 
returns. Harford (1999) suggests that bidder with high cash reserves are more likely 
being a bidder but negatively related to bidder abnormal return in both short run and 
long run. Moreover, High divergence opinion and good past performance indicates 
that the price reach the highest bidding possible in the market. They are more likely to 
be overvalued. The overvalued bidder tends to overpay their target and suffer serious 
governance problems. The deals conducted by such bidders tend to be 
value-destroying (Fu et al., 2013). Overall, bidders with high divergence opinion and 
good past performance tend towards value-destroying deals.  
 
The literature discussed above explored how divergence opinion affects bidder 
announcement return. In contrast, asymmetry of information theory implies that there 
is asymmetry of information between management and investors. Deal announcement 
will disclose more information to the market. The signalling effect will change 
bidders’ abnormal return accordingly. Stock payment leads to negative abnormal 
return because it signals that the bidder is overvalued. Moreover, when more 
information becomes available in the market through time, the level of asymmetry 
information declines, the stock price drops. In the scenario of merger and acquisition, 
Dionne et al. (2014) study the impact of information asymmetry on premium, by 
investigating 1026 US deals from 1990 to 2006, they find that well-informed bidders 
pay lower premiums. Armstrong et al. (2011) reveal that there are tradeoffs between 
cost of capital and information asymmetry. Firms may choose to maintain high-level 
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information asymmetry to maximise their benefit. Louis (2002) shows that negative 
long-term merger performance is caused by pre-merger information asymmetry. We 
have mixed empirical results about the effect of information asymmetry on bidder 
merger performance. In addition, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no paper has 
directly examined the combined effect of divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry on merger gain of bidders with different pre-merger performances. 
Although Moeller, Moeller et al. (2007) have carried out a similar study, they only 
focus on controlling means of payment and public status.  
 
Motivated by the unresolved issues above, and byy using one of the most 
comprehensive samples, which covers US M&A deals conducted from 1990 to 2013 
and makes use of detailed analyst earning forecast, idiosyncratic volatility and 
pre-merger performance, this paper sheds new light on how divergence opinion and 
information asymmetry affect acquisition performance in both the short and long run. 
 
In this study, following the measurement of divergence opinion in previous literature 
(Dierkens, 1991, Alexandridis et al., 2007, Moeller et al., 2007, Boehme et al., 2009), 
we use the analyst forecast dispersion (DIVO) to measure divergence opinion; 
Idiosyncratic volatility measures information asymmetry. In order to study how bidder 
past performance can change the impact of divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry on acquisition performance; we sort our sample on the basis of differences 
in bidder past performance. Bidders with positive Runup ratio are categorised as 
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well-performed bidder. Bidders with negative Runup ratio are categorised as poorly 
performed bidders 
 
We find that a low divergence opinion bidder outperforms a high divergence opinion 
bidder in both the long and short run. Analyst forecast dispersion is significantly 
negatively related to bidder cumulative abnormal return five days surrounding the 
announcement day. A one-unit increase in the Divo value leads to a 16.94% decrease 
in CAR[-2,2]. However, this effect is weaken in bidders with good past performance, 
which is 5.94% decrease in CAR[-2,2].  This result suggests that bidders past 
performance substantially alter the impact of divergence opinion on bidders 
short-term abnormal return.. The result implies that Low Divo bidder are undervalued, 
merger and acquisition deal, as an exogenous event, attract more potential buyers and 
lower the capital cost.  This is supported by the empirical results regarding investor 
recognition theory.  
 
We also found that a high idiosyncratic volatility bidder will achieve a higher 
abnormal return in the short run. Bidder’s idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma value) is 
positively related to bidder short-term abnormal return. A high idiosyncratic volatility 
bidder will receive a 30.34% higher short-term abnormal return (CAR[-2,2]) than an 
low idiosyncratic volatility bidder. This is because high idiosyncratic volatility 
indicates high level of information asymmetry between management and investor. 
High pre-deal idiosyncratic volatility shows the bidder is overvalued by the market. It 
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can help bidders achieve high short-term merger gain but it will sacrifice the 
long-term return. A one-unit increase in idiosyncratic volatility leads to a 43.03% 
decrease in bidders long-term abnormal return BHAR [0,24]. 
 
Overall, for bidders with poor pre merger performance, analyst divergence opinion has 
negative impact on their announcement return. For bidders with good pre merger 
performance, a positive relation has been found between information asymmetry and 
announcement return. These empirical results strongly support that bidder pre merger 
performance is an important conditioning variable that we should put into 
consideration in examining the impact of divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry on bidder merger and acquisition performance.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in many ways; first, this chapter sheds 
new light on puzzling empirical evidence on how the combinations of divergence 
opinion and information asymmetry affect bidder merger performance. Different from 
previous literature, this paper argues that the effect of divergence opinion is stronger 
than information asymmetry if the bidder has negative pre merger performance. For 
well-performed bidders, the effect information asymmetry is more impotent than 
divergence opinion.  
 
Second, previous literature does not distinguish bidder pre merger performance, By 
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simultaneously analysing bidders with different pre merger performance, this chapter 
provide new evidence on the impact of divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry on bidder merger gain. This chapter emphasis that divergence opinion 
have stronger negative impact on poorly performed bidder than well-performed bidder. 
Information asymmetry has stronger positive impact on well-performed bidder’s 
announcement return than poor performed bidder. In the long run, high information 
asymmetry is associated with negative return regardless pre merger performance.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows, literature review in Section 2. 
Hypothesis construction in Section 3, Data and methodology are presented in Section 
4. Section 5 show empirical results and robustness test; Section 6 for Conclusion.  
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4.2 Literature review  
 
The investment value of analysts’ research 
There is extensive literature that studies the investment value of analysts’ research, 
most of which concentrates on the quality of analyst earning forecast and 
recommendation. Many previous studies suggest that the consensus of analyst earning 
forecast can be considered as a measure of market expectation (Brown and Rozeff, 
1978, Fried and Givoly, 1982, O'brien, 1988).  The evidence shows that analysts’ 
forecast are less biased and the magnitude of accuracy will increase as more 
information will release when it close to the actual earning announcement. They 
conclude that analysts are less optimistic as analysts tend to underestimate the actual 
earning. The market price change has little impact on analyst earning forecast, By 
studying the formulation of analyst earning forecast, Abarbanell (1991) acknowledge 
that analyst don’t take prior price change as an important factor in analyst’s forecast 
formulation process: they confirm that analyst forecast is superior to time series 
model in term of earning forecasting accuracy. 
 
On the other hand, De Bondt and Thaler (1990) argue that severe agency problems 
force analysts to issue overoptimistic recommendations and earning forecasts. Francis 
and Philbrick (1993)’s model demonstrates that analyst will issue forecasts in favour 
of management to access extra information if the compensation exceeds the reputation 
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damage. Conflicts of interest among financial analysts, management and investor do 
exist.  
 
Lin and McNichols (1998) study to what extent analysts’ growth forecast and 
recommendation is effected by the underwriting relationship with investment bank. 
The results indicate that affiliated analyst’s recommendations are more in favour of 
investment bank clients rather than growth forecast. Investment bank and 
management give more incentive for analyst offer more optimistic analyst. Similar 
results are found in Hansen and Sarin (1996), by study analyst forecast error surround 
the seasoned equity offering, they find that forecast error are not significantly 
different between affiliated and unaffiliated analyst.  
 
Dechow et al. (2000) find that sell-side analyst growth forecast tend to be 
overoptimistic around common equity offer, more optimistic forecast are found in the 
group of affiliated analyst. Affiliated analyst get more compensation if they offer 
more optimistic growth forecast. However, highest growth forecast issued by 
affiliated analyst is associated with the worse post-offering performance. In addition, 
Dechow et al. (2000) also suggest that growth stock, defined as stock with high P/E 
ratio and growth rate, received more optimistic forecast and recommendation from 
affiliated analysts. This is because; both management and analyst are benefit from 
issuing biased forecast. Overoptimistic forecast or recommendation boost the price of 
growth stock so that the cost of raising external capital will be substantially reduced. 
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In turn, management provide more underwriting fee to the affiliated analyst. In this 
case, the unaffiliated analyst may also provide overoptimistic recommendation to 
attract new client.  
Chan and Karceski (2003) examine the quality of analyst earning forecast by studying 
analyst behavior in the bull market of 1990s, their results suggest the conflict of 
interest make analyst issue biased earning forecast in order to gain favour of investment 
bank client. Empirical evidence suggest that analyst incentives increase when they 
server more institutional investor.  
 
Most of the literature mentioned above concludes that the quality of analyst research 
has poor investment value. Furthermore, Liu and Song (2001) study the analyst 
performance surround the Internet bubble durst in 2000. They divided the analyst into 
two groups, unaffiliated and affiliated analyst. They define affiliated analyst as the 
analysts who have underwriting relation with Internet Company. The results find that 
unaffiliated analyst issues more optimistic forecast than affiliate analyst before the 
bubble burst. Then, analysts in both group issue pessimistic forecasts after the bubble 
burst. However, these biased forecasts are less notable in the subgroup of independent 
analysts. These results indicate that even many analysts are affiliated with intuitional 
investor, less biased forecast still available in the public. These results also indicate that 
no matter how strong the conflict is, divergence opinion does exist among analyst.  
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To contrary with literatures above, many literatures have found that analyst forecast 
quality is determined by many factors such as firm size, brokerage house ownership, 
working experience and reputation (Clement, 1999, Jacob et al., 1999, Cowen et al., 
2006, Groysberg and Lee, 2008, Fang and Yasuda, 2009).  
The reputation concern theory states that analyst’s reputation is based upon issuing 
accurate forecast and recommendation on the right time. Analyst compensation is 
relying on their reputation. The long career concern disciplines analyst from activities 
that damage their reputation. Fang and Yasuda (2009) study the impact of conflict 
interest on star and non-star analyst’s earning forecast and recommendations. They 
confirm that the long career reputation concern have strong disciplinary power. But, 
the discipline power of bank reputation are different when take analyst personal 
reputation as a proxy. The accuracy level of recommendations and earing forecast 
issued by non-reputational analyst are negatively related to their employers’ 
reputation. Non-reputational analyst who hired by top-tier investment bank issue more 
biased recommendation and earning forecast. Discipline power of personal reputation 
is stronger for reputational analyst working for top tier investment bank than the 
non-reputational colleague. Consequently, analyst reputation concern is one of the 
determinants of forecast accuracy.  
 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find that providing accurate forecasts will benefit both analysts 
and the institution they work for.  Accurate forecasts build analysts a long career 
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reputation and increase the credibility of their brokerage house. Thus, high credibility 
will boost the brokerage house’s revenue. In addition, Pacelli (2015) indicates that 
corporate culture is one of the significant determinants of analyst forecast quality. 
Analysts play a key role in financial markets. The service they provide not only 
represents the general market expectation but reduces the information asymmetries 
between firms and investor.  
However, individual investors and institutional clients have different attitudes toward 
analysts’ accurate forecast. Individual investor expect highly accurate forecast and 
recommendation because analyst research could be the determinants in their decision 
making process. On the other hand, institutional investor expects the ‘right’ forecast 
rather than forecast accuracy. Bradshaw (2011) suggest that earning forecast accuracy 
is not the major concern for institutional investor compare with “management access” 
and “accessibility”. Empirical evidence from Brown et al. (2015) and Groysberg et al. 
(2011) suggest that there is no statistically significant relation between analyst 
compensation and earning forecast accuracy. As a result, analyst can issue biased 
earning forecast to meet their clients’ immediate need, especially in the case of 
short-term profit maximizing. Michaely and Womack (1999) find optimistic bias is for 
those clients who want to boost stock price or promote underwriting. Hilary and Hsu 
(2013) find pessimistic bias is for those clients who want to lower their recent earning 
target. Overall, analyst forecast accuracy is not related to their compensation, is not the 
major concern of institutional clients. Thus, analyst forecast are more likely to be 
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biased in the favor of management and investment bank rather than individual investor.  
Hong and Kubik (2003) find that brokerage house reward optimistic analyst more 
than accurate analyst. To gain more underwriting fee, brokerage house even 
encourage analyst to issue overoptimistic forecast and recommendation. Therefore, 
the disciplinary power of long career concern is weak.   
 
Overall, previous literatures have mixed results about the true investment value of 
analyst earning forecast and recommendation. However, after reviewing previous 
literature, we can acknowledges that analyst forecast can represent the market 
expectation, it is more accurate than the forecast generated from time series model. 
Analyst do have conflict interest, they tend to issue biased forecast in the favour of 
management and institutional investor. It can be argue that the reputation concern 
theory does encourage analyst to issue accurate earning forecast, reputation concern do 
have discipline power for analyst with high reputation even through the power is week 
for analyst with low reputation. The accurate and independent earning forecast is 
available in the public. Thus, no matter how strong the conflict of interest is, how 
serious analyst herding behaviour is, divergence opinions among analyst always exist.  
Analyst dispersion represents the market expectation for one company. In this paper, 
we use analyst divergence opinion, measured by standard deviation of analyst earning 
forecast, to examine bidder and target performance.    
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Divergence Opinion Theory versus Merger &Acquisition 
Miller (1977)’s model show that the demand curve for stock with divergence opinion 
has downward slope, the higher divergence opinion is, and the steeper the slope will 
be. An increase in stock supply will drop the stock price, as less optimistic investor 
will absorb the extra supply. Miller (1977) ‘s divergence opinion theory imply that 
bidder with high divergence opinion will receive negative future return as the stock 
float has been increased by merger and acquisition deal.  Many empirical evidence 
support Miller (1977)’s theory, Diether et al. (2002) shows that stock with high 
dispersion in analyst earning forecast generate lower future return than stock with low 
dispersion. Similar results are found in bidders announcement return, Moeller et al. 
(2007) suggest high divergence opinion about acquirer’s price lead to negative 
announcement return when stocks are used as means of payment. Based upon Miller 
(1977)’ theory, stock price drop when stock supply increases. Using stock as means of 
payment increase the bidders float. Therefore, negative announcement return is 
expected. However, It is difficult to distinguish whether the negative return is caused 
by divergence of opinion or signaling effect. Travlos (1987) shows that signaling 
effect leads negative return for bidder using stock as means of payment. Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) shows stock payment leads to negative abnormal return in the long run. 
Because, Bidder gain advantage by using overvalued stock as mean of payment in 
merger and acquisition. However, Stock payment signal that bidders stock are 
overvalued. Consequently, bidders stock price drop as investor short bidders stock. 
The relation between bidders short run abnormal returns and pre-announcements 
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divergence opinion remains unclear. Moeller et al. (2007) found an insignificant result 
for the short run.  
Miller (1977)’s divergence of opinion theory also implies that investors have their 
own identical stock evaluation. The stock price will firstly setup by the most 
optimistic investor, and then the price will decline through time as uncertainty 
become certainty as more information available.  Many literatures support this 
implication. Alexandridis et al. (2007) examine how divergence of opinion about 
bidders stock price before announcement related to bidder post acquisition abnormal 
return. They find that acquirer in the high divergence opinion group gain less than the 
acquirer in the low divergence opinion group.  Acquirers with high divergence 
opinion before announcement receive negative abnormal return in the long run.  
Duchin and Schmidt (2013) study the quality analyst research and level of uncertainty 
surround merger and acquisition announcement during and outside merger wave. 
They conclude that the quality of analysis surrounding acquisitions changes during 
the wave and outside the wave. The quality of analyst research is greater outsider the 
wave than during the wave.  
 
In this paper, we examine the relation between bidder abnormal return and pre 
announcement divergence opinion further by adding bidders past performance as one 
extra proxy. Previous literature suggests that bidder with high growth potential, high 
P/E ratio underperform bidder with lower P/E ratio in both short run and long run. 
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According to Miller (1977) theory, stock with low divergence opinion implies that the 
stock price is set by less optimistic investors, it is close to the fundamental price. 
Therefore, We conjecture that high P/E bidder attract more analyst following, the 
increase in the number of analyst following will increase level of divergence opinion. 
High divergence opinion will leads to negative abnormal return in both short run and 
long run.  
Financial analyst face new challenge in issuing accurate earning forecast for firms 
involved in merger and acquisition. This is because merger and acquisition 
substantially change the earning time series for bidder and target. Accurately 
forecasting earnings for the combined firm will be even more challenging. Haw et al. 
(1994) document that merger and acquisition leads to significant increase in analysts' 
absolute earnings forecast errors in the year after deal completion. It will take 
approximately 4 years to regain the pre-merger accuracy level. In addition, 
diversifying deal also cause substantial increase in the earning forecast error(Dunn 
and Nathan, 1998), Erwin and Perry (2000) show that, comparing with firms conduct 
focus preserving deals, higher forecast error for firms conduct focus-decreasing deals 
within 5-year after deal completion.  
Merger and acquisition deal alter firm’s fundamental characteristics, such as size, 
financial health, capital structure. Profitability and growth rate, Kinney (1971) believe 
these fundamental changes increase analyst earning forecast error. Although there are 
more information available for bidder and target before merger and acquisition, 
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analysis has lack information regard to the new firm created by the merger deal. 
Consequently, the earning forecast for the combined firm will be less accurate.  
Furthermore, Scharfstein and Stein (1990)’s career concern theory states that Security 
analyst’s reputation is base up the forecast accuracy and length of forecasting record. 
Security analysts’ compensation and career rely on how influential and accurate their 
recommendation and earning forecast will be. For the long career concern, security 
analyst earning forecast should be as accurate as possible. Hilary and Hsu (2013) 
argue that earning forecast consistency is more important than accuracy. There are 
two types of analysts, the first type is the analyst who made consistent forecast error, 
and the second type is the analyst with higher stated accuracy. They document that the 
first type of analyst has greater capability of affecting price than the second type. 
Consistent analyst has lower possibility of being downgraded and higher possibility of 
being nominated All Star analysts. Institutional investors favour analyst with high 
consistency and trading strategy.  
Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Gleason and Lee (2003) propose that the greater the 
amount of information available in the market about the firm, the more accurate 
analysts' earnings forecasts will be. In the same vein, we propose that if the M&A 
increases the richness of the information environment of the merging firms, this 
should enhance the ability of analysts to forecast more accurately. Consequently, 
analyst forecast errors are expected to decline after the merger.  
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Scheinkman et al. (2004) show that the price of stock with high divergence opinion 
will drop if the volumes of stock float increase. Supply curve shift to the right as 
shown in Miller (1977) model. There are many ways to increase stock float, Moeller 
et al. (2007) shows that stock swap in merger and acquisition deal will increase the 
stock float and cause negative future return for bidders. Baker et al. (2007) argue that 
target shareholder are less sensitive, it take time for market to absorb the new issues.  
Moreover, newly issued shares may partially trade in the market. For instance, 
fundamental investor tends to hold the share for a long time period. In this case, for a 
given increase in the supply of shares, we would expect the bidder abnormal return to 
fall in bidder diversity of opinion and in the proportion of target shareholders who are 
not sleepy. Moreover, the lock up agreement may deter new issues to hit the market 
immediately after deal completion. Geczy et al. (2002) also show that the short selling 
for bidders tend to limited as the high borrowing cost and low availability of 
acquirer’s stock. To examine how increase in stock float will affect analyst forecast 
accuracy and bidders abnormal return, we conjecture that stock payment increase post 
deal completion earning forecast accuracy. As increase the stock supply bring the 
stock price toward its fundamental value, since the stock price is set up by less 
optimistic investors. Bidder’s long-term abnormal returns are negatively related to 
stock payment or increase in stock float.  
Following previous literature, earning volatility is measured by the standard deviation 
of earnings per share for the past three years. The earnings volatility of merging firms 
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will increase due to merger and acquisition. High earning volatility lowers the earning 
predictability of bidder and target.  
Finally, Pacelli (2015) concludes that, due to the conflict of interest, analysts maximize 
their own benefit when issuing the earning forecast. The earning forecast is highly 
likely to be analyst’s optimal choice after balances all stakeholder’s interest rather than 
the most accurate forecast they can make. This is because: it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish whether analyst issue biased earning forecast intentionally, due to the 
earning forecast making process. Although there are many regulations that promote 
analyst independence, the discipline power still is weak. However, the effect of 
regulations, such as Global Settlement and regulations fair disclosure are proved to be 
effective.  
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4.3 Hypothesis Construction 
The literature shows that there are mixed results in regard of how asymmetry 
information and divergence opinion affect bidder’s abnormal return. We argue that 
the mix results are caused by the obscene of firm’s pre announcement performance 
and stock recognition. Our hypothesis rational begins with Miller (1977)’s divergence 
opinion theory. Based upon Miller (1977)’s assumption, we draw the demand curve 
for stock A (see diagram one). The slope of demand curve AOB shows the original 
level of divergence opinion. The original price is P0. Next, the divergence opinion 
increases so that the demand curve becomes steeper. We get demand curve COD and 
EOF. The stock price will increase simultaneously from P0 via P1 to P2. The 
cumulative abnormal return will be the sum of R1 and R2.  
 
Then, we draw the original demand curve GOH for stock B, we emphasis that the 
slope of demand curve GOH is steeper than any demand curve of stock A. according 
to Miller’s theory, the divergence opinion of stock B is greater than the divergence 
opinion of stock A. Next, the slope of demand curve GOH increases, we get demand 
curve IOJ and KOM. The stock price will increase from P3, via P4 to P5. We get 
stock return R3 and R4. In the diagram will can see, the sum of R1 and R2 is greater 
than the sum of R3 and R4. If we assume the stock price took 365 days to increase 
from P0 to P2 or P3 to P5. The divergence opinion steadily increase, the slope of the 
demand curve get steeper day by day, draw the daily demand curve, we will have the 
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daily return. The sum of the daily return is the run-up ratio.  
According to the trading mechanism demonstrated in Miller (1977), we conjecture 
that stock with low divergence opinion and low past performance, e.g. stock A in 
diagram one, are more willing to conduct merger and acquisition deal. This is because 
Low divergence opinion indicate that the firms stock price have already been fully 
realized by the optimistic investor available in the market, there is low trading activity 
and low investor recognition. No matter the stock price is high or low, there is lack of 
price movement. The poor past performance also shows the same problem. The lack 
of investor recognition shrinks the number of potential buyers. The declining stock 
price and fixed investment recognition demand firms to attract more attention. 
Investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 1987) address that an exogenous event 
increases stock recognition, the company will lower the cost of raising capital and 
increase the investment opportunity, Merger and acquisition is one of such exogenous 
event. Moreover, Miller (1977)’s view, Increase in stock recognition attracts more 
investors from the buying side. So the value of stock increase but the expected return 
will decrease. Therefore, the deals conducted by bidder with low divergence opinion 
tend to be value enhancing.  
Furthermore, in the scenario of merger and acquisition, we conjectures bidder with 
high divergence opinion and high past performance (stock B in diagram one) receive 
negative return. The rational is that these bidders are like “Glamour” bidder. They are 
associated with high P/E ratio, high free cash flow, overconfident CEO and high 
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agency cost. Bidders with high cash flow have poor acquisition performance. 
Moreover, High divergence opinion and good past performance indicates that the 
price reach the highest bidding possible in the market. They are more likely to be 
overvalued. The overvalued bidder tends to overpay their target and suffer serious 
governances problem. The deal conducted by such bidder tend to be value destroying. 
Overall, Bidder with high divergence opinion and good past performance tend to 
value destroying deal.  We hypothesise that  
H1a:  Analyst Divergence opinion controlling bidder’s past performance 
negatively related to Bidder short-term abnormal return  
 
Furthermore, as stated in Scharfstein and Stein (1990)’s career concern theory, 
security analyst should update their earning forecast on time. Therefore, the 
Divergence opinion one-year proceeding deal announcement has no impact on bidder 
abnormal return in the long run.  
 
In contrary, Asymmetry information model imply that there are asymmetry 
information between management and investors. Deal announcement will disclosure 
more information to the market. The signaling effect will change bidder’s abnormal 
return accordingly. Stock payment lead to negative abnormal return because it signals 
that bidder is overvalued. Moeller et al. (2007) also consider asymmetry information 
as the uncertainty of future growth. In this paper, we measure information 
asymmetries by idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma). It also known as a measurement of 
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idiosyncratic risk and the uncertainty about future growth, Furthermore, Divergence 
opinion theory and investor recognition hypothesis imply that increase the visibility of 
stock will increase the stock price. Merton’s investor recognition hypothesis indicates 
that increase in public awareness lower the company’s financing cost increase the 
investment opportunity, so the value of stock increase but the expected return will 
decrease. In other words, high idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) implies high market 
valuation before deal announcement. In addition, the effect of investor recognition 
will boost by high idiosyncratic volatility. We conjecture that bidder with high 
idiosyncratic volatility will trigger stronger investor recognition effect. A bidder with 
high idiosyncratic volatility achieves positive abnormal return in the short run. 
Therefore, we hypothesis that  
H2a: Idiosyncratic volatility positively related to Bidder short-term abnormal return  
However, the effect of information symmetry will perish in the long run. Because, 
more information will be disclosed and the stock price will back to it’s fundamental 
value. Therefore, we hypothesis that 
H2b: Idiosyncratic volatility negatively related to Bidder long-term abnormal return
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4.4.Data and Methodology 
4.4.1 Sample Selection 
In this paper, we examine how divergence opinion one year before deal announcement 
effect bidders and target abnormal return in both short run and long run.  Therefore, 
we combine deal data from Thomas one and analyst earning forecast from The 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). We collect the deal sample from 
Thomas one; the initial deal sample includes 299,048 US merger and acquisition deals. 
We require that all deal should be announced over the period 1 January 1980 to 1 
January 2015. Both bidders and targets are US firms, the original sample yield to 
196031 deals. Bidders are required to be public and targets are required to be public, 
private, or subsidiaries. Because we study bidders and target short/long-term 
acquisition performance, all deals should be completed deal. Using these criteria give 
us a sample of 89199 deals. Following the standard procedure, we exclude financial 
and utility firms with Standard Industrial Classification codes 6000–6999 and 4900–
4999; these leave us a sample of 63720 deals. Takeover transaction values are 
required to be greater than or equal to $1 million, yielding a sample of 33274 deals. 
We also remove deals completed with following Merger and acquisition technique: 
Bankruptcy acquisitions, going-private transactions, leveraged buyouts, liquidations, 
repurchases, restructurings, reverse takeovers, and privatizations, produce a sample of 
28649 deals.  
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We collect all available analyst-earning forecast from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The earning forecast sample is ranged from 1st January 
1990 to 31st December 2015. To guarantee the data accuracy, we obtain both 
recommendation announcement day and review day. Our sample include 11,016,157 
earning forecast made by 20289 analyst from 919 financial institutions. We match the 
earning forecast sample, firm characteristics and deal characteristics by deal number, 
Analyst Name, Company Name and earning forecast announcement day. Because, 
bidders have multiple analysts following before and after deal announcement, and 
analyst will review their earning forecast through time.  To estimate the analyst 
divergence opinion one year before deal announcement, we introduce a time variable 
Gap. Gap is defined as the calendar day difference between earning forecast 
announcement day and deal announcement day. We keep the earning forecast given 
365 days before the deal announcement and 365 days after the deal announcement day, 
the sample yield to 1,758,295 earning forecast record. Following Hassan, Zhao and 
Zhu (2014), we use annual earnings forecasts 365 days before the deal announcement 
day to estimate pre deal divergence opinion. To estimate post deal earning forecast 
error, we need actual earnings in the fiscal year of deal completion and earning 
forecast one fiscal year after the deal completion. Nonetheless, we estimate the 
analyst divergence opinion and drop all the duplicate deals, our sample drop to 28609 
deals.  
Finally, we combine bidder and target abnormal return in both short run and long run 
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with analyst divergence opinion, deal characteristics and firm characteristics. We use 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 3 m 5 and 11 days surrounding announcement day to 
measure bidders short-term abnormal return, BHAR 12 , 24 , 36 month to measure 
long term abnormal return. After drop all missing observation in bidder’s CAR and 
BHAR, the sample yield to 18,707, we further match the sample with analyst 
divergence opinion toward bidder, the sample yield to 14,010. To control deal 
characteristics, We require that deal information, such as relative transaction value, 
deal attitude, diversification, deal type and means of payment, should recorded by 
Thomson One Banker, yielding 9910 deals.  
 
To control firms’ characteristics, we require that The Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database should have sufficient record about bidder stock price data. 
We require that bidder should have sufficient accounting information recorded by 
Compustat database so that we can estimate firm characteristics, such as leverage ratio, 
run-up ratio, market to book ratio, price to earning ratio, return on equity ratio, debt to 
equity ratio and cash flow to equity ratio, leaving a sample of 7843 observations.  
4.4.2 Methodology  
4.4.2.1 Univariate Test  
Both a univariate test and multivariate regression model are employed to analyse the 
impact of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder’s abnormal returns 
in the short and long run. We categorise the bidder into three groups on the basis of 
divergence opinion. The High Divo bidders is the bidders who is in the highest third of 
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bidder ranked by analyst earning forecasting dispersion, where Divo is greater than 
1.1385.  The lowest third of bidders, where Divo is lower than 0.2454, is categorised 
as Low Divo bidders. The middle third of deals is classified as the neutral group.  
 
In the univariate test, we compare the mean of the short-term and long-term abnormal 
returns obtained by each deal group. We use a different approach to estimate the 
abnormal return in the short run and long run. For the short run, we choose time 
windows of 3, 5 and 11 days to calculate CARS. CARS in each time window are 
estimated by the market model and market-adjusted model separately. For the long run, 
we use market model and the size-adjusted model to estimate Buy and Hold ratio 
(BHAR)  
 
We also compare bidder firm characteristics. Run-up measures the pre-acquisition 
stock performance, defined as market cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to bidders 
over the window [-365, -28] before the acquisition announcement day. The returns are 
calculated based on the market-adjusted model. The market-adjusted model employs 
the CRSP value-weighted index and its parameters are estimated over 255 days, ending 
366 days prior to the acquisition announcement.  
 
The return on equity (ROE) ratio measures the bidder’s profitability, and is defined as 
net income divided by common and preferred equity – COMPUSTAT 
Item18/(Item10+Item11); M/B, the market to book ratio, measures the market 
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valuation of bidder’s stock, and is defined as the annual closing price multiplied by the 
common shares outstanding and divided by the total common equity – COMPUSTAT 
Item24*Item25/Item60; P/E, the price to earnings ratio, measures net income per share, 
and is defined as the annual closing price divided by the earnings per share – 
COMPUSTAT Item24/Item58; cash flow/Equity, which is a ratio of cash flow over 
equity, measures the amount of free cash being held by a company, and is defined as the 
sum of a company’s income before extraordinary items and depreciation minus 
dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by the total assets – 
COMPUSTAT(Item18+ Item14- Item19- Item21)/(Item6); debt/total Equity, the debt 
over asset ratio, measures to what extent a company is leveraged, and is defined as 
long-term debt divided by total assets – COMPUSTAT Item9/Item6. Leverage ratio 
defined as defined as COMPUSTAT (Item 9+Item34)/(Item 9+Item34+Item216). 
 
For each group, we compare the deal-specified characteristics. These include: relative 
size, which measures the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the ratio of the 
transaction value from Thomas One Banker over the bidder’s market value four weeks 
before the announcement from CRSP; stock, which measures the percentage of deals 
completed with stock payment; and cash, which measures the percentage of deals 
completed with cash. Diversification measures diversification deals, which is defined 
as the bidder and the target not having the same first two digits of primary SIC code. 
Tender offer measures the deal type. For market environment, we estimate the market 
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heat degree. The number of analysts following is a proxy for a firm's information 
environment.  
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4.4.2.2 Multivariable Test 
We split the full sample into two groups on the basis of bidders pre merger performance. 
The well-performed bidders are defined as bidders with positive Runup ratio. The 
poorly performed bidders are defined as bidders with negative Runup ratio.  
 
Univariate tests are insufficient to reveal the true relationship between divergence 
opinion and abnormal returns. It does not estimate the interactive relationship among 
firm characteristics and deal characteristics. We therefore carry out multivariable tests 
as shown in the following regression model:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 1  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 2 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 3 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 4 
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Regression models 1 measure the relationship between divergence opinion and 
abnormal returns. The key explanatory variable is acquirers’ divergence opinion 
(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡) measured by the standard deviation of analyst earning forecast dispersion. 
Regression model 2 includes interaction variable 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 which captures bidders 
past performance. Regression model 3 and 4 highlight the effect of means of payment 
by add dummy variable Stock and Cash respectively.  
To reveal the true relationship between information asymmetry and abnormal return, 
we carry out multivariable tests as shown in the regression model 5 to 8:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 5  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 6 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 7 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 8 
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Regression models 1 measure the relationship between information asymmetry and 
abnormal returns. The key explanatory variable is acquirers’ idiosyncratic volatility 
(𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡) measured by the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model 
regression calculated from 365 days to 28 days preceding deal 
announcementRegression model 2 includes interaction variable 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡  which 
captures bidders past performance. Regression model 7 and 8 highlight the effect of 
means of payment by add dummy variable Stock and Cash respectively.  
To estimate the combined effect, we carry out regression model 9: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In order to the analyse the impact of divergence opinion on bidder’s return in the long 
run, we rerun the regressions by replacing bidders’ CAR with bidder’s BHAR as a 
dependent variable. We use regression models 10, 11 and 12 shown below:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 10 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 11 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 12 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression model 13 
 
The dependent variable is the buy and hold ratio (BHAR), which measures bidders’ 
abnormal returns in the long run. BHARs measure bidders’ abnormal returns in the first 
24 months after the month of announcement. We also include the same variable in 
regressions 1 to 9 to control for firm, deal, and market environment. 
 
For each regression model, we have control variables that affect acquirer returns. 
Runup ratio measures past stock return; market-to-book ratio (M/B) measures market 
valuation, and leverage (Leverage) measures rate of leverage. Deal specified control 
variables are: relative transaction values, which measures relative size; Stock is a 
dummy variable, which denote 100% stock payment; Tender offers denote whether 
the deal type is tender offer, Diversification is a dummy variable that measures 
diversifying deals. This paper controls for M&A market heat (M&A Heat Degree).  
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4.4.2.3 Measuring Short-term Performance 
We use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to measure bidder’s short-term M&A 
performance. The market model defines cumulative abnormal return 2 days 
surrounding announcement day as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−2,2 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)]
2
𝑡=−2
 
 
Where Rit represent firms’ daily return; Rmt represent daily market index return. 
(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) is the market return estimated by market model. Therefore, the 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of bidder’s daily abnormal return 
during the event window two days before and two days after the announcement day.  
 
Bouwman et al. (2009) point out that bidders may conduct multiple deals within the 
sample period. To address this issue, we estimate the market-adjusted CAR. The 
market-adjusted CAR 2 days surrounding announcement day is defined as the sum of 
daily abnormal return within the event window [-2,2];  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−2,2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
2
𝑡=−2
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Where ARit is the daily abnormal return that is defined as firm’s daily return minus 
value-weighted daily market return.  
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2.4.2.5 Measure of long-term performance 
Bidders’ acquisition performance in the long run is measured by buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). Initially, we use the market adjust model to estimate 
bidder’s buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). But, Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) suggest that market adjusted BHAR has many biases, 
such as rebalancing bias, new-listing bias, and skewness bias. Moreover, Lyon, Barber, 
and Tsai (1999) and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) believe that size-adjusted 
BHAR is a more reliable indicator for bidder’s long-term M&A performance. To 
address this issue, we estimate both Markets adjusted and Size adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). Market adjusted Buy-and-hold abnormal return 24 month 
after deal announcement is defined as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,0,24 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑗𝑡)
24
𝑡=0
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡)
24
𝑡=0
 
Where Rjt denotes firm’s monthly stock return starting from the month of deal 
announcement. Rmt denotes the monthly value-weighted monthly return.  
 
On the other hand, we use the function below to estimate Size-adjusted BHAR 24 
months after deal announcement: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,0,24 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑗𝑡)
24
𝑡=0
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑝𝑡)
24
𝑡=0
 
Rjt denotes firm’s monthly stock return starting from the month of deal announcement. 
Rpt denotes the return of size adjusted reference portfolio. To build the size-adjusted 
portfolio, all CRSP firms are sorted in descending order and separated into 10 groups 
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by market capitalisation. Then, we sort each group by Market to book ratio and split 
each group into quintiles. Finally, we have 50 size adjusted reference portfolios. The 
portfolio return is shown below,   
𝑅𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑅𝑘𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
Rkt denotes firm K’s monthly stock return. N denotes the number of firms in the 
reference portfolio to which firm K belongs. Therefore, the portfolio return 𝑅𝑝𝑡 , is the 
average return of all firms in the portfolio excluding firm K.  
 
4.4.2.4. Measure Divergence Opinion and Information Asymmetry 
In this paper, following previous literature, we use analyst earing forecast dispersion 
to measure divergence opinion which is defined as the standard deviation of analyst 
forecast for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. This 
measurement is widely used because its can bypass many disturbance such as firm’s 
financial conditions trading costs and size. 
 
Previous literature suggests that idiosyncratic volatility can be used as an appropriate 
measurement of information asymmetries. Chen et al. (2005) also suggest that 
idiosyncratic volatility can be used as a measure of information uncertainty. 
Idiosyncratic volatility can explain the reasons why bidders have low long-term 
abnormal returns. This is consistent with the view of Ang et al. (2006) that stocks 
subject to high past firm-level volatility have low future returns. The idiosyncratic 
volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model 
regression calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event 
window.  
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To estimate idiosyncratic volatility of single stock, we follow the main assumption of 
Capital Asset Pricing Model; the stock return is affected by a common factor and 
firm’s specified shock; daily stock returns are also estimated.  
(1) 𝑅𝑖 𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 𝑡(𝑅𝑚 𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖 𝑡 is stock return, 𝑅𝑚 𝑡is the market return, 𝑟𝑓 𝑡 is the risk-free rate, and 
𝜀𝑖 𝑡is the idiosyncratic return. The idiosyncratic volatility of stock i is the standard 
deviation of the residuals 
The idiosyncratic volatility =√𝑉𝐴𝑅 (𝜀𝑖 𝑡) 
To avoid market bias, Boehme et al. (2009) estimate idiosyncratic volatility by using  
the event window of 100-day period preceding the acquisition announcement. In this 
chapter, we use an event window 365 to 28 days preceding the deal announcement so 
that we can study the bidder with different past performances.  
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4. 5 Results and Discussion 
4.5.1 Summary statistics and Univariate Test  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the full sample. The full sample contains 7842 
acquisition deals conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 
31st, 2013. Since this paper examine how divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry effect bidders abnormal return in both short run and long run, the full 
sample is divided into three subsamples by the degree of analyst divergence opinion 
about bidders (Divo), namely, Low Divo, Neutral and High Divo.  
Insert Table 4.1 Here 
 
Panel A shows bidders cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 3, 5, 11 days surrounding 
announcement day, Market model are use in the CAR estimation. For the full sample, 
bidders in all groups have positive abnormal return in short run. Column Low-High 
shows the short-term abnormal return differences between Low Divo and High Divo 
bidders. The results show that Low Divo Bidders outperform High Divo bidder in the 
short run. Low Divo Bidders cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are significantly 
greater than that of High Divo bidders in all event windows. The highest cumulative 
abnormal return appears in Low Divo group.  Its cumulative abnormal returns 5 days 
surrounding announcement day CAR [-5,5] reach 1.17%, which is twice as much as 
that of High Divo group. The lowest CARs, which is 0.017% CAR [-5,5], are found in 
High Divo group.   
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Market-adjusted and size-adjusted Buy and Hold Ratio (BHAR) measure the long-term 
performance. We estimate the Buy and hold ratio, 12, 24 36 month after the month of 
deal announcement. The figure suggests that all bidders make lose in the long run. As 
shown in the table, all BHAR Ratio is negative. However, the BHAR for Low Divo 
Bidders are much lower than the full sample average and other groups. The highest 
return is made by Low Divo bidder 12 month after deal announcement, which is -0.89% 
for market adjusted BHAR [0, 12]. Although the figure is negative but it close to break 
even. The difference between Low and High Divo bidder’s long-term abnormal return 
clearly shows that Low Divo Bidders outperform High Divo bidders in the long run.  
Table 1 suggest that bidder with high divergence opinion tend to conduct value 
destroying deals. Deal conducted by Low Divo Bidders is value enhancing. Overall 
bidders with low divergence opinion outperform High Divo bidders in both short run 
and long run.  This is consistent with H1:  Analyst Divergence opinion negatively 
related to Bidder short-term abnormal return. Low divergence opinion indicate that 
the firms stock price have already been fully realized by the optimistic investor 
available in the market, there is low trading activity and low investor recognition. An 
exogenous event, such as merger and acquisition, will attract more investors from the 
buying side. Divergence opinion theory and investor recognition hypothesis imply 
that increase in the number of investors in the buying side increase stock price.  
Panel B presents statistics for firm characteristics for bidders in all groups. As 
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mentioned before, Analyst Divergence opinion (Divo), as known as, Analyst forecast 
dispersion, is defined as the standard deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 365 
days to 28 days before deal announcement. Because we divided the full sample by 
Analyst Divergence opinion about the bidder, it is not surprise that the average Divo 
of Low Divo Bidders is 0.1017, the figure reach 6.1735 for the High Divo Bidders. 
However, we find interesting result for information asymmetries measurement. We 
measure information asymmetries by the idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma), which is 
defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model regression 
calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event window. Sigma 
in Low Divo group is 0.0333 that is significantly higher than the Sigma of High Divo 
group. The results suggest that Low Divo bidder have higher degree of information 
asymmetry than the High Divo bidders. Investors of Low Divo bidder face more 
uncertainty than the others so investments for Low Divo bidder tend to be more risky 
than others.  Miller (1977) believes that the effect of investor recognition will boost 
by high idiosyncratic volatility. It indicates that the significant difference in Bidders’ 
abnormal return is caused by the magnitude information asymmetries.  This results is 
consistent with H2a: Idiosyncratic volatility negatively related to Bidder short term 
abnormal return. 
Panel B also shows that Low Divo Bidders have significantly higher RUNUP ratio. It 
suggests that Low Divo Bidders havebetter stock performance one year before the deal 
announcement than high Divo Bidders. Next, Low Divo Bidders have significantly 
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lower leverage ratio and Debt to Total Equity ratio. Furthermore, Low Divo group has 
lower market to book ratio than that of High Divo Bidders though the difference is 
insignificant; nevertheless, on average, one Low Divo bidders are covering by 9.8281 
analysts. This number is far smaller than the number of analyst covering High Divo 
Bidders that is 24.68 analysts per High Divo Bidders.  These figures indicate that 
bidders Low Divo Bidders have better operating performance than the High Divo 
bidders but they have less public exposure and recognition. Therefore, the market 
undervalues Low Divo Bidders.  
 
Panel C presents statistics for deal characteristics for the full sample and all three Divo 
subsamples. Market Heat Degree measures the deal clustering effect within the sample 
period. It indicates whether the deal is conduct on the merger wave. The result shows 
that Low Divo Bidders have lower market heat degree than High Divo bidders. It 
suggests that Low Divo bidders tend to conduct the deal when merger and acquisition is 
less popular in the market.  
Furthermore, the Relative Size shows that Low Divo Bidders acquire larger target than 
High Divo Bidders. For the means of payment, Low Divo Bidders tend to use less stock 
than High Divo Bidders. 21.08% of deals conducted by Low Divo Bidders are 
completed with stock payment, 23.57% for High Divo Bidders.  
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Cash payment are more popular than Stock payment, 45.68% of deals completed by 
High Divo Bidders are paid with cash, compare with 40.59% in Low Divo Bidders.  
Low Divo Bidders tend to make less tender offer and conduct less diversifying deals. 
The target public status also shows that Low Divo bidders are more interesting in 
acquiring private target.  58.19% of deals conducted by Low Divo bidders are 
acquiring private target, 42.58% for the High Divo bidders. High Divo bidders acquire 
more public listed target than Low Divo bidders. 29.88% of deals conducted by High 
Divo bidders are acquiring public target that is twice as much as the number of public 
target acquiring by Low Divo bidders.   
 
Overall, Figures in table 1 shows that Low Divo Bidders outperform High Divo bidder 
in merger and acquisition. This is consistent with divergence opinion theory and 
previous literature that stock with high dispersion generate lower future return than 
stock with low dispersion; acquirer in the high divergence opinion group gain less 
than the acquirer in the low divergence opinion group. On the other hand, Low Divo 
bidders have higher idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) than high Divo bidders. This 
results indicate that Low Divo bidder have higher magnitude information asymmetry. 
Its stock return within 365 to 28 days proceeding deal announcement are more 
intensely fluctuated that the return of High Divo bidders. Therefore, Low Divo 
bidders bear more uncertainty about future growth and are more risky than other. As 
Miller (1977) suggested high idiosyncratic volatility will trigger stronger investor 
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recognition effect. The high abnormal returns are the reward for investor who is 
willing to bear the extra risk. Therefore, bidder with high idiosyncratic volatility tends 
to conduce value-enhancing deals.  
 
High Divo Bidders also tend to use more stock in the means of payment. Travlos (1987) 
confirms that using stock payment in M&As will trigger signalling effect. Stock 
payment signals overvaluation of bidders share. It reduces the information asymmetry 
in the market.  Therefore, the deals with stock payment face substantially lower 
announcement return than others. According to divergence opinion theory, High Divo 
bidders are more likely to be overvalued. As the stock prices of High Divo Bidder are 
set buy the most optimistic investors. This will strengthen the signalling effect. This is 
another reason why High Divo Bidders has lower abnormal return than other.  This is 
consistent with Moeller et al. (2007). They suggest high divergence opinion about 
bidder lead to negative announcement return when stocks are used as means of 
payment. 
 
On the other hand, comparing Low Divo and High Divo Bidders, only few firm 
characteristics are significantly different.  Low Divo Bidders tend to have better past 
performance, less leveraged than High Divo Bidders. However, High Divo Bidders 
have more analysts following. Number of analyst following is used as a proxy for the 
richness of a firm's information environment. Fang and Peress (2009)use the number 
of analyst following as a measure of media coverage. High number of analyst 
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following indicates higher public exposure and more information disclosure. If the 
bidder has poor past performance, the high number of analyst following will spread 
the information efficiently. Therefore, High Divo bidders are more likely received 
negative return.  From the deal characteristic comparison, it is clear that Low Divo 
bidder and High Divo Bidder has completely different perception about the target and 
timing.  Low Divo bidder tends to conduct the deal when there is less deal clustering in 
the market.  Although Low Divo Bidder prefers private target rather than public target, 
they make less tender offer and acquiring target with higher relative size. Over 40.59% 
deals are paid with 100% cash. Only 21.8% deals use stock as means of payment. As we 
discuss above, the stock price of Low Divo Bidders tend to be less active than the stock 
price of High Divo bidders. The deal conducted by Low Divo Bidders is the exogenous 
events states in Miller (1977) investor recognition hypothesis. The deal will attract 
more potential buyer and have high growth potential. Therefore, Low Divo bidder 
doesn’t prefer stock payment.  
 
All these results suggest that Low Divo bidder outperform High Divo bidders. Analyst 
divergence opinions are negatively related to bidder return.  Idiosyncratic volatility is 
positively related to bidders abnormal return. In addition,  the firm characteristics 
suggest that the Low bidders with good past performance conduct value enhancing 
deals.
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4.5.2 Multivariate Test 
 
Due to the limitation of univariable test, The results from table 1 could be biased.   
Therefore, we carry out multivariate regressions. First of all, we examine the relation 
between analyst divergence opinion (Divo) and abnormal return in both short run and 
long run. Then, we analyst how Idiosyncratic volatility is related to bidders short- and 
long-term abnormal returns. Finally, we estimate the combined effect of analyst 
Divergence opinion (Divo) and Idiosyncratic volatility on bidders merger gain. So that 
we can identify which factor has the stronger influential power.  
Analyst Divergence opinion (Divo) and Bidders’s abnormal return in the short run 
Table 2 presents the regression results that reveal how analyst Divergence opinion 
(Divo) related to acquirer’s short-term abnormal return. Regression 1 estimates the 
impact of analyst Divergence opinion on Bidders cumulative abnormal return in 5 
days surrounding announcement day. We add an interaction variable Divorun into 
Regression 2. DivoRun is the interaction variable measured by Divo multiply Runup 
ratio. Therefore, we can put bidder past performance into account, when we estimates 
the impact of analyst Divergence opinion on Bidders short-term return. Regression 3 
and 4 examine whether the impact of Divergence opinion changes if we put different 
means of payment into consideration. All the CARs are estimated by marke model.  
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Insert Table 4.2 Here 
The key independent variable in regression 1 t is Divo value that measures analyst 
divergence opinion. We define Divo is the standard deviation of analyst forecast for a 
bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. The results show that, the 
coefficient of Divo is insignificant and it has a positive sign. It suggests Divo has no 
impact on bidder return. However, we argue that this result is caused by mixed impact 
of Divo on bidders with different past performance. This is one of the reasons why we 
introduce the interaction variable DivoRun. Results from regression 2 suggest a 
negative relation between DivoRun and Bidders CARs [-2,2], the coefficient of 
DivoRun is significantly negative. One unit increase in DivoRun will increase bidders 
CAR[-2,2] by 9.08%. The results indicate that bidders with high divergence opinion 
and good past performance will conduct value destroying deal. Even though the 
significant level is 10%, this result implies that we should put past performance into 
consideration when we study the impact of divergence opinion on short-term merger 
gains. Therefore, we split the full samples into two subsamples, subsample one 
include the bidder with negative past performance only. Subsample two contain the 
bidders with positive past performance. All the results will be report in table 4 and 5.  
For the control variables, Relative Size and tender offer are significantly positive. 
These results suggest that acquiring larger target have positive impact on bidder short 
term abnormal return. This is because acquiring large target gain more public 
exposure and attract more potential buyers. However, acquiring public target tend to 
be value destroying. Public listed company have more option to deter threat of being 
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takeover. This is why Low Divo bidder acquire more private target as stated in table 1.  
 
Results In table 2 suggest that the analyst divergence opinion (Divo) have 
insignificant impact on bidders abnormal return in short run. However, we found 
negative relation Divorun and Bidders CAR[-2,2]. These results the impact of 
divergence opinion on bidder return can be altered by bidders past performance. this 
encourage us to further examine the true impact of divergence opinion on the return of 
bidders with difference past performance.  
 
Table 3 shows the relation between idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) and bidders 
short-term abnormal return. Regression 1 estimates the impact of idiosyncratic volatility 
(Sigma) on Bidders cumulative abnormal return in 5 days surrounding announcement 
day. Regression 2 includes an interaction variable SigmaRun. SigmaRun is measured 
by Divo multiply Runup. Regression 3 and 4 reveal the impact of means of payment 
by adding dummy variable STOCK and Cash. All the CARs are estimated by market 
model.  
Insert Table 4.3 Here 
 
Idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma), the key explanatory variable of regressions in table 3, 
is highly significantly in all regression. The positive coefficient of Sigma indicates that 
one unit increase in idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) will increase CAR [-2,2] by 
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17.52%. This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis H2a: Idiosyncratic volatility 
positively related to Bidder short-term abnormal return. 
 
Idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) as a measurement of idiosyncratic risk shows the 
uncertainty of bidders future growth.  It also used to measure the magnitude of 
Asymmetry information between management and investors. High level of 
information asymmetry before the deal announcement has positive impact on bidders 
merger again in the short run. This is because bidders with high information 
asymmetry pay lower premium(Dionne et al., 2014). Deal announcement will 
disclosure more information to the market. The signaling effect will change bidders 
abnormal return accordingly. Furthermore, Miller (1977) bidder with high 
idiosyncratic volatility will trigger stronger investor recognition effect. Therefore. 
Bidder with high idiosyncratic volatility tends to conduce value-enhancing deals.  
 
After adding the interaction variable into regression 2, the impact of Sigma is even 
stronger. One unit increase in idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) will increase CAR [-2,2] 
by 28.11%. The coefficient of SigmaRun is also highly significant. The negative sign 
suggest that bidders with high idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) and good past 
performance conduct value destroying deal. This is because high idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) and high past performance indicate that the bidder is more risker 
than others. High past performance put the market expectation into the highest 
position, high idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) indicates high price fluctuation range 
 216 
and high information asymmetry. Therefore, they are more sensitive to negative 
information.  Unfortunately, These bidders are like “Glamour” bidder in Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998). They are more likely to associated with high P/E ratio, high free 
cach flow, overconfident CEO and high agency cost. All the factors have negative 
impact on bidder short term abnormal return.   
 
Regression 3 and 4 shows the impact of means of payment. Stock payment signifies the 
overvaluation of bidders stock. The Signalling effect has negative impact on 
announcement return. The result shows that Bidder short-term abnormal return will be 
down by 0.58% if the deal is paid by 100% stock. Bidders return will increase by 0.52% 
for 100% cash payment.  
 
For the control variables, Negative coefficient in the RUNUP ratio also suggest that 
bidder with good past stock performance tend to receive negative abnormal return. This 
is consistent with Rosen (2006). They find that bidder Runup is negatively related to 
both short run and long run abnormal returns for bidders.  The coefficient of relative 
size suggests that 1% increase in relative size will leads to 2.31 increase in CAR [-2,2].  
Furthermore, Conducting tender offer has significantly positive impact on bidder 
abnormal return in short run. Marking tender offer will increase the CAR CAR[-2,2] 
by over 3% on average. In addition, acquiring public target lead to a 2.69% loss in 
short-term abnormal return.   
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The combined effect of Divo and Sigma on Bidders’s abnormal return  
Table 4 regression results the combined effect of divergence opinion and idiosyncratic 
volatility (sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  Regression 1 estimates the 
impact of divergence opinion on Bidders cumulative abnormal return in 5 days 
surrounding announcement day. Regression 2 estimates the impact of idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) on Bidders short-term abnormal return. Regression 3 and 4 show the 
combined effect of divergence opinion and idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) on acquirer’s 
short-term abnormal return.  Both interaction variable DivoRun and SigmaRun are 
included.  Regression 3 and 4 also reveal the impact of means of payment by adding 
dummy variable STOCK and Cash respectively. All the CARs are estimated by 
market model.  
Insert Table 4.4 Here 
 
For the full sample, as shown in regression 1 and 2, idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) 
have significant impact on bidder short-term abnormal return. As discussed before, 
due to the influence of past performance, the effect of Divo is not pronounced. 
Regression 3 and 4 shows that the idiosyncratic volatility (Sigema) has stronger 
influence on bidder short term abnormal return than Divergence opinion.  
 
The results show that idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) is significantly positive in the 
regression 3 and 4. The results suggest that one unit increase in idiosyncratic volatility 
 218 
(sigema) will leads to an increase of 30.13% and 32.12% for CAR [-2,2] respectively.  
These results indicate that Bidders with high idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) will 
achieve higher abnormal return. In other words, the higher information asymmetry 
before deal announcement, the larger bidder short-term abnormal return will be. The 
significant coefficient of SigmaRun appears in regression 3 and 4 with a negative sign. 
The negative relation indicates that idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) have different 
impact on bidders merger again if we put bidders past performance into consideration. 
The results suggest that bidders with high information asymmetry and good past 
performance tend to conduct value destroying deal.  
There are number of factors that has significant impact on bidder short-term abnormal 
return. Our result suggests that acquiring large target also leads to increase in short-term 
abnormal return. The results suggest that 1% increase in relative transaction value will 
leads to 2.44% increase in CAR [-2,2]. Furthermore, Using stock payment will leads 
to 0.56%% decrease in CAR [-2,2], an 0.51% increases for cash payment. Tender 
offer increase the CAR[-2,2] by 3.11%. These results suggest that bidder tends to 
receive positive abnormal return in short run when its idiosyncratic volatility is high 
but good past performance will reverse the impact.    
,  
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The effect of divergence opinion on merger gain of poorly performed bidder 
As mention above, the regressions in table one do not full reveal the puzzle effect of 
divergence opinion on bidder’s short-term abnormal return since the disturbance of 
bidder’s past performance. Therefore, we split the bidder into poorly performed and 
good performed bidder.  Poorly performed bidder is marked with negative Runup and 
good performed bidders with positive Runup. Table 5 presents the regression results 
that reveal how analyst Divergence opinion (Divo) related to poorly performed 
bidder’s short-term abnormal return. 
Regression 1 estimates the impact of analyst Divergence opinion on Bidders 
cumulative abnormal return in 5 days surrounding announcement day. Then, adding 
interaction variable Divorun into Regression 2. Regression 3 and 4 estimate the 
impact of different means of payment. All the CARs are estimated by market model.  
 
Insert Table 4.5 Here 
The key independent variable in regression 1 is divergence opinion (Divo ) which is 
the standard deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal 
announcement. Regression 2 shows that, the coefficient of Divo is highly significant 
and it has a negative sign. It suggests Divo has negative impact on poorly performed 
bidder’s short-term abnormal return. One unit increase in divergence opinion (Divo) 
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leads to 17% decrease in bidder abnormal return, this results is robust after controlling 
bidders past performance and means of payment. This results support H1:  Analyst 
Divergence opinion negatively related to Bidder abnormal return in both short run.  
 
Results from regression 2 suggest a negative relation between DivoRun and Bidders 
CARs [-2,2]; the coefficient of DivoRun is significantly negative. One unit increase in 
DivoRun will decrease bidders CAR [-2,2] by 58.60%. The results imply that, for 
bidders with poor past performance, high divergence opinion will leads to value 
destroying deal. This is because, stock with high divergence opinion indicate that the 
stock price is setup by the most optimistic buyer in the market. The further raise in 
stock price is heavily replying on the higher maker expectation. However, the poor 
past performance indicate that the market expectation for the firm will decline. 
Furthermore, from investor recognition theory, firms with Low divergence opinion 
and poor past performance are more likely suffer from the problem of low investor 
recognition. The lack of investor recognition shrinks the number of potential buyers. 
Therefore, low recognition has negative impact on bidders stock return. Merger and 
acquisition can put the firm under spotlight, it all attracts new potential buyers and 
lower the capital cost. So that, deal conduct by bidder with low divergence opinion 
and poor past performance are more likely be value enhancing. This effect may not be 
available for bidders with high divergence opinion because they have already been 
very recognized.  
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For the control variables, Relative Size and tender offer are significantly positive. 
These results suggest that 1% increase in the relative size will leads to 1.68% increase 
in bidder short-term abnormal return. This is because acquiring large target gain more 
public exposure and attract more potential buyers. However, acquiring public target 
tend to be value destroying. Bidder short-term abnormal return will drop by 2.33% if 
the target is Public listed company. This is because public target have more option to 
deter threat of being takeover. More detail information will be disclosed that may ruin 
the investor recognition effect. This is why Low Divo bidder acquire more private 
target as stated in table 1.  
 
Results In table 5 suggest that the impact of divergence opinion on bidder return can 
be altered by bidders past performance. For bidders with poor past performance, the 
analyst divergence opinion (Divo) have significant negative impact on bidders 
abnormal return in short run. However, it is remain unknown for the impact of 
idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) on bidders with poor performance. . This encourages 
us to further examine the true impact of idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) on bidders with 
poor performance. The results are shown in table 6.  
 
Table 6 shows regression results that reveal the combined effect of Analyst Dispersion 
(Divo) and   Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on short-term abnormal return of 
poorly performed bidder.  
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Insert Table 4.6 Here 
Regression 1 estimates the impact of divergence opinion on Bidders cumulative 
abnormal return in 5 days surrounding announcement day. Regression 2 estimates the 
impact of idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) on Bidders short-term abnormal return. 
Regression 3 and 4 show the combined effect of divergence opinion and idiosyncratic 
volatility (sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  Both interaction 
variable DivoRun and SigmaRun are included.  Regression 3 and 4 also reveal the 
impact of means of payment by adding dummy variable STOCK and Cash 
respectively. All the CARs are estimated by market model.  
 
The results show that the coefficient of divergence opinion (Divo) and DivoRun are 
significantly negative in the regression 3 and 4. The results suggest that one unit 
increase in divergence opinion (Divo) will leads to an decrease of 15.94 % and 
54.45% % for CAR [-2,2] respectively. The coefficient of divergence opinion (Divo) 
and Sigma in regression 1 and 2 are insignificant. These results indicate that Bidders 
with high divergence opinion will receive low abnormal return. In other words, the 
higher analyst forecast dispersion before deal announcement, the lower bidder 
short-term abnormal return will be. The insignificant coefficient of Sigma and 
SigmaRun appears in all regression suggest that the impact of divergence opinion 
have stronger influence on the merger gain of poorly performed bidders than the 
idiosyncratic volatility (sigma).  The negative relation between divergence opinion 
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and bidders merger gains suggest that bidders with high divergence opinion and good 
past performance tend to conduct value destroying deal.  
For the control variables, significant coefficient appears on relative size, target public 
status, tender offer and diversification.  The results suggest that 1% increase in 
relative size will leads to 1.59% increase in CAR [-2,2]. Furthermore, Using stock 
payment will leads to 0.98% increase in CAR [-2,2], an 0.64% increases for cash 
payment. Tender offer increase the CAR [-2,2] by 3.40%. These results suggest that 
bidder tends to receive positive abnormal return in short run when the bidder has low 
divergence opinion and poor past performance.    
 
Table 7 shows regression results that reveal how idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) 
related to bidders’ short-term abnormal return.  
Insert Table 4.7 Here 
All bidders have well past performances that are marked with positive Runup ratio.  
Idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma), the key explanatory variable of regressions in table 7, 
is statistically significant with a positive sign in regression 3 and 4. The positive 
coefficient of Sigma indicates that one unit increase in idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) 
will increase CAR [-2,2] by over 27% and 30.34% respectively. This empirical 
evidence supports the hypothesis H2: Idiosyncratic volatility positively related to 
Bidder abnormal return in short run 
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For the bidders with good past performance, the higher Idiosyncratic volatility 
(sigema) is, the better short-term abnormal return they will receive. This because: As a 
measurement of the uncertainty of future growth (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
2006), idiosyncratic volatility shows the range of fluctuation of bidder’s stock 
return.   . The good past performance indicate that the stock return have high growth 
potential and the stock is currently on the growth track.  Furthermore, Idiosyncratic 
volatility is a measurement of Asymmetry information between management and 
investors. High level of information asymmetry before the deal announcement has 
positive impact on bidders merger again in the short run. This is because bidders with 
high information asymmetry pay lower premium (Dionne, La Haye and Bergeres 
2014). Deal announcement will disclosure more information to the market. The 
signaling effect will change bidders abnormal return accordingly. Regression 4 shows 
that cash payment will increase bidder abnormal return by 0.5%. Using cash instead 
of stock will signal the market that the bidders are undervalued. Miller (1977) 
suggests that stronger investor recognition effect appears on bidder with high 
idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, Therefore, deal conducted by bidder with high 
idiosyncratic volatility and good past performance are value enhancing. 
 
The coefficients of SigmaRun, the interaction variable between idiosyncratic volatility 
and Runup, are highly significant in regression 2, 3, and 4. One unit increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) will decrease CAR [-2,2] by 48.89%. The negative sign 
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suggest that bidders with high idiosyncratic volatility (sigema) and good past 
performance conduct value destroying deal. This is because; an over average high past 
performance put the market expectation into the highest position, high idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) indicates high price fluctuation range and high information 
asymmetry. Therefore, they are more sensitive to negative information.  More 
information will be disclosed before deal announcement. Therefore, an over high past 
performance and high idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) signal the market that bidder 
stock price have reach its peak and begin declining.  
 
For the control variables, Negative coefficient in the RUNUP ratio also suggest that 
bidder with good past stock performance tend to receive negative abnormal return. This 
is consistent with Rosen (2006). They find that bidder Runup is negatively related to 
both short run and long run abnormal returns for bidders.  The coefficient of relative 
size suggests that 1% increase in relative size will leads to 1.68% increase in CAR 
[-2,2].  Furthermore, Conducting tender offer has significantly positive impact on 
bidder abnormal return in short run. Marking tender offer will increase the CAR 
CAR[-2,2] by over 3.5 % on average. In addition, acquiring public target lead to over 
2% loss in short-term abnormal return.   
 
 226 
Table 8 shows regression results that reveal the combined effect of Analyst Dispersion 
(Divo) and   Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on short-term abnormal return of 
well-performed bidder. All bidders have positive Runup Ratio.  
Insert Table 4.8 Here 
Regression 1 estimates the impact of divergence opinion (Divo) on Bidders 
cumulative abnormal return in 5 days surrounding announcement day. Regression 2 
estimates the impact of idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) on Bidders short-term 
abnormal return. Regression 3 and 4 show the combined effect of divergence opinion 
and idiosyncratic volatility (sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  Both 
interaction variable DivoRun and SigmaRun are included.  Regression 3 and 4 also 
reveal the impact of means of payment by adding dummy variable STOCK and 
CASH respectively. All the CARs are estimated by market model.  
The results show that the coefficient of divergence opinion (Divo) is significantly 
negative in the regression 1. The results suggest that one unit increase in divergence 
opinion (Divo) will leads to an decrease of 5.94% for the short-term abnormal return 
of well performed bidders. This results support H1 Divergence opinion have 
negatively related to bidder short-term abnormal return. 
The coefficient of divergence opinion (Divo) regression 3 and 4 are insignificant. The 
significant coefficient appears in Sigma and SigmaRun. These results indicate that, for 
bidders with positive past performance, impact of idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) is 
stronger than the impact of divergence opinion (Divo). Bidders with high 
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idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) will receive high abnormal return. In other words, the 
higher information asymmetry before deal announcement, the higher bidder 
short-term abnormal return will be.  
For the control variables, significant coefficient appears on relative size, target public 
status, tender offer and diversification.  The results suggest that 1% increase in 
relative size will leads to 2.84% increase in CAR [-2,2]. Furthermore, Using cash 
payment will leads to 0.49% increase in CAR [-2,2], Tender offer increase the CAR 
[-2,2] by 2.8%. These results suggest that bidder with positive past performance tends 
to receive positive abnormal return in short run when the bidder has low divergence 
opinion or have high divergence opinion (Divo).   
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Divergence opinion, idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) and Bidders’ long-term 
abnormal return  
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the OLS regression among Divergence 
opinion, idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) and Bidders’ long-term abnormal return. 
Regression 1 estimates the impact of divergence opinion on Bidders Buy and Hold 
Ratio. Regression 2 estimates the impact of idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) on 
Bidders long-term abnormal return. Regression 3 and 4 show the combined effect of 
divergence opinion and idiosyncratic volatility (sigma) on acquirer’s long-term 
abnormal return.  Both interaction variable DivoRun and SigmaRun are included.  
Regression 3 and 4 also reveal the impact of means of payment by adding dummy 
variable STOCK and Cash respectively. All the BHARs are market adjusted BHARs 
Insert Table 4.9 Here 
 
In the long run, Bidders’ divergence opinion has no impact on bidders long-term 
abnormal return, insignificant coefficient is found in all regression. This is because, 
the divergence opinion are estimated by Analyst earning forecast dispersion (Divo), 
which is the standard deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 365 days to 28 days 
before deal announcement. Scharfstein and Stein (1990)’s career concern theory states 
that Security analyst’s reputation is base up the forecast accuracy and length of 
forecasting record. Security analysts’ compensation and career rely on how influential 
and accurate their recommendation and earning forecast will be. For the long career 
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concern, security analyst should update their earning forecast on time. However, we 
estimate bidder long-term abnormal return by the Buy and hold ratio two year after 
the deal announcement. Therefore, the Divergence opinion one-year proceeding deal 
announcement has no impact on bidder abnormal return in the long run.  
Furthermore, Weeber et al. (2002) point out that financial analyst face more challenge 
in issuing accurate earning forecast for firms involved in merger and acquisition. This 
is because, firstly, Merger and acquisition deal alter firm’s fundamental characteristics, 
such as size, financial health, capital structure, Profitability and growth rate. More 
importantly, merger and acquisition substantially change the structure of bidder/Target 
earning time series. Kinney (1971) believe these fundamental changes increase 
analyst earning forecast error. Haw et al. (1994) found significant increase in analysts' 
absolute earnings forecast errors in the year after deal completion. Secondly, changes 
in information environment affect the quality of earning forecast. Although there are 
more information available for bidder and target before merger and acquisition, 
analysis has lack information regard to the new firm created by the merger deal. 
Consequently, the Divergence opinion one-year proceeding deal announcement has no 
impact on bidder abnormal return in the long run. 
 
The results also show that Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) have significant negative 
impact on bidders abnormal return in the long run. One unit increase in Idiosyncratic 
Volatility (Sigma) will lead 43.03% drop to the bidder long-term abnormal return. The 
results indicate that Bidders with high Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) make lose in 
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the long run. This is because, high Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) measure the level 
of information asymmetry and the uncertainty of future growth. High information 
asymmetry before deal announcement has positive effect on bidders return in 
short-run as the events will attract more optimistic investor or risk loving investors. 
After the deal completion, more information will be released. The level of information 
asymmetry will drop. The stock price will back to its fundamental level. Therefore, 
the higher information asymmetry the bidder has before deal announcement, the lower 
long-term abnormal return will be.  Therefore, the deals conducted by bidders with 
high Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) are tending to be value destroying.  
 
For the control variable, RUNUP ratio, Market to book ratio and Market Heat degree 
has negative impact on bidder abnormal returns in the long run. One unit increase in 
RUNUP ratio will reduce BHAR [0,24] by 12.78%. One unit increase in M/B ratio 
will reduce BHAR [0,24] by 0.43%. One unit increase in Market Heat degree will 
reduce BHAR [0,24] by 23.03%. This result indicates that bidders with good pre 
merger stock performance will suffer from negative abnormal return in the long run. 
This is consistent with Rosen (2006), bidder can take the advantage of stock 
overvaluation in the short run, but the price will eventually back to its fundamental 
value in the long run.  
 
Overall, Results In table 9 suggest that Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) is a 
determinant of bidders abnormal return in long run. Bidders with high Idiosyncratic 
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Volatility (Sigma) tend to receive negative abnormal return in the long run. Using 
Stocks as means of payment has negative impact on long term abnormal return though 
it is insignificant in our sample. Using Cash payment will raise bidder’s long-term 
abnormal return. This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis H1b: Idiosyncratic 
Volatility (Sigma) negatively related to bidders long-term abnormal return.  
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4.5.3 Robustness Test 
The main finding of this paper is that divergence opinion negatively related to the 
short-term abnormal return of poorly performed bidders. Bidders with low divergence 
opinion and poor past performance tend to conduct value-enhancing deals. Because, 
the merger and acquisition deal conducted by bidders with low divergence opinion and 
poor past performance will trigger the strongest investor recognition effect. The 
announcement return will increase, as the deal, as an exogenous event, will attract more 
potential buyers.  
Secondly, the idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to bidder’s abnormal return in 
both short and long run. The results suggest that high idiosyncratic volatility have 
positive impact on bidder’s abnormal return. This is because, high idiosyncratic 
volatility indicate bidders’ high growth potential and the high level of information 
asymmetry before deal announcement.  
Finally, bidder’s past performance substantially changes the impact of divergence 
opinion and idiosyncratic volatility on merger gain. The short-term abnormal return of 
bidder with poor past performance, signified by negative Runup ratio, have 
significantly negatively related to the analyst divergence opinion. The idiosyncratic 
volatility have no impact on the merger gain of bidders with poor past performance. 
However, for the bidders with good past performance, signified by positive Runup 
ratio, a strong positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and short term 
abnormal return has been found. The analyst divergence opinion have no impact on 
the merger gain of bidders with good past performance. 
To test the robustness of our results, we use different event window to define analyst 
divergence opinion, such as 730 days to 90 days before deal announcement; 180 days to 
28 days to deal announcement, the results are robust. We also we test the robustness by 
changing the estimation time period of idiosyncratic volatility and using dummy 
variable to distinguish High and Low Divo or Sigma Bidders   The results remain 
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unchanged which shows Low Divo bidders outperforms high Divo bidders in short run 
if the bidder have poor past performance; High Sigma bidders outperform Low Sigma 
bidder if the bidder have good past performance.  
 
 
In addition, to examine the influence of outliers, we winsorise the data by 3% and 5% 
separately. The results are slightly changed when we use different even windows. 
However, it is robust for different estimation methods. To overcome the problem of 
Endogeneity, we initially perform a Hausman test and the results suggest IV (2SLS) 
regression.  
Insert Table 4.10 Here 
 
We use the reference point 52 week high and the number of days 52-week high 
preceding deal announcement day as instrument variables to rerun the test.  The results 
are robust.  
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4.6. Conclusion 
By using one of the most comprehensive samples, which covers US M&A deals 
conducted from 1990 to 2013 and makes use of detailed analyst earning forecast and 
bidder stock return, this paper sheds new light on how divergence opinion and 
information asymmetry affect acquisition performance in both the long and short run.  
 
Following previous literature (Alexandridis et al., 2007, Boehme et al., 2009, 
Dierkens, 1991, Moeller et al., 2007), we use the analyst forecast dispersion (DIVO) 
to measure divergence opinion; Idiosyncratic volatility measure information 
asymmetry. In order to study how bidder past performance can change the impact of 
divergence opinion and information asymmetry on acquisition performance; we sort 
our sample on the basis of differences in bidder past performance. Bidders with positive 
Runup ratio are categorised as well-performed bidder. Bidders with negative Runup 
ratio are categorised as poorly performed bidders 
 
We find that a low divergence opinion bidder outperforms a high divergence opinion 
bidder in both the long and short run. Analyst forecast dispersion is significantly 
negatively related to bidder cumulative abnormal return five days surrounding the 
announcement day. A one-unit increase in the Divo value leads to a 16.94% decrease 
in CAR[-2,2]. However, this effect is weaken in bidders with good past performance, 
which is 5.94% decrease in CAR[-2,2].  This result suggests that bidders past 
performance substantially alter the impact of divergence opinion on bidders 
short-term abnormal return. The result implies that Low Divo bidder are undervalued, 
merger and acquisition deal, as an exogenous event, attract more potential buyers and 
lower the capital cost.  This is supported by the empirical results regarding investor 
recognition theory.  
 
We also found that a high idiosyncratic volatility bidder will achieve a higher 
abnormal return in the short run. Bidder’s idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma value) is 
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positively related to bidder short-term abnormal return. A high idiosyncratic volatility 
bidder will receive a 30.34% higher short-term abnormal return (CAR[-2,2]) than an 
low idiosyncratic volatility bidder. This is because high idiosyncratic volatility 
indicates high level of information asymmetry between management and investor. 
High pre deal idiosyncratic volatility shows that bidder’s overvalued by the market. It 
can help bidder achieve high short-term merger gain but it will sacrifice the long-term 
return. A one-unit increase in idiosyncratic volatility leads to a 43.03% decrease in 
bidders long-term abnormal return BHAR [0,24]. 
 
Overall, Different from well-performed bidders, analyst divergence opinion has 
negative impact on the short-term abnormal return of poorly performed bidders. A 
positive relation has been found between pre-merger information asymmetry and 
short-term abnormal return of well-performed bidder.   
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Appendix  
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Bidder Abnormal Return  
This table presents summary statistics for the samples of acquisitions conducted by US public bidders 
from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013. The full sample is divided into 3 subsamples by the 
level of divergence opinion about bidders one year proceeding deal announcement. Low Divo is the 
bidder with low divergence opinion who’s the divergence opinion is in the first one third of Divo. 
Neutral is the middle third of Divo. High Divo is the final third and represent the bidder with highest 
divergence opinion. Panel A reports bidder short-term and long term abnormal returns. Bidders 
short-term abnormal return is measured by Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Both Market adjusted 
model and Market Model is used in CAR estimation. We estimate the CAR for 3, 5 and 11 days 
surrounding announcement day, CAR [-1,1], CAR [-2, 2] CAR [-5,5] respectively. Bidders Long-term 
abnormal return that is captured by The post-merger 12-month, 24-month, 36-month Buy and hold 
ratio, BHAR [0,12], BHAR [0,24], BHAR [0,36] respectively. Both Size Adjusted BHAR and Market 
Adjusted BHAR are estimated.  Panel B presents summary statistics of bidder Firm Characteristics. 
Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) is defined as the standard deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 
365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. The idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) as a measure of 
information asymmetries is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model regression 
calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event window. Leverage ratio, defined 
as total liability divided by total asset. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, 
-28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of 
bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total 
common equity; P/E, the price to earnings ratio measures the net income per share, is defined as annual 
price close divided by earnings per share; ROE, the return on equity ratio measures the bidder’s 
profitability, is defined as net income divided by common and preferred equity; Debt/Total Equity, the 
debt over asset ratio measures to what extent the company is leveraged, is defined as long term debt 
divided by total asset: Cash flow/Equity, the Cash flow over equity ratio measures the amount of free 
cash holding by the company, is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary item and 
depreciation minus dividends of common and preferred stock then divided by total asset; Analysts is 
the number of analyst who has cover the bidder for at least 1 years before deal announcement.  Panel 
C report deal characteristics, Market Heat is measured as the quarterly moving average of deals 
conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2013. Relative Size 
denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market 
value; Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target 
oriented in different industry. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer.  Stock denotes that 100% 
stock; and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash payment. Public Private and Subsidiary measures target 
public status. 
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Full Sample Low Divo Neutral High Divo Low-High Pro 
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  Panel A     
Market Adjusted        
CAR [-1,1] 0.0110  0.0142  0.0114  0.0073  0.0069  0.0006  
CAR [-2,2]] 0.0131  0.0176  0.0129  0.0089  0.0086  0.0002  
CAR [-5,5] 0.0153  0.0214  0.0146  0.0099  0.0115  0.0001  
Market Model       
CAR [-1,1] 0.0084 0.0107 0.0095 0.0052 0.0055 0.0060 
CAR [-2,2]] 0.0091 0.0117 0.0096 0.0058 0.0058 0.0124 
CAR [-5,5] 0.0059 0.0086 0.0075 0.0017 0.0069 0.0241 
Size Adjusted        
BHAR [0,12] -0.0637 -0.0305 -0.0914 -0.0691 0.0386 0.0089 
BHAR [0,24] -0.1374 -0.1001 -0.1641 -0.1480 0.0479 0.0185 
BHAR [0,36] -0.1651 -0.1203 -0.2007 -0.1742 0.0540 0.0368 
Market Adjusted       
BHAR [0,12] -0.0402 -0.0089 -0.0695 -0.0422 0.0333 0.0270 
BHAR [0,24] -0.0873 -0.0562 -0.1221 -0.0836 0.0274 0.1852 
BHAR [0,36] -0.0923 -0.0570 -0.1345 -0.0856 0.0286 0.2714 
Panel B       
Divo 2.2704 0.1017 0.5362 6.1735 -6.0718 0.0000 
Sigma 0.0296 0.0333 0.0269 0.0286 0.0048 0.0000 
Leverage 0.2636 0.2214 0.2903 0.2792 -0.0578 0.0000 
RUNUP 0.1910 0.2677 0.1378 0.1676 0.1000 0.0000 
M/B  4.8040 5.1606 3.8705 5.3810 -0.2205 0.2653 
P/E 24.9346 25.6882 23.5619 25.5537 0.1345 0.9589 
ROE 0.0170 0.0112 0.0265 0.0132 -0.0020 0.4940 
Debt/Total Equity  0.2138 0.1812 0.2502 0.2100 -0.0288 0.0064 
Cash flow/Equity 0.0485 0.0422 0.0593 0.0439 -0.0017 0.5396 
Analysts 16.7104 9.8281 15.6150 24.6877 -14.8596 0.0000 
Panel C        
Market Heat  1.4270 1.4331 1.3431 1.5047 -0.0715 0.0000 
Relative Size  0.1536 0.1615 0.1648 0.1344 0.0271 0.0001 
Tender 0.0723 0.0451 0.0811 0.0907 -0.0455 0.0000 
Diversification  0.3676 0.3393 0.3630 0.4005 -0.0612 0.0000 
STOCK 0.2003 0.2108 0.1546 0.2357 -0.0249 0.0309 
CASH 0.4529 0.4059 0.4962 0.4568 -0.0509 0.0002 
Public 0.2288 0.1511 0.2364 0.2988 -0.1477 0.0000 
Private 0.4974 0.5819 0.4847 0.4258 0.1561 0.0000 
Subsidiary 0.2738 0.2670 0.2789 0.2754 -0.0084 0.4938 
Obs 7842 2614 2614 2614   
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Table 4.2 OLS Regression of analyst divergence opinion and acquirer’s short-term abnormal return 
This table shows regression results that reveal how Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) related to 
acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  The sample includes acquisitions conducted by US public 
bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013. Independent variable, Analyst divergence 
opinion (Divo) is the standard deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before 
deal announcement. DivoRun is the interaction variable measured by Divo multiply Runup ratio. 
Dependent variable, Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 5 days surrounding announcement day CAR [-2,2]. Stock denotes that 
100% stock; and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the 
market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close 
multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; leverage ratio is defined as total 
liability divided by total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the 
proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Public denote target public status. Market Heat is 
measured as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of 
deals conducted from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification 
indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] 
Divo -0.0296 0.0018 0.0041 0.0035 
 
(0.323) (0.958) (0.906) (0.921) 
DivoRun 
 
-0.0901* -0.0906* -0.0913* 
  
(0.071) (0.070) (0.068) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0045 
 
   
(0.131) 
 CASH 
   
0.0036* 
    
(0.063) 
RUNUP -0.0168*** -0.0143*** -0.0139*** -0.0138*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.751) (0.630) (0.503) (0.590) 
Leverage 0.0020 0.0020 0.0015 0.0016 
 
(0.629) (0.620) (0.708) (0.695) 
Relative Size 0.0244*** 0.0246*** 0.0245*** 0.0259*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public -0.0279*** -0.0279*** -0.0271*** -0.0277*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Heat Degree -0.0056 -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0055 
 
(0.363) (0.379) (0.367) (0.371) 
Tender 0.0318*** 0.0318*** 0.0306*** 0.0305*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0029 
 
(0.130) (0.127) (0.134) (0.120) 
Constant 0.0186** 0.0175** 0.0178** 0.0153** 
 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.047) 
N 7842 7842 7842 7842 
R-sq 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.3 OLS Regression of idiosyncratic volatility and acquirer’s short-term abnormal return 
This table shows regression results that reveal how idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) related to 
acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  The sample includes acquisitions conducted by US public 
bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013. Independent variable, The idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) as a measure of information asymmetries is the standard deviation of the residuals 
from a market model regression calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event 
window. SigmaRun is the interaction variable measured by Sigma multiply Runup ratio. Dependent 
variable, Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 5 days surrounding announcement day CAR [-2,2].  Stock denotes that 100% 
stock; and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is measured 
as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to 
book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply 
common share outstanding divided by total common equity; leverage ratio is defined as total liability 
divided by total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the 
proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Public denote target public status. Market Heat is 
measured as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of 
deals conducted from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification 
indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] 
Sigma 0.1752* 0.2811*** 0.3057*** 0.3248*** 
 
(0.087) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
SigmaRun 
 
-0.4154*** -0.4213*** -0.4286*** 
  
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0058* 
 
   
(0.055) 
 CASH 
   
0.0052*** 
    
(0.009) 
RUNUP -0.0176*** 0.0005 0.0010 0.0014 
 
(0.000) (0.936) (0.869) (0.816) 
M/B 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.849) (0.572) (0.413) (0.514) 
Leverage 0.0032 0.0034 0.0029 0.0031 
 
(0.434) (0.403) (0.472) (0.450) 
Relative Size 0.0231*** 0.0231*** 0.0228*** 0.0247*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public -0.0269*** -0.0269*** -0.0258*** -0.0264*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Heat Degree -0.0051 -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0049 
 
(0.406) (0.418) (0.412) (0.423) 
Tender 0.0320*** 0.0326*** 0.0311*** 0.0307*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0025 
 
(0.181) (0.194) (0.216) (0.194) 
Constant 0.0127 0.0085 0.0081 0.0040 
 
(0.108) (0.282) (0.304) (0.623) 
N 7842 7842 7842 7842 
R-sq 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.041 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.4 OLS regression of the combined effect of Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) and 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return 
This table shows regression results that reveal the combined effect of Analyst divergence opinion 
(Divo) and Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  The sample 
includes acquisitions conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013. 
Independent variable, Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) is the standard deviation of analyst forecast 
for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. DivoRun is the interaction variable 
measured by Divo multiply Runup ratio. The idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) as a measure of 
information asymmetries is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model regression 
calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event window.  SigmaRun is the 
interaction variable measured by Sigma multiply Runup ratio. Dependent variable, Acquirer short-term 
abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Return 5 days 
surrounding announcement day CAR [-2,2]. Stock denotes that 100% stock; and Cash pay the deal for 
100% cash payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the 
[-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of 
bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total 
common equity; leverage ratio is defined as total liability divided by total asset. Relative Size denotes 
the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; 
Public denote target public status. Market Heat is measured as the quarterly moving average of deals 
conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer 
denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different 
industry.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] 
Divo -0.0296 
 
-0.0107 -0.0120 
 
(0.323) 
 
(0.756) (0.728) 
Sigma 
 
0.1752* 0.3013*** 0.3212*** 
  
(0.087) (0.005) (0.003) 
DivoRun 
  
-0.0674 -0.0678 
   
(0.173) (0.171) 
SigmaRun 
  
-0.3990*** -0.4064*** 
   
(0.008) (0.007) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0056* 
 
   
(0.062) 
 CASH 
   
0.0051*** 
    
(0.009) 
RUNUP -0.0168*** -0.0176*** 0.0019 0.0023 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.760) (0.706) 
M/B 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.751) (0.849) (0.318) (0.395) 
Leverage 0.0020 0.0032 0.0029 0.0031 
 
(0.629) (0.434) (0.472) (0.450) 
Relative Size 0.0244*** 0.0231*** 0.0228*** 0.0247*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public -0.0279*** -0.0269*** -0.0258*** -0.0264*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Heat Degree -0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0046 -0.0045 
 
(0.363) (0.406) (0.450) (0.462) 
Tender 0.0318*** 0.0320*** 0.0311*** 0.0307*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0024 
 
(0.130) (0.181) (0.220) (0.198) 
Constant 0.0186** 0.0127 0.0080 0.0039 
 
(0.014) (0.108) (0.313) (0.636) 
N 7842 7842 7842 7842 
R-sq 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.042 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.5 The impact of divergence opinion (Divo) on bidders with negative pre merger performance 
This table shows regression results that reveal how Analyst forecast dispersion (Divo) related to 
acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  The sample includes acquisitions conducted by US public 
bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013. The bidders runup ratio is negative.  
Independent variable, Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) is the standard deviation of analyst forecast 
for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. DivoRun is the interaction variable 
measured by Divo multiply Runup ratio. Dependent variable, Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, 
which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Return 5 days surrounding 
announcement day CAR [-2,2]. Stock denotes that 100% stock; and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash 
payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] 
window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s 
stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common 
equity; leverage ratio is defined as total liability divided by total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative 
size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Public denote 
target public status. Market Heat is measured as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over 
the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type 
is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] 
Divo 0.0279 -0.1694** -0.1700** -0.1702** 
 
(0.632) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
DivoRun 
 
-0.5860** -0.5949** -0.5911** 
  
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0088* 
 
   
(0.097) 
 CASH 
   
0.0055* 
    
(0.091) 
RUNUP -0.0481*** -0.0334*** -0.0335*** -0.0341*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
M/B -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.474) (0.692) (0.834) (0.750) 
Leverage -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0040 -0.0040 
 
(0.654) (0.592) (0.550) (0.553) 
Relative Size 0.0168** 0.0168** 0.0167** 0.0184** 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.025) 
Public -0.0233*** -0.0230*** -0.0215*** -0.0227*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Heat Degree 0.0085 0.0095 0.0093 0.0090 
 
(0.408) (0.356) (0.362) (0.379) 
Tender 0.0363*** 0.0360*** 0.0339*** 0.0341*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0060* -0.0061* -0.0060* -0.0061* 
 
(0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.051) 
Constant 0.0013 0.0030 0.0034 -0.0005 
 
(0.922) (0.810) (0.786) (0.969) 
N 2782 2782 2782 2782 
R-sq 0.049 0.053 0.054 0.054 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.6 The impact of the combined effect on bidder with negative pre merger performance 
This table shows regression results that reveal the combined effect of Analyst Dispersion (Divo) and   
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  The sample includes 
acquisitions conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013.  The 
bidders runup ratio is negative. Independent variable, Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) is the 
standard deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. 
DivoRun is the interaction variable measured by Divo multiply Runup ratio. The idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) as a measure of information asymmetries is the standard deviation of the residuals 
from a market model regression calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event 
window.  SigmaRun is the interaction variable measured by Sigma multiply Runup ratio. Dependent 
variable, Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 5 days surrounding announcement day CAR [-2,2]. Stock denotes that 100% stock; 
and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book 
ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common 
share outstanding divided by total common equity; leverage ratio is defined as total liability divided by 
total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal 
value over bidders market value; Public denote target public status. Market Heat is measured as the 
quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted 
from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder 
and target oriented in different industry.  
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(1) (2) (4) (5) 
 
CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] 
Divo 0.0279 
 
-0.1594* -0.1599* 
 
(0.632) 
 
(0.068) (0.067) 
Sigma 
 
0.1554 0.0186 0.0248 
  
(0.390) (0.938) (0.918) 
DivoRun 
  
-0.5445** -0.5409** 
   
(0.022) (0.024) 
SigmaRun 
  
-0.6133 -0.6078 
   
(0.283) (0.286) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0098* 
 
   
(0.067) 
 CASH 
   
0.0064* 
    
(0.055) 
RUNUP -0.0481*** -0.0452*** -0.0077 -0.0085 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.689) (0.660) 
M/B -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 
(0.474) (0.473) (0.786) (0.696) 
Leverage -0.0031 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0031 
 
(0.654) (0.742) (0.641) (0.646) 
Relative Size 0.0168** 0.0159* 0.0159* 0.0179** 
 
(0.038) (0.052) (0.052) (0.032) 
Public -0.0233*** -0.0227*** -0.0208*** -0.0222*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HeatDegree 0.0085 0.0094 0.0101 0.0098 
 
(0.408) (0.363) (0.327) (0.344) 
Tender 0.0363*** 0.0365*** 0.0340*** 0.0342*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0060* -0.0056* -0.0057* -0.0057* 
 
(0.056) (0.075) (0.072) (0.069) 
Constant 0.0013 -0.0026 0.0034 -0.0013 
 
(0.922) (0.848) (0.809) (0.929) 
N 2782 2782 2782 2782 
R-sq 0.049 0.049 0.056 0.056 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.7 The Impact of idiosyncratic volatility on bidders with positive pre merger performance 
This table shows regression results that reveal how idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) related to 
acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  The sample includes acquisitions conducted by US public 
bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013. Independent variable, The idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) as a measure of information asymmetries is the standard deviation of the residuals 
from a market model regression calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event 
window. SigmaRun is the interaction variable measured by Sigma multiply Runup ratio. Dependent 
variable, Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 5 days surrounding announcement day CAR [-2,2]. Stock denotes that 100% stock; 
and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book 
ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common 
share outstanding divided by total common equity; leverage ratio is defined as total liability divided by 
total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal 
value over bidders market value; Public denote target public status. Market Heat is measured as the 
quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted 
from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder 
and target oriented in different industry.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] 
Sigma -0.0113 0.2547 0.2741* 0.3034* 
 
(0.935) (0.125) (0.100) (0.070) 
SigmaRun 
 
-0.4840** -0.4889** -0.5046** 
  
(0.016) (0.015) (0.012) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0048 
 
   
(0.189) 
 CASH 
   
0.0050** 
    
(0.045) 
RUNUP -0.0112** 0.0096 0.0100 0.0108 
 
(0.028) (0.285) (0.268) (0.231) 
M/B 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.835) (0.575) (0.464) (0.528) 
Leverage 0.0054 0.0061 0.0056 0.0057 
 
(0.279) (0.219) (0.262) (0.252) 
Relative Size 0.0287*** 0.0282*** 0.0279*** 0.0299*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public -0.0296*** -0.0292*** -0.0283*** -0.0287*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Heat Degree -0.0152** -0.0154** -0.0156** -0.0153** 
 
(0.048) (0.044) (0.043) (0.047) 
Tender 0.0280*** 0.0285*** 0.0271*** 0.0266*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 
 
(0.671) (0.718) (0.749) (0.703) 
Constant 0.0232** 0.0136 0.0134 0.0090 
 
(0.015) (0.163) (0.170) (0.371) 
N 5060 5060 5060 5060 
R-sq 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.039 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.8 The impact of combined effect on acquirer with positive pre merger performance 
This table shows regression results that reveal the combined effect of Analyst Dispersion (Divo) and   
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on acquirer’s short-term abnormal return.  The sample includes 
acquisitions conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013.  The 
bidders runup ratio is negative. Independent variable, Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) is the 
standard deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. 
DivoRun is the interaction variable measured by Divo multiply Runup ratio. The idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) as a measure of information asymmetries is the standard deviation of the residuals 
from a market model regression calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event 
window.  SigmaRun is the interaction variable measured by Sigma multiply Runup ratio. Dependent 
variable, Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 5 days surrounding announcement day CAR [-2,2].  Stock denotes that 100% 
stock; and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is measured 
as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book 
ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common 
share outstanding divided by total common equity; leverage ratio is defined as total liability divided by 
total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal 
value over bidders market value; Public denote target public status. Market Heat is measured as the 
quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter frequency of deals conducted 
from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder 
and target oriented in different industry.  
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(1) (2) (4) (5) 
 
CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] CAR [-2,2] 
Divo -0.0594* 
 
-0.0559 -0.0566 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.254) (0.248) 
Sigma 
 
-0.0113 0.2838* 0.3135* 
  
(0.935) (0.088) (0.061) 
DivoRun 
  
-0.0035 -0.0038 
   
(0.953) (0.948) 
SigmaRun 
  
-0.4900** -0.5055** 
   
(0.015) (0.012) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0045 
 
   
(0.219) 
 CASH 
   
0.0049** 
    
(0.049) 
RUNUP -0.0113** -0.0112** 0.0100 0.0108 
 
(0.010) (0.028) (0.270) (0.233) 
M/B 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.728) (0.835) (0.397) (0.445) 
Leverage 0.0053 0.0054 0.0055 0.0056 
 
(0.290) (0.279) (0.267) (0.259) 
Relative Size 0.0284*** 0.0287*** 0.0276*** 0.0296*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public -0.0295*** -0.0296*** -0.0282*** -0.0286*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HeatDegree -0.0146* -0.0152** -0.0150* -0.0147* 
 
(0.059) (0.048) (0.051) (0.056) 
Tender 0.0279*** 0.0280*** 0.0272*** 0.0266*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0008 
 
(0.693) (0.671) (0.771) (0.727) 
Constant 0.0236** 0.0232** 0.0136 0.0094 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.163) (0.353) 
N 5060 5060 5060 5060 
R-sq 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.040 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.9 The combined effect of Analyst Dispersion (Divo) and Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on 
acquirer’s long-term abnormal return 
This table shows regression results that reveal the combined effect of Analyst Dispersion (Divo) and   
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Sigma) on acquirer’s long-term abnormal return.  The sample includes 
acquisitions conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 1990 to December 31st, 2013. 
Independent variable, Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) is the standard deviation of analyst forecast 
for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. DivoRun is the interaction variable 
measured by Divo multiply Runup ratio. The idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) as a measure of 
information asymmetries is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model regression 
calculated from 365 days to 28 days before the announcement event window.  SigmaRun is the 
interaction variable measured by Sigma multiply Runup ratio. Dependent variable, Acquirer long-term 
abnormal returns, which is measured by Market adjusted Buy and Hold ratio 24 month after 
announcement day BHAR [0,24]. Stock denotes that 100% stock; and Cash pay the deal for 100% cash 
payment. Control variables include; RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] 
window prior to announcement. M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s 
stock, is defined as annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common 
equity; leverage ratio is defined as total liability divided by total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative 
size of the deal, and is defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Public denote 
target public status. Market Heat is measured as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over 
the average quarter frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type 
is tender offer. Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (4) (5) 
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BHAR [0,24] BHAR [0,24] BHAR [0,24] BHAR [0,24] 
Divo 0.1008 
 
0.3387 0.3412 
 
(0.775) 
 
(0.382) (0.380) 
Sigma 
 
-0.4303*** -0.4110*** -0.3860*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DivoRun 
  
-0.4150 -0.4171 
   
(0.325) (0.322) 
SigmaRun 
  
-0.9481 -1.0249 
   
(0.411) (0.373) 
STOCK 
  
-0.0087 
 
   
(0.774) 
 CASH 
   
0.0340* 
    
(0.068) 
RUNUP -0.1278*** -0.1076*** -0.0534 -0.0481 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.279) (0.330) 
M/B -0.0046** -0.0043** -0.0040* -0.0039* 
 
(0.034) (0.042) (0.054) (0.062) 
Leverage 0.0896** 0.0603 0.0600 0.0585 
 
(0.048) (0.185) (0.188) (0.198) 
Relative Size -0.0186 0.0144 0.0157 0.0265 
 
(0.615) (0.700) (0.676) (0.486) 
Public 0.0290 0.0056 0.0067 0.0084 
 
(0.227) (0.815) (0.787) (0.725) 
HeatDegree -0.2303*** -0.2472*** -0.2479*** -0.2475*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender 0.0546* 0.0504 0.0500 0.0401 
 
(0.099) (0.129) (0.141) (0.229) 
Diversification -0.0089 -0.0171 -0.0172 -0.0174 
 
(0.689) (0.413) (0.402) (0.400) 
Constant 0.1494** 0.2853*** 0.2702*** 0.2411*** 
 
(0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
N 7842 7842 7842 7842 
R-sq 0.059 0.064 0.065 0.065 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.10 IV Regression of analyst divergence opinion and acquirer’s short-term abnormal return 
This table shows Two Stage Least Square Regression (IV Regression) results that reveal how Analyst 
divergence opinion controlling bidder past performance (DivoRun) is related to acquirer’s short-term 
abnormal return.  The sample includes acquisitions conducted by US public bidders from January 1st, 
1990 to December 31st, 2013. Independent variable, Analyst divergence opinion (Divo) is the standard 
deviation of analyst forecast for a bidder 365 days to 28 days before deal announcement. DivoRun is 
the interaction variable measured by Divo multiply Runup ratio. 52-weeks-High is the instrument 
variable. Dependent variable, Acquirer short-term abnormal returns, which is measured by Market 
adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Return 5 days surrounding announcement day CAR [-2,2]. Control 
variables include; RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. M/B, the market to book ratio measures market valuation of bidder’s stock, is defined as 
annual price close multiply common share outstanding divided by total common equity; leverage ratio is 
defined as total liability divided by total asset. Relative Size denotes the relative size of the deal, and is 
defined as the proportion of deal value over bidders market value; Public denote target public status. 
Market Heat is measured as the quarterly moving average of deals conducted over the average quarter 
frequency of deals conducted from 1990 to 2013. Tender offer denote the deal type is tender offer. 
Diversification indicates bidder and target oriented in different industry.  
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 First Stage  Second Stage 
DivoRun 
 
-0.098*** 
  
(0.018) 
   Runup 270.795*** 3.099*** 
 
(0.000) (0.008) 
   M/B 3.286*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.014) (0.018) 
   Leverage 0.816 0.324 
 
(0.964) (0.496) 
   Relative Size 24.834** 2.537*** 
 
(0.038) (0.000) 
 
  Public -13.971 -2.779*** 
 
(0.186) (0.000) 
   Market Heat Degree 48.086*** -0.165 
 
(0.006) (0.802) 
 
  Tender 2.345 3.073*** 
 
(0.792) (0.000) 
   Diversification -1.058 -0.282 
 
(0.885) (0.160) 
   52-Weeks-High 1.059*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
   Constant -104.838*** 0.877 
 (0.001) (0.284) 
N 7842 7842 
p-values in parentheses ="* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
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Diagram 4.10 Divergence opinion and pre merger performance 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 
5.1 Summary  
 
This thesis investigates how financial constraint and financial analysts affect US 
bidder M&A performance. Previous literature investigates how M&A abnormal return 
related to free cash flow, market valuation and analyst recommendation and earning 
forecast. This paper extends existing literature and provides new empirical evidence.  
Chapter 2 examines to what extent financial constraint and disparity can effect bidder 
merger performance; Chapter 3 investigates whether analyst recommendations affect 
merger and acquisition performance: Whether recommendation consensuses have the 
predicting power on bidders' announcement return, if so, which recommendation 
consensus has the strongest predicting power. Chapter 4 extensively analyzed the 
combined effect of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder 
abnormal return in both short run and long run, via controlling bidder pre-merger 
stock performance.  
 
The impact of financial constraint on merger and acquisition performance has 
extensively studied in the previous literature. Both The free cash flow hypothesis 
(Jensen, 1986) and Hubris Hypothesis (Roll, 1986) predict that bidders with high free 
cash flow more likely conducted value-destroying deal. Different from previous 
literature,  this thesis firstly uses more comprehensive methods to estimate the 
financial constraint, e.g., KZ Index, WW Index, and SA Index,   to reveal the impact 
of financial constraint on bidder M&A performance; 
Second, we put both bidder/target financial constraint and disparity into consideration. 
I find that a constrained bidder outperforms an unconstrained bidder in both the long 
and short run; target financial constraint is significantly negatively related to bidder 
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announcement return. The results suggest that acquiring a financially unconstrained 
target has a positive influence on bidders’ announcement return. Moreover, Our 
results also show that target has a substantially lower market-to-book value than 
bidders. This result indicates that all bidder tends to be overvalued by the market. The 
purpose of acquiring a financially unconstrained target is to transfer overvalued stock 
into a substantial asset. More importantly, the financial disparity is positively related to 
acquirer abnormal return in the short run but not in the long-term. This because: it is 
positive news for the market when a bidder acquires an unconstrained target as it 
indicates cash inflow to the bidder. The positive impact of acquiring a target with 
significant financial constraint disparity will soon vanish as the market will bring the 
price back to its fundamental value. Besides, the financial disparity (ATDKZ) is 
negatively related to bid premium. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the role of analyst recommendation in the context merger and 
acquisition performance. There is a lengthy discussion regard to the quality of analyst 
recommendation. Chapter 3 focus on whether recommendation consensus can predict 
bidders M&A performance, if so, which type of recommendation consensus are more 
accurate that the others. We find that recommendation Consensus positively related to 
bidders announcement return; acquirers with high recommendation Consensus before 
announcement day outperform acquirers with low recommendation consensus in the 
short run: analyst can successfully predict the incoming M&A deals and adjust their 
recommendations accordingly, the recommendation consensus estimated 90 days 
proceeding deal announcement have the strongest predicting power. It suggests that 
analyst do have the superior skill. Also, we examine the influence of implementation 
of Reg-FD. 
 
Divergence opinion theory (Miller, 1977) and information asymmetry hypothesis 
(Travlos, 1987, Myers and Majluf, 1984) are vitally important when we study the 
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influence of analyst on bidder merger and acquisition performance. By controlling 
bidder pre-merger performance, Chapter 4 estimate how the combination of the 
analyst divergence opinion and information asymmetry influences bidder abnormal 
return. The results suggest that a low divergence opinion bidder outperforms a high 
divergence opinion bidder in both the long and short run. This effect is much stronger 
in the sample of poorly performed bidders than well-performed bidder. For bidders 
with poor pre-merger performance, analyst divergence opinion has a negative impact 
on announcement return. For bidders with good pre merger performance, a positive 
relation has been found between information asymmetry and announcement return. 
These empirical results strongly support that bidder pre merger performance is an 
important conditioning variable that we should put into consideration in examining 
the impact of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on bidder merger and 
acquisition performance.  
 
Overall, this thesis provides new empirical evidence on how bidder M&A 
performance are related to financial constraint, financial constraint disparity, 
recommendation consensus, divergence opinion and information asymmetry. The 
results suggest that constrained bidder outperform unconstraint bidder, financial 
analyst do have superior skills, and pre merger performance is an impotent controlling 
variable when we study divergence opinion and information asymmetry in the context 
of M&A abnormal return. 
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5.2 Implications 
This thesis has many implications for both research and practice. First, this thesis 
provides new evidence to resolve the puzzling results in previous literature regard to 
financial constraint and bidder M&A performance. Existing literature concentrates on 
examines the impact of bidder financial constraint on bidder abnormal return. This 
thesis addresses this issue from a different aspect, target financial constraint, and 
financial disparity. This study reveals the fact that constraint bidder achieves high 
announcement return by acquiring unconstraint target. The financial disparity 
negatively related to the premium paid. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis directly examines predicting the power of recommendation 
consensus on acquisition performance; The results suggest that analyst do have 
superior skill, they can successfully predict the incoming M&A deals and adjust their 
recommendation accordingly. For the investor, the thesis suggests that 
recommendation consensus is more reliable than recommendation given by individual 
analyst, and trading with recommendation consensus is profitable, but one should 
choose the right estimation event window. For US M&A deals, the recommendation 
consensus estimated 90 days proceeding deal announcement have the strongest 
predicting power. 
This study further estimates the combined effect divergence opinion and information 
asymmetry on bidder performance, for the researcher, this thesis suggests that bidder 
pre-merger performance can substantially alter the results when we study the impact 
of divergence opinion and information asymmetry on M&A performance. For the 
investor, analyst divergence opinion is a reliable indicator for stock selection. 
However, it is equally important to put past performance into consideration. A bidder 
with a high divergence opinion are likely to conduct value-destroying deal, but it is 
misguiding if the bidder has positive pre-merger performance. The idiosyncratic 
volatility is a more appropriate indicator for such bidders.   
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5.3 Limitations and future research 
This thesis can improve in many aspects. First, chapter 2 observer that bidder with 
neutral financial constraint receives an above average abnormal return in both short run 
and long run. These results are results from other determent factors rather than financial 
constraint or financial disparity. Furthermore, chapter 3 do not distinguish analyst by 
their ranks, e.g., Star or Non-star analyst, in the estimation of recommendation 
consensus. There are mixed results regard to the analyst ranking quality; it is worth to 
investigate further the predicting power of recommendation consensus estimated form 
recommendation issued by a star or non-star analyst. Finally, studying analyst forecast 
error and its changes before and after the deal announcement could push our knowledge 
about the role of the analyst in M&A into a new level.    
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